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The dissertation consists of three essays. The rst one uses a simple
implicit contract model to explain why risk-neutral rms buy insurance
policies. By buying a policy, a rm gives a credible promise to repair
damages and continue production in case of an accident, possibly against
its own ex post motives. The higher expected employment can be traded
against a lower wage.
The theme of the second essay is wage distribution and its links to
childcare. Childcare requires similar kind of eort and care that employers
demand at work. In the essay, the model of Ramaswamy and Rowthorn
( 1991) is augmented with gender specic eort functions. It
is shown that women with higher domestic duties are allocated into the
rms with relatively low dependency of eort and low wages. The higher
the eort production cost for women is relative to that of men, the higher
the wage gap is. The availability of public childcare facilities, e.g. daycare
centres, might have an eect on wage gaps.
The third essay studies the Finnish wage arbitration system and com-
pares it with those used in North America. The rst argument defended in
the essay is that the Finnish system of wage arbitration can be interpreted
as a form of arbitration. This is not self-evident because there is a right-to-
strike. The second argument concerns the role of arbitration. I argue that if
there is some uncertainty about the award, the Finnish arbitration system
shares the good informational properties of strikes or lock-outs, but on the
other hand, the loss in the case of a bargaining impasse is also smaller than
in the case of arbitration.
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This dissertation consists of three theoretical essays. The rst one, Chapter
2, uses a simple implicit contract model to explain why risk-neutral rms
buy insurance policies. The theme of the second essay, Chapter 3, is wage
distribution and its links to dierent forms of childcare. The third essay,
Chapter 4, studies the Finnish wage arbitration system. The essays deals
with . The analyses are based
on the assumption of utility maximising behaviour. In this sense, the study
belongs to the new generation of theoretical labour economic studies.
Modern studies in labour economics, especially in Europe, analyse the
market structure of the labour market. The consequences of existence of
strong organisations are analysed. Also, informational asymmetries have
an increasingly important role in theoretical research. Although the new
generation of research has been mainly theoretically motivated, empirical
research in the eld has also changed its outlook.
Recent developments in labour economics can be interpreted in many
ways. I am inclined to think that labour economics is going back to its
roots in concrete and institutionally aware research. Moreover, it is again
admitted that that the history matters. However, it is now going back to
its roots equipped with better theoretical tools and a deeper understanding
of the nature of market relations and economic interdependence than what
has been available before.
The development in labour economics has been very similar to general
5
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developments in economics. A historically-oriented research pattern disap-
peared almost completely before the Second World War. In Finland, this
happened later. The historical school was replaced by neo-classical micro-
theory and Keynesian macro-economics, at least in academic research. This
neo-classical synthesis, as it is sometimes called, became dominant in the
whole Western world. The belief in this research agenda had its culmination
point in the economic crises of the 1970's. The oil crisis raised new issues
for research and academic economists became, perhaps, more divided; com-
petition between dierent macro-economic theories has been quite fervent
since then.
In the late 1970's and in the 1980's, a major theme in theoretical eco-
nomics was to nd "micro-foundations for macro-economics". Though the
major anomalies emerged in the eld of macro-economics, the consequences
in economic theory are well visible also in micro-economics. "The micro-
foundations" had to answer questions such as why are prices rigid, why do
wages not decline when there is unemployment, why do nancial markets
not stabilise the economy, etc. Attempts to answer these and other ques-
tions generated a completely new body of micro-economic research. The
availability of new theoretical tools, game theory and informational eco-
nomics had a parallel eect. As a consequence, the assumption of atomistic
agents was replaced by strategic interaction and the assumption of per-
fect information was replaced by the study of asymmetric information. At
the moment, the micro-foundations for macro-economics are so well estab-
lished that sometimes it is dicult to see any dierence between macro-
and micro-theory.
The attempt to nd a theoretically solid base for macro-economics has
also changed the status of labour economics. One of the few widely accepted
ideas among the economists' profession is that rigidity of wages or too high
a level of wages is somehow related to the chronic unemployment problem
of the Western hemisphere. In that sense labour economics is now in a
strategic position in the eld of economic research.
The main challenge for theoretical analysis has been the need to explain
why labour markets do not clear. There are four well-developed directions
of research, each of which hold some promise of contributing to the an-
swers. The rst is the so-called "implicit contract" theory. It builds on the
assumption that rms are able to insure the workers against uncertainty by
holding real wages relatively stable. The classical references are Azariadis
(1975), Baily (1974) and Gordon (1974). In the 1980's, implicit contract
theory lost, however, its status as an interesting (un)employment theory
when it was realised that the models did not predict unemployment but ei-
1.2. FIRST ESSAY: WHY DO RISK-NEUTRAL FIRMS PURCHASE INSURANCE POLICIES? 7
ther full or over-employment, depending on the informational assumptions.
However, it is still accepted that these models may be relevant for other
topics.
The second direction of research, which falls under the heading of "trade
union models", is based on the observation that trade unions, or employed
workers in general, have some bargaining power that leads to higher real
wages and lower employment than would be observed under perfect compe-
tition. References to classical studies can be found from reviews by Oswald
(1985) and Pencavel (1985), see also Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991).
The third strand in theoretical literature is labelled "eciency wages".
According to these theories, the quality of labour is assumed to be related
to the real wage. Yellen (1984) and Katz (1986) provide many relevant
references, see also Bulow and Summers (1986) for interesting applications.
The fourth deviation from the perfect competition assumption is to as-
sume that the labour market is characterised by "search" behaviour (see
Mortensen 1986 and Sargent 1987).
The analyses presented in this study seek not to challenge the status
of the major theory approaches in modern labour market studies. On the
contrary, the models presented here use the achievements of the established
theories to explain and analyse phenomena that are not well understood.
Specically, the analyses of this study use building blocks from implicit
contract studies, eciency wage theories and trade union models.
The rst essay analyses the question why do rms purchase insurance poli-
cies. In previous literature, this is explained by risk-aversion of the owners
and by various institutional ndings, including tax-related issues (Main
1983, Mayers and Smith 1982). Moreover, it has been argued that rms
oer insurance for their employees because they cannot buy insurance them-
selves. Explanations are relevant in many cases and valuable as such, but it
has been dicult to nd explanations that are consistent with conventional
micro-theory.
Chapter 2 aims to satisfy the demand for micro-economic explanations
for rm insurance policy demand by oering a theoretical model where
risk-neutral agents buy insurance policies. The explanation is based on the
notion that a policy is a kind of a nancial contract. By buying a policy,
1.2 First essay: Why do risk-neutral rms
purchase insurance policies?
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a rm gives a credible promise to repair damages and continue production
in case of an accident, possibly against its own motives. By an insurance
policy, negative prot, i.e. loss, can be avoided in some cases and hence
production is more likely to continue also after an accident. From the
workers' point of view, buying an insurance policy is a way of changing
incentives of the rm. This motive has been brought up before in economic
literature (e.g. see Mayers and Smith 1982), but the present analysis is the
rst attempt to model this analytically.
The purchase of an insurance policy is a way of committing to
do something that the rm does not want to do i.e. rebuild the
factory or repair the machinery after an accident and insurance can be used
as a commitment device (the classical reference is Kydland and Prescott,
1977).
In the analysis of Chapter 2, the rm and its employees are assumed
to be risk-neutral, but the workers are assumed to have some rm-specic
human capital and thus are dependent on the continuous operation of the
rm. The reason to assume risk-neutrality is simply a need to show as
clearly as possible that the role of the insurance policy is not to reallocate
risks but to alter incentives. The analysis of the chapter shows if the rm
can deviate from the production agreement in the case of a re or some
other major accident, i.e. if it can go bankrupt, it is willing to include an
insurance policy in the wage contract even if it is risk-neutral.
A simplied version of the implicit contract model of Rosen (1985) is
used as a starting point for the analysis. It is shown that if the rm is
able to cease production after an accident, the ecient contract cannot be
maintained. An insurance policy providing for the minimum capacity for
production after an accident improves the expected prot level, but it is
nevertheless possible that the minimum capacity for protable production
cannot be provided when productive capacity is too low after an accident,
i.e. when the damages are too large.
In the analysis, it is assumed that wages do not depend on the available
production capacity. However, one may imagine a situation where wages
can be adjusted in such a way that production is always protable. In
this case there would be no reason to buy an insurance policy as workers
provide for the required insurance to the rm. There are reasons for this
kind of behaviour not to be very common and for wages to be generally
quite rigid. However, the question of possibility of applying conditional
wages to overcome the problems which may arise when rms are able to
cease production raises an alternative interpretation for the rms' insurance
policies. The insurance policies can be useful in reducing the utility loss
ex ante
ex post,
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caused by non-exible wages.
The use of price options as well as foreign exchange futures and forward
contracts have become more popular recently. The thoughts presented in
this chapter are, perhaps, useful in understanding why rms, that should
be risk-neutral as the owners can insure their incomes via portfolio diversi-
cation, proceed in this direction. Though the share-holders of rms may
be risk-averse, other stake-holders may not be.
The aim of Chapter 3 is to oer a theoretical explanation for gender wage
dierentials and labour market stratication. The model developed is also
used for policy analysis. The analysis of the chapter starts with the obser-
vation that women are more likely than men to be responsible for childcare.
Childcare requires similar kind of eort and care that employers demand
at work. Hence, commitment to work according to the employers' rules is
more demanding for female than for male employees. However, this di-
culty is not constant over time or across societies. It depends, ,
on the availability, the quality, and the costs of childcare facilities.
The basic nature of childcare implies that it is quite dicult to combine
with professions characterised by high eort requirements. Professions not
requiring total concentration or commitment are more easily combinable
with heavy childcare loads.
It is reasonable to assume that workers demand better hourly compen-
sation if they are asked to work harder or more eciently. Because domestic
duties vary, compensation demands of workers in dierent occupations also
vary. As a consequence, we may expect that individuals with strong family
commitments are allocated to jobs where eort is less important. Moreover,
if pay is positively related to eort, then these people are also paid less.
The main building block of the model used in the analysis is adopted
from studies by Ramaswamy and Rowthorn (1991,1993). The authors gen-
eralised a basic eciency wage model to take into account that the impor-
tance of eort varies between rms. Their model is capable of producing
a wage distribution; rms valuing eort highly pay high wages and rms
with time-intensive production technology maximise their prots by paying
lower wages.
In Section 3.2 of this study, the Ramaswamy-Rowthorn model is aug-
inter alia
1.3 Second essay: Childcare and wage dis-
tribution
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mented with gender specic eort functions. In Section 3.3, it is assumed
that there is a continuum of rms and that the rms dier from each other
according to how important eort, i.e. exible and careful work, is for pro-
duction. It is shown that women with higher domestic duties are allocated
into the rms with relatively low dependency of eort. They are also paid
less than male employees. This is the main argument of the chapter.
The second main conclusion of the chapter concerns the gender utility
dierence, i.e. the gender gap. The higher the eort production cost for
women is relative to that of men, the higher the gap is.
Many services are not available at the market; in Chapter 3 it is argued
that childcare is such a service. The family has an absolute advantage in
childcare, but social customs and public services available dene how costly
it is in terms of eort losses at the labour market. A heavy childcare load
makes it dicult to work exibly and carefully in a paid job. Historically,
women have had the main load of childcare. This is partly because of bio-
logical reasons and partly because of social practices. Hence, the availability
of public childcare facilities, e.g. daycare centres, might have an eect on
wage gaps. This is the third main conclusion of the chapter.
The third essay deals with the Finnish wage arbitration system. As far as
I know, it is the rst study on the topic with roots in economic theory.
Arbitration is widely used in North America, especially in public sec-
tor wage disputes, and there is ample economic research on how arbitra-
tion works and how it should be interpreted. Hence, it is natural to start
the analysis with an review of the studies about North American arbitra-
tion experiences. Studies by Ashenfelter (1987), Ashenfelter and Currie
(1990), Bloom and Cavanagh (1987), Chelius and Dworking (1980), Craw-
ford (1979, 1981), Currie and McConnell (1991), Farber (1980), Farber and
Bazerman (1986, 1987 and 1989), Farber, Neale and Bazerman (1990) are,
perhaps, the most essential sources of institutional information and theo-
retical concepts.
The rst argument defended in the chapter is that the Finnish system
of wage arbitration can be interpreted as a form of arbitration. This is not
self-evident because the Finnish system deviates from those in use in the
United States and Canada and the rules of the Finnish system are quite
1.4 Third essay: Finnish wage arbitration -
theoretical comments
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vague. However, Finnish labour law requires that all strikes and lock-outs
should be announced to the State Arbitrator before the work stoppage is
due. Moreover, participation in the arbitration is obligatory. Rules are well-
honoured and it can be argued that the whole system is implicitly designed,
or at least accepted, by the labour market parties. In the essay, it is shown
that if the award by the arbitrator is known beforehand and if it is preferred
by both parties to the option of disputing, the arbitrator can eectively set
the wage.
The second main argument of the chapter concerns the role of arbi-
tration. It is inspired by a review article by Kennan and Wilson (1993),
which is very critical of arbitration, as the authors emphasise the positive,
information revealing role of work stoppages. The argument is very stim-
ulating as it diverges from the mainstream thinking of arbitration studies.
In Section 4.7, I argue that if there is some uncertainty about the award,
the Finnish arbitration system shares the good properties of strikes or lock-
outs. Uncertain outcomes of arbitration are not as eective an incentive
to reach an agreement as work stoppages are, but on the other hand, the
loss in the case of a bargaining impasse is also smaller than in the case of
arbitration.
Although the functioning and the role of the Finnish arbitration system
can be interpreted and understood in terms of abstract game theory, its
structure and exact operation are quite unclear. There are several dierent
phases in the arbitration and the timing of events varies from one year to
another. Arbitration is in many senses based on traditions and implicit
rules, as written procedural rules are scarce. Hence, theoretical arguments
presented in this study must be based on the stylised facts of negotiation
experiences and on strong simplifying assumptions. For example, The State
Arbitrator has very little direct power in enforcing the bargaining code.
Even the main aspect of the rules, namely the obligation to participate
in arbitration, is very dicult to enforce as the parties may simply feign
participation. However, parties seem to honour this and other written and
unwritten rules quite well; this is also assumed in the theoretical analyses
of the chapter.
The diculty of applying formal game theory in modelling the Finnish
arbitration system directed my analysis towards the third main conclusion
of the chapter. It is argued that the Finnish arbitration system can be seen
as a product and a combination of two dierent targets, or principles. First,
the bargaining outcome should be eective and reect the economic funda-
mentals as well as possible. The characteristics of good allocation rules are
discussed in Section 4.4. On the other hand, the arbitration process can-
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not be very complicated and should be robust in respect to opportunistic
behaviour of the negotiating parties. These objectives are, however, con-
tradictory. From abstract implementation theory, reviewed in Section 4.5,
it is known that using simple strategies, only simple allocation rules can
be implemented. More sophisticated allocation rules, for example the co-
operative Nash solution, can be implemented only with dynamic games with
strict rules for behaviour. Moreover, perfect information is required. But,
as real negotiation situations are characterised by imperfect information
and the negotiators have an incentive to signal more power than they really
possess, for example by breaking the rules of game, allocations with ne
theoretical properties are not normally implementable. Thus, the Finnish
arbitration system is one particular solution to the trade-o between the
targets, i.e. between the need to nd a simple system and the need to
produce allocations with desirable properties.
12
1
2
Business insurance accounted for 54 percent of direct property and liability insur-
ance premiums written in the United States in 1978 (Mayers and Smith, 1982). Main
(1983) cites a report by : " 86 percent of the top 500 industrial corporations
purchased insurance against at least 75 percent of their perceived total loss exposure."
In 1991, corporate re and combined insurance (normally also res are covered by
combined policies) premiums totalled FIM 576 million (Jarvikare 1996). See also Suomi-
nen (1994).
: : :Fortune
Firms purchase insurance policies . The policies vary, but there are some
general features. In Finland, almost all rms have a re insurance pol-
icy. The practice is so common that there is a general misbelief that re
insurance is obligatory. Insuring machinery or production as such is less
common, but is everyday life in rms of dierent size, in dierent industries
and with dierent market and ownership structures.
The situation may look paradoxical if one looks at it from the economist's
point of view. The basic reason to purchase an insurance policy is to re-
duce risks, but rms are normally seen in economics as risk-neutral entities.
Though the owners may be risk-averse, the rm shouldn't be. The owners'
risk-aversion apparently provides no incentive for the purchase of an insur-
ance policy, since stockholders and other investors with access to capital
markets can eliminate insurable risks through diversication of portfolios.
The reality on one hand and basic intuition of economists on the other
13
2.1.1 Paradox of corporate insurance
2.1 Introduction
Chapter 2
Why do risk-neutral rms
purchase insurance policies?
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The uncertainty in the model of this chapter is not related to production price but
to damage of the physical productive capital. However, capital enters into the prot
function in a similar way as the price level in the model analysed in this chapter.
Assume a rm having the prot function ( ) where is a stochastic pro-
duction price and is a constant wage parameter. The convexity of the prot function
guarantees that the expected prot from production under uncertain price conditions is
higher than the prot with production price equal to the expected price.
An insurance policy may also change the expected values of, let us say, production
capacity of the rm. If that is the case and the policy is purchased just to obtain
higher expected production capacity, an additional question rises. Why does the rm
not increase the expected value of its production simply by buying more capital? We
will be more precise later (see Subsection 2.2.4) but it is worthwhile to arm already
now that this alternative is excluded from the analysis.
pF L wL; p
w
 
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seem to clash. The situation looks even more puzzling if one notes that
expected prots are, in fact, in price variability in a basic model
of the rm . Indeed, it has been dicult to nd an explanation for corporate
insurance demand from micro-theory .
In the literature of insurance demand, however, several attempts have
been made to explain why companies buy insurance policies. Explanations
have been based on dierent institutional ndings and observations, see
discussion in Section 2.3. Many of the ndings are plausible and add re-
markably to our understanding of the behaviour of rms. However, there
is a demand for more general explanations that have roots in micro-theory.
This chapter aims to satisfy the demand for micro-economic explanations
for insurance demand by oering a theoretical model in which risk-neutral
agents purchase insurance policies. The explanation is based on the notion
that an insurance policy is a kind of a nancial contract. This motive
has been mentioned before in economic literature (e.g. see Mayers and
Smith 1982), but the analysis at hand is the rst attempt to model this
analytically. Previous studies dealing with related ideas are reviewed in
Subsection 2.3.2.
An purchase of an insurance policy changes the incentives that
the rm is facing . Without a policy, the rm has to decide whether
to continue production and whether to repair the damage occurred on the
basis of reparation costs and variable production costs. With an insurance
policy, the repairing costs are, at least implicitly, already paid and the
continuation of production can be judged on the basis of future variable
production costs only. Hence, some of the bankruptcies caused by adverse
increasing
ex ante
ex post
2.1.2 Insurance policies change incentives
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The assumption that the price of capital exceeds its marginal productivity may be
relevant for the rm with old production technology but reparation of modern machinery
is more likely to be protable as such. Hence, one may expect that contractual motives
to buy insurance policies are more important in the case of outdated technology than in
other cases.
This possibility creates a for the con-
tract, see Subsection 2.2.3.
strong individual rationality constraint (SIRC)
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production conditions are avoidable.
A simplied version of the implicit contract model by Rosen (1985) is
used as a starting point for the analysis. The strategy of the analysis is
. Though the formal analysis of the chapter is based
on the assumptions of risk-neutrality of the agents, the purpose is not to
claim that rms or workers are in fact risk-neutral; this topic is beyond the
scope of this study. The reason to assume risk-neutrality is simply a need
to show that the role of the insurance policy is not to reallocate risks but
alter incentives.
In addition to the risk-neutrality of all agents, there are other assump-
tions that are intended to exclude all "trivial" motives to purchase an in-
surance policy. For example, the insurance company is assumed to not be
superior in processing claims and reparation costs are assumed to be equal
for everybody. Hence, there is no special reason to rely on an insurance
company's help. Moreover, reparations of damages are assumed to be non-
protable in a conventional case, i.e. the price of new capital exceeds its
marginal productivity. This extreme assumption is made to highlight the
contractual motive for an insurance purchase. Without the assumption,
it would turn out that the reparations are sometimes carried out by the
rm, but sometimes only if it has an insurance policy. This would be an
unnecessary complication.
Though several possible reasons for insurance purchases are excluded,
the basic setting of Rosen (1985), as well as the analysis presented here,
may still exaggerate the motive to insure. It is based on the symmetric
information assumption and thus the limitations caused by moral hazard
and adverse selection problems are bypassed here.
It will be shown in Subsection 2.2.5 that under some feasible conditions,
the rm is willing to include an insurance policy in the wage agreement. If
the rm is able to cease production when actual prot is negative , a large
accident or a devastating re may lead to factory closure and to a lay-o
of workers. By an insurance policy, some cases of negative prot can be
avoided and hence production is more likely to continue.
to
show that an insurance purchase may be protable even if all conventional
motives are excluded
CHAPTER 2. WHY DO RISK-NEUTRAL FIRMS PURCHASE INSURANCE POLICIES?16
From the workers' point of view, buying an insurance policy is a way
of altering incentives of the rm. It can be thus argued that re insurance
policies can be seen as insurance against bankruptcies. The same mecha-
nism can be analysed also from the rm's point of view. For example, the
rm may purchase a re insurance policy just to be able to make a credible
promise to build the factory again after a possible re. This kind of promise
could be traded against a lower wage or a more protable contract with a
subcontractor. The trade union or the subcontractor would have reason
to believe the promises only if the rm has an incentive to keep its word.
Without an insurance policy, a promise to continue production after a re
or any other major damage would be without value if the total cost of pro-
duction exceeds the value of production. The role of the insurance company
would then be to guarantee that the rm honours its promise not to stop
production after an accident. The insurance company could hence be seen
as a third party which is used by the rm to reduce its future alternatives.
A purchase of an insurance policy is thus a way to commit
to do something that the rm does not want to do i.e. rebuild
the factory or repair the machinery and the insurance policy can be used
as a commitment device (the classical reference is Kydland and Prescott,
1977). Tying one's own hands is known to be advantageous in some strategic
situations, see references in Persson and Tabellini (1994).
It should be noted that the promise with guarantees is valuable only
if the rm does not automatically repair the damages. If the reparations
are protable as such, there is no reason to purchase an insurance policy.
Altering the incentives the rm is facing may be valuable only if the workers
or other "stake-holders" value increased job security highly. High valuation
may arise when repairs are protable , i.e. if expected costs of the
repairs are lower than the gain from higher expected employment, but non-
protable from the rm's point of view. In this kind of a situation
an insurance policy may solve the time consistency problem.
One cornerstone of the analysis deserves comment. It was assumed that
the insurance purchase is included in the wage contract. There is, however,
no evidence that such contracts exist. Hence, the contracts, if they exist,
must be of implicit nature. Implicit contract theories (see Subsection 2.3.4)
have been criticised from similar bases; written "implicit contracts" do not
exist. The situation concerning insurance policies is, nevertheless, very
dierent. Formal inclusion of a policy into a wage contract is not necessary
for two reasons. First, there is no reason to include it in an explicit contract
for possible use in court, as the insurance company guarantees the deal.
Second, because insurance contracts are usually long-term contracts, the
ex ante
ex post,
ex ante
ex post
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The following example may provide an explanation why insurance policies are im-
portant and in fact are very common. Consider a case, in which you are asked to move
to a small town with only one factory to take up a job in that factory. The factory
is outdated and your work will require rm specic skills, which you only can learn by
doing and which are of no value outside the rm. How would you react if you were told
that the rm does not have a re insurance policy?
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insurance decision of the rm is already known before the wage negotiation
starts.
It is important to note that the value of job security may result from
other factors than risk-aversion. A credible promise of a job with no risk of
redundancy may be valuable if there is friction in the labour market or if
the workers have rm-specic skills. Then the risk of losing a job decreases
expected wage income. This has a negative eect on the expected utility of
the workers even if they are risk-neutral.
The insurance purchase can, hence, be seen as a solution to the problem
of deviation between the private value and the social value of production.
Production after a re may be unprotable for the rm because of high
repairing costs. At the same time, the workers may value production highly
because an alternative income may be low. If both components of social
value are included, the value of production may exceed the sum of repairing
and production costs.
The basic argument behind the analysis is explained and the formal model
is presented in Section 2.2. It will be shown that under some quite non-
restrictive assumptions, an insurance policy is always included in a wage
agreement.
After the analysis of contractual factors in the insurance purchases, pre-
vious insurance studies are reviewed in Subsections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. The
results of Section 2.2 are compared with the outcomes of the trade union
and the implicit contract models in Subsections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4. Section 2.4
concludes the analysis.
2.1.3 Outline of chapter
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The implicit contract models are discussed with some more depth in Subsection
2.3.4.
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There are several ways to model insurance policy purchases by risk-neutral
rms. The basic implicit contract model of Rosen (1985) is adopted here
as a starting point. The model is originally from Azariades (1975) and
simple enough to produce tractable results. However, in the analysis at
hand, prot of the rm, not utility of the workers, is maximised. Moreover,
Rosen's model is simplied by assuming linear production technology and
a uniform distribution for the productivity parameter.
In Subsection 2.2.2, the model is solved and the properties of optimal
contract are studied. The ecient solution of the model requires only that
the workers are willing to sign a contract with the rm, i.e. that the ex-
pected utility exceeds or is equal to that what is available elsewhere in the
economy. Actual prot may be negative if the realised productivity is very
low, perhaps after an accident or a re at the plant.
In Subsection 2.2.3, the analysis deviates from the implicit contract
model and deals with a more realistic case. It is required that the prot of
the rm should be zero or positive with all realisations of productivity. If
not, the rm ceases production and faces bankruptcy; in this case all work-
ers will be made redundant. This condition is called the
. It will be shown that the ecient contract cannot
be maintained if the constraint is honoured. Production is lost if the dam-
ages are large, i.e. if the productive capital is low. The minimum level of
productive capital for protable production depends on production costs,
i.e. compensations for the workers. Hence, the constraint is analysed in
the form that denes the minimum amount capital required for protable
production as a function of monetary compensation to the workers.
A possibility to repair the damages is introduced in Subsection 2.2.4.
This would imply that also the expected value of productivity can be al-
tered. However, it will be assumed that the reparations are in general
non-protable, i.e. the price of new capital exceeds the marginal product of
the capital. The rst conclusion is, of course, that there is no reason to buy
an insurance policy if there are no contractual ineciencies. The situation
is, however, dierent when the strong individual rationality requirement
constrains the terms of the contract. In Subsection 2.2.5, it will be shown
that an insurance policy purchase can be used to decrease the utility loss
resulting from contractual ineciency.
strong individual
rationality constraint
2.2 Model of insurance policy demand
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Alternatively, the unemployed workers may receive unemployment benet from the
government. Analysis of this situation would require dening how the benet is nanced
and is hence too complicated for our purposes.
One may wonder whether the informational problems cause the same problems for
the employment function ( ). This is not the case, as the rm has an incentive to follow
the employment rule because it is, by construction, a condition for prot maximisation.
 
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In the model of Rosen (1985), the rm makes a contract with a group
of identical workers. Output depends on the amount of utilised labour
and the stochastic disturbance . The rm is assumed to pay a salary
to its employed workers and an unemployment benet to its unemployed
workers . The optimal labour contract is derived by maximising the utility
of a representative worker subject to the reservation prot of the rm. The
contract denes the wage, the unemployment benet and the employment
rule for every realisation of the stochastic .
Our analysis deviates here from that of Rosen. First, in the analysis at
hand, the prot of the rm is maximised, not the utility of the workers.
It is more natural to maximise prot when one tries to explain behaviour
of the rm. Second, we take into account the very fact of the real world
that wages are not very often indexed to production conditions. There is
a large theoretical and empirical literature on nominal rigidities of wages,
but these studies are not reviewed here. For our purposes, it is enough to
note that conditional wage schemes are rare and that this is partly due to
informational problems . Moreover, it will turn out that risk-neutrality of
the rm implies constant wage in the basic implicit contract model.
Rosen adopted the same simplifying assumption about the preferences
of the workers as Azariadis did in his seminal paper (1975). The utility of
a worker is = ( + ), where is consumption and is the fraction
of time devoted to leisure and is a constant parameter. is normalised
such that 0 1. This utility function has linear indierent curves and
and are perfect substitutes. The parameter measures the marginal
product of producing non-market goods or equivalently the monetary value
of leisure. Hence, is the reservation price of time supplied to work.
To exclude conventional motives to purchase an insurance policy, the
following assumption is essential.
( )
= +


u U C mL C L
m L
L
C L m
m
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The workers are risk-neutral and the utility function
is linear such that
Assumption 2.1
2.2.1 Basic model
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Rosen assumes that number of workers is ( ). Here we make an implicit assump-
tion that 1.
It is interesting to compare this assumption with the result derived from basic im-
plicit contract theory. Risk-aversion of the workers guarantee in the basic implicit con-
tract model that employed and unemployed workers enjoy the same level of income for
any given value of , i.e. ( ) = + ( ). In addition, if the rm is risk-neutral
and thus able to provide full insurance coverage for the workers against all variations in
incomes, optimal wage contract is of the form = + .
n 
n
 C  m C 
C m C

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Following Rosen (1985), we require that the worker has to work full-time
or not at all, that is = 1 or = 0. The rm has a constant number of
workers and uses a fraction of them in production. The rm sets , which
in general is a function of , i.e. = ( ). Thus 0 ( ) 1.
The contract denes the compensation of the workers. We denote wage
by and unemployment benet by . As noted already, the compen-
sations are constants, i.e. they do not depend on the available production
capacity.
= +
This condition is natural. If it does not hold, there is no equilibrium at
the internal labour market of the rm as the unemployed (employed) would
start to compete for jobs (leisure) by oering contracts with wage
( ) if + (if + ), where is a small positive
number. From this basis, it is natural to assume that every worker has the
same probability to be employed, i.e. that they are allocated randomly.
The damages are modelled by a variable production capacity in the
production function. If one denotes full production capacity with and
stochastic damages with , then the capacity available for production can
be expressed as = . In what follows, the analysis is carried out by
using variable .
= ( )
( )
For notational ease, it is assumed that is restricted such that 0 1.
Realisation of = 1 implies that there is no damage to the production plant
L L
p p
 p    
C C
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Utilities of the workers are constant across the employ-
ment status, e.g.
Production function of the rm is of the form
where is the stochastically determined production capacity and labour
input.
Assumption 2.2
Assumption 2.3
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Rosen assumes only that is distributed with a known distribution function ( )
and a density function ( ) = ( ).
 G 
G  g 
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and low values of correspond to large damages. Later, we will analyse
more carefully how depends on the existence of insurance policies. Before
that, it is enough to make the following assumption .
0 1 ( ) = 1
0 1
Because employed workers do not have any leisure, their utility is simply
. 1 ( ) unemployed workers enjoy leisure and receive an unemployment
benet . Hence, the expected utility of a worker is
= [ ( ) + ( + ) (1 ( ))] (2.1)
Assumption 2.2 implies that
= +
Using function ( ) and equality = + , prot of the rm can be
expressed as a function of
( ) = ( ) ( ) (1 ( ))
= ( ) ( )
( )
(2.2)
where ( ) is the social value of production. Expected prot is
= ( ) (2.3)
An ecient contract maximises the expected prot of the rm with respect
to and the employment function ( ), given the alternative utility of
the workers. Because the utility of leisure is , it is natural to assume that
the reservation utility exceeds the value of leisure.

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is a continuous random variable taking values between
and with density function , i.e. is uniformly distributed
between and .
Assumption 2.4
2.2.2 Ecient contract
Z
Z
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Because = + , the expected utility of the workers is ( + )+(1 )
= + , where 1 is the probability that production takes place.
If production takes place, the workers get = + = .
C m C m m C m C
m C m
C m C M
 
 
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If Assumption 2.5 does not hold, production would not take place as the
workers prefer to stay at home.
The contract is obtained by solving the following problem.
max ( )
( ) s.t. = +
(2.4)
Noting that ( ) = ( ) ( ) allows us to conclude that optimal
labour demand is
( ) =
0 if
1 if
(2.5)
and that optimal is the lowest number satisfying , i.e.
= .
The rm pays compensation = to the workers in any case
and an additional compensation if there is production . Thus prot
( ) =
= if
= if
(2.6)
is negative if . Straightforward calculation shows that expected prot
is
( ) =
1
2
+
2
(2.7)
Hence it is clear that the rm has positive expected prot only if is small
enough.
It is important to note that in the basic case analysed here there is
no scope for an insurance policy purchase as the rm has no incentive to
reduce the variability of . For example, if an insurance policy guaranteeing
that production capacity = = 1 2 is available in all circumstances,
expected prot would be
1
2
=
1
2
+ =
1
2
(2.8)
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, i.e. the value of workers' outside option is
higher than the value of leisure.
Assumption 2.5
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One may wonder whether the constraint can be bypassed via capital markets. It
should, however, be noted that this would not be a solution. The rm is not producing
when ( ) 0 because it maximises prot and, by assumption, it can always obtain zero
prot by not producing. Hence, even if there is nancing available for negative prots,
there is no reason produce if ( ) 0. Moreover, banks do not have an incentive to
nance losses. The insurance companies are prepared to do this only because they receive
insurance premiums before production takes place.
  <
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provided that 1 2. This certain prot is smaller than the expected
prot under stochastic productivity, because the opportunity to avoid pro-
duction under unfavourable production conditions is lost. Moreover, the
workers do not gain if this kind of insurance policy is bought in this case
as the expected utility remains at the level .
Until now it has been assumed that an ecient contract can be agreed
upon and implemented without any problems. However, in the real world
there are informational and contractual ineciencies that hinder the rst-
best solutions. In what follows, one particularly important contractual
imperfection is analysed more carefully.
It is reasonable to assume that the rmmay stop producing if production
is causing a loss; i.e. that bankruptcy is possible. In this situation, the rm
would not pay the wage to the employed nor the compensation to the
unemployed workers. Hence, it is required that the rm should produce non-
negative prot for every realisation of (i.e. ( ) 0), otherwise there
would be no production. This constraint is called the
.
Consider rst the basic case without a possibility to buy an insurance
policy. The contract can be obtained by solving the following problem.
max
( )
( )
s.t. +
= 0
(2.9)
The problem is the same as (2.4) on page 22, but there is an additional
restriction ( ) 0. If the restriction is not fullled, there is no production.
m < =
M
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strong individual
rationality constraint, SIRC
2.2.3 Consequences of strong individual rationality
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See Equation (2.5) at page 22.
Note that utility of the unemployed workers is and the utility of employed workers
is = + and that the corresponding probabilities are + and 1 . Hence,
it is required that ( + )+ (1 ) or equivalently (1 )
.
m
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Because ( ) is increasing in , the restriction can be written in a more
tractable form = 0. The probability that production is carried out
is thus
= 1 (2.10)
where is the threshold for protable production.
The optimal contract has the following properties. The prot function
( ) = ( ) ( ) can have positive value only if there is pro-
duction, i.e. only if ( ) 0. Moreover, because of linearity of production
technology, ( ) is either zero or one. Thus ( ) ( ) =
must be positive and the threshold for the protable production is then
= + and optimal labour demand is
( ) =
0 if +
1 if +
(2.11)
When ( ) and ( ) are compared, one observes that causes a
loss of production when [ + ). The corresponding prot function
is
( ) =
0 if +
if +
(2.12)
Because the probability of protable production is 1 = 1 ,
the optimal can be obtained by noting that it is the lowest number sat-
isfying (1 ) . If is very large, it may be possible
that such a number does not exist and no contract is signed. Because
(1 ) reaches its maximal value when = (1 ) 2, produc-
tion can be maintained only if
(1 )
4
+ (2.13)
If an agreement is reachable, the expected prot is
( ) =
(1 )
2
(2.14)
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SIRC
See Appendix A.
In Subsection 2.2.2, it was noted that an insurance policies which reduces
variability of productivity does not increase utility of the contracting part-
ners. A policy may, however, also change the expected value of production
capacity. For example, an insurance policy may guarantee full production
capacity for the rm in all circumstances. This kind of insurance would
be protable if the insurance premium is low compared to the expected
increase of production capacity.
The lower boundary for the insurance premium is expected reparation
costs. If the insurance company is oering actuarially fair policies, i.e. if
the insurance market is competitive, the insurance premiums coincide the
expected reparation costs. In what follows, this is assumed.
Let us start with a general denition of the insurance policy ( ). The
insurance company receives an insurance premium and promises to repair
some part of the losses caused by an accident or a re. From the rm's
point of view, this implies higher operating capital and higher productivity
than would be available if there is no insurance. The available production
capacity + ( ) is determined by realised drawn from the distribution
( ) and by the insurance policy ( ). The production function (see As-
sumption 2.3 on page 20) becomes
= ( ) [ + ( )] ( + ( )) (2.15)
where is shorthand notion for + ( ) and function ( ) describes the
scale of reparations, i.e. the insurance policy. The function is bound such
that 0 ( ) 1 for every . For example, if the insurance company is
committed to repairing all damages, then ( ) 1 and the rm always
operates with full capital stock 1. If there is no insurance, ( ) 0 for
every .
The expected cost of reparations is
= ( ) (2.16)
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(a) The expected prot under is lower and (b) the
wage higher than in the ecient case.
Proposition 2.1
Proof
2.2.4 Insurance against bankruptcy
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The analysis of Subsection 2.2.5 is based on the observation that is not xed
when an insurance is introduced.
This method may be unfamiliar. Think of the integral in (2.17) as the limit of a
sum across a large number of discrete possible realisations of . For example, the
integral = ( ( )) ( ) can be written in the form = ( ( )) , where is
probability of the event = . Then partial derivatives = ( ( )) can be
written compactly = ( ( )) ( ). See footnote 3 on page 1151 in Rosen (1985)
for further details.
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where is the price of investment goods. Our assumption on actuarially
fair policies implies that this is also the insurance premium.
Substituting (2.15) into (2.3) from page 21 and taking (2.16) into ac-
count gives
= [ ( ) ( ) ( )] (2.17)
If is taken as given , the partial derivative of the expected net prot
(after the insurance costs) with respect to ( ) is
( ) (2.18)
If the price of capital is high enough, there is no reason to include insurance
into the contract if is given. Because 0 ( ) 1, condition 1
would guarantee that the rm does not want to buy an insurance policy if
there are no contractual ineciencies. To exclude all trivial motives to buy
an insurance policy, it is assumed that the following holds.
1
If this assumption is not made, it may turn out that the rm would be
interested in buying an insurance just to increase its expected production
capacity as the price of capital is so low that investments are protable as
such. Then the demand for insurance policies would be higher than with
the assumption. The assumption is thus intended to produce a case where
insurance policies only have a contractual role.
Consider the following insurance policy.
( ) =
if
0 otherwise
(2.19)
q
E K      m q  d C :
C
 
  q
C   q >
q >
 
    "; 
       
 
 
  2  
The price of capital exceeds its marginal productivity, i.e.
.
Assumption 2.6
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Note that need not be the same as obtained in Subsection 2.2.3.C C
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This policy provides the minimum capacity for protable production if the
realisation of is not too low. The idea is that the productive capacity is
replaced after a damage or a re up to a limit , i.e. up to the limit of
protable production. However, reparations are not carried out if they re-
quire an increase in capital larger than . As a result, the actual productive
capacity in use is if realised is smaller than or larger than . If
is between and , the available capacity is .
Price of the policy ( ) is
= =
2
(2.20)
where is price of investment goods. Production can be maintained by an
insurance policy ( ) if the realisation of production capacity is or
higher.
The tools developed above can be used to derive the main conclusions of
this chapter. If an insurance policy of type (2.19) is available, production
can be maintained when = + . The linearity of the
production function guarantees that if there is production, ( ) = 1 and
all workers are employed.
Though production can be maintained, it is not necessarily protable
as ( ) = 0 when . If insurance costs are neglected, prof-
itable production requires that = + . Expected prot without
insurance costs is then
( ) =
(1 )
2
(2.21)
and with insurance costs
(1 )
2 2
(2.22)
Because the workers' participation constraint is (1 + )
, where (1 + ) is the probability that there is production
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2.2.5 Optimal insurance demand
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Unemployed workers' utility is simply because no unemployment compensations
are paid as the rm is bankrupt and employed workers enjoy an income of = + .
The participation constraint (1 + ) is obtained on the basis of
these by straightforward calculation.
The problem reduces to that given in (2.9) if 0.
m
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and the compensations are paid , the optimal contract can be obtained by
solving the following problem .
max (1 )
2 2
s.t. (1 + ) + 0
(2.23)
The rst-order conditions of the problem are
=
1
1 2 +
(2.24)
for and
= (2.25)
for . The multiplier is related to the workers' participation constraint.
Because (2.24) is decreasing and (2.25) increasing in , there are unique
and solving the system of the rst order conditions. The obtained
= (2.26)
determines and hence also = + uniquely.
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The optimal contract has the following properties:
(a) The rm buys an insurance policy with .
(b) The optimal is the smallest number satisfying
(c) Production takes place with full sta if .
(d) The rm is able to increase its expected prot by buying an insurance
policy.
Proposition 2.2
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See Appendix A.
Inspection of the workers' participation constraint reveals interesting
properties. First, if reservation utility is very large, there is no way of
reaching an agreement. Because (1 + ) has its maximal value
when = (1 + ) 2, an agreement can be reached only if
(1 + )
4
+ (2.27)
Comparison with Equation (2.13) (see page 24) reveals that there are values
of with which production is possible only if there is an insurance policy
available.
Second, because the constraint is binding, one may set
(1 + ) + = 0 (2.28)
and calculate
=
1 2 +
(2.29)
Hence the introduction of an insurance would decrease the wage if 1
2 + is positive. Then also the probability of protable production
increases as 1 + is increasing in and decreasing in . One
may note that 1 2 + is indeed positive. If it were negative,
(1 + ) would be decreasing in . Hence, we can conclude
that is negative if production is possible.
The above discussion justies the following proposition.
SIRC
1 + 1
Though the rm is able to reduce losses due to the
by buying a policy, some of the losses still remain.
See Appendix A.
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If binds, i.e. if there is a possibility for the rm to
go bankrupt, the rm buys an insurance policy. As a consequence, the rm
can increase the probability of production and pay smaller wages. In other
words, and .
strong individual
rationality constraint
An insurance purchase cannot eliminate all ineciencies
caused by a possibility of bankruptcy. With a policy,
(a) the wage level is higher,
(b) the probability of production is lower, and
(c) the expected prot is lower
than in the ecient case.
Proof
Proposition 2.3
Proposition 2.4
Proof
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Articles are mainly published in the and
. The only Finnish studies on the topic are theses by Jarvikare (1994,1996).
Journal of Risk and Insurance Journal of
Business
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Before entering the conclusions, studies discussing the "traditional" as well
as contractual motives of buying insurance policies should be reviewed. In
addition to this, the results of Section 2.2 are compared with the outcomes
of the trade union and the implicit contract models in Subsections 2.3.3-
2.3.4.
The problem of rms' insurance demand is known in the literature and
many authors have tried to explain why rms buy insurance policies .
As Mayers and Smith (1982) pointed out, the task is fairly simple for the
closely held rm or for the rm owned by one family. These rms are likely
to purchase an insurance policy for the same reasons as individuals buy
insurance policies. Hence, the theory of consumers' insurance demand is
widely applicable if the rm is risk-averse. However, one should keep in the
mind that other economic factors may override risk-aversion. For example,
if prot can be very high in some cases, even risk-averse owners of the rm
may prefer uncertain production conditions to certain ones.
Consumers' motives of purchasing insurance policies are analysed in sev-
eral studies, for classical treatments see Mossin (1968), Ehrlich and Becker
(1972) and Arrow (1974). The basic result of the analyses is that the
less risk-averse contracting party bears more risk than the more risk-averse
one. Insurance companies are capable of reducing aggregate risk by pooling
numerous individual consumers' risks together and diversifying the remain-
ing risk by wide ownership and pooling contracts. As a consequence, the
insurance companies are often assumed to be risk-neutral. Risk-neutral
insurance companies are capable of oering full-coverage insurance to con-
sumers if the probabilities of accidents are independent of actions taken by
the consumers or if the actions are observable and veriable. The situation
is, however, very dierent if the clients' actions are unobservable and aect
the probabilities. A moral hazard problem arises and the full-coverage is
optimal only if the cost of careful behaviour is very large or approaches
zero. (Shavell 1979)
2.3.1 Insurance purchases by risk-averse rms
2.3 Related studies: A brief review
2.3. RELATED STUDIES: A BRIEF REVIEW
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Also retroactive insurance policies exist, see Smith and Witt (1985).
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Moreover, if the clients are of dierent types and the type of an indi-
vidual is unobservable, an adverse selection problem may arise and limit
the use of insurance contracts. If risk-aversion of the clients is relatively
mild and the insurance pool contains a relatively wide range of risks, the
insurance company is unable to oer full coverage to all consumers. If the
"bad" risks are covered, the insurance becomes too expensive for "good"
consumers. (Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992)
The study at hand is not the rst attempt to analyse insurance policies as
contractual entities. According to the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, corpo-
rate nancing policy is irrelevant if a rm's investment policy is given and if
there are no contracting costs or taxes. For the rm, an insurance purchase
is just one element of its nancing policy. Taking a loan or selling shares
provide capital immediately and unconditionally, but insurance policies are
similar to options or futures. These nancial instruments provide capital
for transactions or reinvestments with delay and their usefulness is not
known beforehand. Making reference to Modigliani and Miller, Mayers and
Smith (1982) conclude that the rm's insurance policy is of importance only
if it is so because of taxes, because of the impact of an insurance policy on
the rm's investment decisions or on contracting costs.
Governments seem to favour the purchase of insurance policies. In ad-
dition to direct regulation, tax systems include incentives to buy policies
(Main 1983, Mayers and Smith 1982). However, as Mayers and Smith (1981)
argue, this does not explain the existence of insurances, but raises the next
logical question: why does regulation favour this institutional form?
The relation between the model of this chapter and models of implicit
contract theory is discussed in more depth in Subsection 2.3.4, but it is
worthwhile to note that the basic form of implicit contract theory does not
focus on contracting costs. If contracting is not costly, it is unimportant how
the property rights are allocated. However, in the real world contracting
is expensive. Because the capital stock of the rm limits the amount of
risk that can be allocated to stockholders and bondholders, the insurance
contract renders an ecient allocation of risk for the rm's other claim
holders. Mayers and Smith (1982) suggest that the higher the employees',
customers', and suppliers' fraction of the claims to the rm's output, the
higher the probability that the rm will purchase an insurance policy.
2.3.2 Insurance policy as part of a contract
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Parry and Parry argue wrongly that in the previous analysis the rm has been risk-
averse. In the papers by Mayers and Smith (1981 and 1982), the rm consists of dierent
interest groups. As a consequence, preference of the rm is not a meaningful concept.
The authors use director and ocer (D&O) liability insurance as a example. It is
designed to cover the errors and the omissions of board members and company ocers.
Grouping of policies is more likely if the information asymmetry between purchaser
and seller of insurance policy is high, when employers' incentive to monitor the employees'
purchase is greater and when the demand for insurance is homogeneous in the group.
For example, an insurance company may control the condition of a sprinkler system.
By buying an insurance policy, the management may credibly promise to maintain the
system.
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A study by Parry and Parry (1991) is an application of the above-
mentioned reasoning. The authors study the purchase of an insurance pol-
icy by a risk-neutral rm for a risk-averse prospective employee. To hire
an employee, especially a manager, the rm has to provide a compensa-
tion package consisting of a salary and an insurance policy . The reasons
mentioned in the study by Mayers and Smith (1982) explain why the rm
foregoes self-insurance and the reasons analysed in Mayers and Smith (1981)
hint toward why the rm does not pay the managers and let them organise
the insurance by themselves.
The comparative advantage of the specialised insurance rms in pro-
cessing claims, evaluating costs and managing legal disputes may be a good
reason to buy an insurance policy, see Mayers and Smith (1982) and Skogh
(1989). Moreover, as Mayers and Smith point out, the conict between own-
ers and managers may explain insurance policies as a monitoring device. If
a specialised insurance company has a comparative advantage in monitor-
ing risks and counter measures, the owner may delegate the supervision and
control of managers to the insurance company .
In addition to re or damage insurance, business-interruption insurance
policies may also be used to control incentives and thus used as contractual
devices. Mayers and Smith (1982) write:
occurrence of an unusual circumstance can alter incentives.
Suppose a re destroys a large part of a single plant of a multi-
plant corporation. The rm might have an incentive to reduce
employment, violating the anticipated allocation of risk bearing.
Business-interruption insurance covering ordinary payroll would
control the incentive. In this case, by guaranteeing the contract
the reduction in the workers' reservation prices can be sucient
to cover the loading fee for the insurance policy.
The text continues (footnote on page 288):
: : :
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In a monopoly union model, the union decides the wage, but takes into account the
labour demand schedule of the rm when maximising utility of the workers. In ecient
contract models, both wage level and employment are agreed upon by the labour market
parties. Because this kind of agreements do not exist in the real world, the "right-
to-manage" models, where the wage is agreed upon by the labour market parties and
the level of employment is decided unilaterally by the rm, have become more popular
recently.
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This appears similar to the risk-shifting incentive discussed ear-
lier, but the rationale is dierent. In this case the rm can
provide the optimum level of risk for the contract.
The authors do not elaborate the idea further. For review of other reasons
to buy a business-interruption insurance policy, see Jarvikare (1996).
Mayers and Smith also have another idea on how insurance can be used
to control incentives. They have presented (Mayers and Smith, 1986) an
analysis of a rm that is partially nanced by debt. If the casualty loss is
large enough, the value of the rm, even after reparations, may sink below
the value of its debts. In such a situation, the shareholders wouldn't be
ready to invest in the rebuilding of the damaged asset. However, by actuar-
ially fair insurance the incentive problem can be solved and the rebuilding
guaranteed. In this context, the insurance contract protects the debtor.
During last two decades, trade union models have become common in
analysing labour markets, especially in Europe. In these models, wages
are set by a trade union or wages are negotiated between a trade union
and a rm or between a trade union and an employers' association. One
may ask if trade union models can be used to explain observed insurance
demand by the rms.
In the literature of trade unions, three main types of models are anal-
ysed: monopoly union models, ecient-bargaining models and the so-called
"right-to-manage" models , see surveys by Oswald (1986) and by Ulph and
Ulph (1990). The most important endogenous variable in trade union mod-
els is the wage level. It is an important factor determining prots. If wages
can be down-sized in less uncertain demand conditions, the rm would want
to buy an option, a kind of an insurance policy, to sell at constant prices
just to lower the wage level. If one, however, concludes that a decrease in
uncertainty does not cause a decrease in the wage level and a correspond-
ing increase in the prot level, there is no reason to purchase an insurance
policy.
2.3.3 Trade union models
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In the model of Section 2.2, uncertainty was modelled as a change in production
capacity. Technically, this corresponds to price uncertainty in Oswald's basic trade union
model. In both models, an uncertain element enters into the production function as a
multiplicative factor.
He assumes that ( ) = (1 (1 )) .F N =  N 
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Consequences of uncertainty are, indeed, studied in the context of the
trade union models. The classical reference is Oswald (1982), in which a
monopoly union model is studied. The similarity between Oswald's model
and the model presented here allows us to compare quite easily the results
obtained . Oswald shows that the eect on the union's optimal wage of an
increase in the riskiness of product demand, i.e. price level, is ambiguous.
With one particular form of production function , he is able to show that
there is no eect.
Oswald studies also other sources of uncertainty. He shows that an
increase in the riskiness of unemployment benet decreases the union's op-
timal wage. Also, if the employed workers show non-increasing absolute
risk-aversion, a rise in the riskiness of the income subsidy increases the
union's optimal wage. The eect of the unions' optimal wage of an increase
in the riskiness of the comparison wage rate is ambiguous.
In can be concluded that in the Oswald's trade union model the rm has
no clear motive to reduce uncertainty and thus the model does not explain
why rms buy insurance policies.
Burda (1995) shows that many aspects of observed trade union be-
haviour can be understood in the light of the monopoly union model. In
his analysis, the monopoly union provides insurance against wage variabil-
ity via its wage policy. An optimal contract is characterised by real wage
exibility only in response to systematic changes in uncertainty. However,
like the analysis of Oswald, the model is not capable of explaining insurance
purchases as the rm is able to insure the workers' incomes by itself.
According to the implicit contract theory, a rm provides more certain
income for the workers than pure production conditions would imply. This
is a welfare improving arrangement if the rm tolerates risks better than
the employees, see the classical papers by Baily (1974) or Azariadis (1975).
Because explicit contracts of risk sharing between the rm and the workers
are rare, the relation is assumed to be implicit. In theoretical models, the
contracts specify the amount of the labour to be utilised and the wages to
be paid in each state of nature.
2.3.4 Implicit contract theory and beyond
2.3. RELATED STUDIES: A BRIEF REVIEW
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Things are seldom that simple and there are many reasons why the rm cannot
provide itself the insurance that it would like to oer its employees. Firms may be risk-
averse or all kinds of rigidities and contractual diculties may hinder the operation of
market forces. Capital stock of the rm also limits its capability to carry down-side risks.
These explanations are already mentioned and have nothing in particular to do with the
basic ideas of implicit contract theory.
The over-employment results was rst pointed out by Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980).
The other early papers are Grossman and Hart (1981) and Green and Kahn (1983).
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One may wonder whether the existence of rm insurance policies can
be explained by implicit contract theory. However, it should be noted that
if the rm is risk-neutral, it would be able to bear all the risks and there
would be no reason to buy a policy . It is, nevertheless, interesting to
compare the basic results of implicit contract theory with the results of the
analysis of Section 2.2.
The model in Section 2.2 was similar to that of the implicit contract
studies, but was solved by assuming a constant wage. The implicit contract
theory outcome of the optimality of constant wage supports indirectly the
assumption made in this study. But, as Manning (1990) points out, the
wage rigidity result depends crucially on the assumption that the employer
is risk-neutral.
The main aim of the implicit contract theory was to explain the existence
of unemployment. The theory is good in explaining why wages are rigid, but
it is not, however, very successful in explaining unemployment as such. The
basic models predict higher employment than would prevail in an auction
type of labour market because the rms hoard labour during a recession .
It is interesting to note that in the model of Section 2.2, there is a similar
property. Reparations are made even though they are non-protable and
consequently production is ineciently high.
The over-employment result has been inuential in creating pressure to
nd a better way to understand implicit risk-sharing contracts between the
rm and its workers. As in many other areas of economics, the asymmetric
informationmodels have been useful in solving remaining theoretical puzzles
of implicit contracts. If the information sets of the rm and the workers
are dierent, i.e. if the parties do not observe the same facts, it is possible
to construct models where underemployment exists. A paper by Calvo and
Phelps (1977) was one of the rst analyses where it was assumed that the
workers cannot observe the values of uncertain variables .
The papers with asymmetric information were able to explain the exis-
tence of unemployment. However, the papers lost an important property of
the original papers by Azariadis and Baily: in models of asymmetric infor-
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mation, an unemployed individual who would like to swap places with an
employed person with the same characteristics does not exist (Oswald 1986).
As Oswald points out, the models based on the assumption of asymmetric
information assumed that workers cannot rely on the government's unem-
ployment benets when unemployed. In the classical papers by Azariadis
and Baily, this assumption was made. Oswald returned the assumption
for empirical grounds into the asymmetric information implicit contract
models. He produced a model where both desired properties were present:
there is under-employment and involuntary employment exists, i.e. the
unemployed workers envy the employed workers (Oswald 1986).
The problem of enforcing the contract was dealt with in Section 2.2.
The strong individual rationality constraint implies that not all contracts
are implementable. The same topic has been discussed also in the context
of contract theory. Holmstrom (1981) argued that reputation eects or
long-lasting contracts may solve the enforcing problem. Workers or rms
that are known to be contract-breakers would earn a bad reputation and
this threat would curb down the endeavour for the short-run gains. Also,
the contract may include seniority wages. A promise of a higher wage in
the future may be good enough reason to stay in the job even if the market
wage is higher than the wage specied by the contract. Based on this, it
can be argued that an insurance policy purchase may not be very important
for old institutions with a long history and that the same contractual eect
can be obtained by reputation formation. One may wonder whether this is
an additional reason why public sector institutions and large corporations
do not insure. The possibility to pool risks in-house is, of course, the main
reason why insurance policies are not bought by large institutions.
2.4. DISCUSSION
1 2
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In this chapter of my thesis, it was shown that the risk-neutral rm may
obtain a higher expected prot level by buying an insurance policy. This
may be the case if the rm can deviate from the agreement if a re or some
other accident makes production non-protable. Moreover, it is required
that the reparation costs exceed the value of expected production after
preparations.
By an insurance policy the contracting parties are able to create suitable
private incentives that serve social purposes. Though production with low
capital may be non-protable from the rm's point of view, it may well
be protable from the workers' point of view. Continuation of production
requires, however, reparations which are, by assumption, non-protable for
the rm.
In the real world, an insurance policy may be useful if without it the rm
cannot credibly promise to build the factory again or to repair the machinery
after a major damage or a re. This may be the case if the factory is old
or if, for some other reasons, the reparation costs are high compared to
value of production. If production is socially protable, then there is in
principle a possibility to share the rent obtained by repairing the factory
and continuing production. In general, the existence of mutually protable
production possibilities does not guarantee that production can ever be
continued, but in the model analysed in this chapter, an insurance policy
would solve the incentive problems and the socially optimal production level
can be maintained.
The analysis was based on a simple model of implicit contracts where
the agents were risk-neutral. It was shown that if the rm is able to cease
production in adverse states of nature, the ecient contract cannot be main-
tained, but an insurance policy providing the minimum capacity for (pri-
vately) protable production is welfare improving. However, it is possible
that the minimum capacity for protable production cannot be provided
when the realisation of the productive capacity is too low, i.e. if the dam-
ages are too large.
The assumption of constant wage should be discussed briey. The model
used in this chapter was constructed by assuming constant wages, i.e. it
was assumed that the wage and the unemployment benet are not
conditional on the realisation of , productivity.
C C

2.4 Discussion
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One may ask why the contracting parties do not decide that wages are
adjusted according to production conditions to provide a positive prot
level in all circumstances. In principle, risk-neutrality of the workers allows
them to provide insurance for the rm. This possibility can be neglected
on the following grounds: rst, the workers' ability to provide insurance
for the rm is a theoretical artifact produced by the extreme assumption of
risk-neutrality. The risk-neutrality assumption was made to exclude from
the analysis all "conventional" motives to insure, but not to describe the
real world. Secondly, prots vary much more than wages at the micro level.
Hence, even if the workers provide insurance, insurance coverage must be
very limited. Third, insurance companies must have higher productivity
in processing information than the workers. Thus the informational asym-
metries outside the analysis justify the assumption that the insurance is
provided by the specialised companies.
I have argued that an insurance purchase can be used to reduce ineciency
caused by contractual ineciencies. The question of possibility of using
conditional wages to overcome the individual rationality constraint raises an
alternative interpretation for the rm insurance policies. Insurance policies
can be useful in reducing the utility loss caused by unconditional, i.e. non-
exible, wages.
Bankruptcies in the event of a severe re or an accident are not the
only cases where non-exible wages cause utility losses. In many cases,
disturbances are of macro nature and it is thus quite dicult to imagine an
insurance policy protecting the continuity of production. However, the use
of price options as well as foreign exchange futures and forward contract
have becomemore popular recently. The ideas presented in this chapter are,
perhaps, useful in understanding why rms that should be risk-neutral, are
actually proceeding in that direction.
The nature of the analysis should be kept in the mind when planning em-
pirical testing of the model. The quite restrictive assumptions that are
made are justied, because the analysis aimed to show that there are other
motives than risk-aversion that could explain why rms buy insurance poli-
cies. I do not intend to claim that controlling incentives is the only reason
of purchasing an insurance policy. It is, perhaps, one motive among oth-
ers. A proper empirical test of this theory should take this reservation as a
starting point.
At rst glance, the properties of real insurance contracts coincide quite
2.4. DISCUSSION
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At the moment, there are no empirical studies available for re insurance demand.
It is, however, interesting to look empirical results by Jarvikare (1996) on business-
interruption insurance demand. Using data obtained from a leading business interruption
insurance company, he gets the following results. Insurance purchases are increasing in
the size of the rm, but the elasticity is less than one. Small, widely-owned rms buy
more insurance than other rms, and large ones less.
Jarvikare's results indicate that other motives than the pooling of risks explain in-
surance purchases. However, as rms get bigger, closely-held and family-owned rms
purchase insurance policies with larger coverage. The interpretation is clear: when risks
become bigger, the traditional motives to buy insurance policies override the contractual
motives.
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well the obtained theoretical ones. The model predicted that there is no
guarantee for the maximumproduction capacity, this seems to t quite well
with casual observations. It is also interesting to note that in the model,
very large damages are not covered by insurance policies. This seems to
correspond to insurance policies in the real world.
Without any empirical study it would, however, be premature to con-
clude that the model corresponds to reality. A proper test of the theory
should start from the very nature of the theoretical model. In the model,
insurance policies were used as a tool to grant credible promises to the work-
ers. The same mechanism would apply to the sub-contracts. Hence, one
may expect that labour-intensive rms or rms with many sub-contractors
are active to insure themselves.
Moreover, because reputation eects may serve the same purposes as
insurance policies serve, one would expect that new and small rms buy
insurance policies eagerly. Old and large rms are in a better position
to develop a good reputation and do not need a third party to guarantee
promises. Unfortunately the possible observation that old and large rms do
not buy insurance would have an alternative interpretation. Large rms are
able to pool risks inside the company and old rms typically have stronger
balance sheets than new rms. Both factors explain why insurance policies
are not needed.
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The problem with Becker's analysis is that it does not explain why childcare is
still performed in the family. Organising it in specialised units would allow much more
eective specialisation.
The aim of this chapter is to oer a theoretical explanation for gender wage
dierentials and labour market stratication. The starting point of the
analysis is the fact that women are more likely than men to be responsible
for childcare. This means that it is costlier for a female employee than
for a male employee to commit oneself to work in a way satisfying the em-
ployer. The widely discussed labour market exibility on one hand and rigid
demands of children's well-being on the other are dicult to combine. How-
ever, this diculty is not constant over time or across societies. It depends,
, on the availability, quality and costs of childcare facilities.
The basic idea of the interplay between domestic and market activi-
ties is not new, see Becker (1993). Becker emphasises the importance of
specialisation in the allocation of time and in the accumulation of human
capital. Married women specialise in childcare and married men in market
activities .
In the study at hand, we go deeper into the problem. It is argued that
the most important element is not the required labour input as such, but
the exibility and the commitment that it requires. This kind of service
is very dicult to buy from the market and there is, hence, a trade-o
between the commitments of the parents. The requirements of exibility
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The study by Francois (1998) has a very similar starting point. However, gender
roles are endogenous in his study, see Subsection 3.1.7.
The denition of family diers across cultures. Here parents should be interpreted
very broadly; it may also mean other members of the family.
See Ilmakunnas (1997) for a discussion on conventional labour supply consequences
of dierent childcare arrangements.
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and commitment order jobs, rms and professions in the labour market.
Professions with high commitment are well paid because the required eort
is very dicult to substitute with hours worked. Using an explicit model, it
is argued that individuals with high domestic commitments are allocated to
low commitment, low pay professions. The model is then used in discussing
the possibility to change family roles.
What is special in the care and supervision of children? What makes it
dierent from other domestic duties? There are two important elements.
First, in all human activities there are elements which are not mar-
ketable. In childcare, this element is large and it is essential in the child-
parent relationship. It is very dicult to hire somebody to tell the same
stories to your child as you like to tell them. Only parents can take full
responsibility for the health of their children. What is important from
the gender point of view is that this form of labour input is
to the other element of caretaking. For example, feeding and
supervising go hand in hand. Similarly, the daily hygiene and looking af-
ter the health of the child are easy to combine. Hence, it is common for
the person who is responsible for daily routines with children also to be
responsible for non-market activities.
The second point is that the time span of children is short and thus
supervising and care activities are needed on a daily basis. The laundry
can wait, but children cannot.
Taking care of one's child requires a lot of the same kind of labour input
as any eort at work. As a parent of a child, one is supposed to be ready to
wake up in the middle of the night if needed. As an airline pilot one must
be willing to stay up even when the plane is lagging behind the timetable.
Imagination and commitment are as valuable at home as in business or in
politics.
The very fact that women have a heavy domestic work load aects
their situation in the labour market . However, the basic argument of this
chapter is more elaborated. It is argued that women are
strongly com-
plementary
generally more
3.1.1 What is special in childcare?
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. Professions that do not require total concentration
or commitment are more easily combinable with heavy childcare loads.
Worries of everyday life are easier to bear if the employer does not demand
full concentration at work. Shorter working hours allow more time for
cleaning, cooking or car reparations. Hence, there is a trade-o between
professional and domestic tasks.
Eciency wage models are a widely known application of a similar idea.
The distinction of hours versus eort is not, however, the only possibility
of aggregating heterogeneous labour inputs. In fact, these terms may be
interpreted in various ways. Sometimes eort refers to intensity or pace
of work, sometimes it is only an index of the quality of workers' perfor-
mance. In this chapter a very specic denition of eort is adapted. The
term
. This kind of eort is important in continuous production processes
and production processes with indivisibilities (Ramaswamy and Rowthorn,
1991). As a consequence, the term labour refers to everything that may be
agreed on beforehand. The reason for using such a denition comes from
above analysis of domestic duties.
It is reasonable to assume that workers demand better hourly compen-
sation if they are asked to work harder. Because domestic duties vary,
compensation demands of workers in dierent occupations also vary. For
example, unexpected overtime work is much more dicult to cope with for
a single mother than for a bachelor. Hence, it may be expected that a per-
son with strong family commitments demands a higher compensation for a
job than a bachelor if the job requires irregular working hours, travelling
and a full commitment to the targets of the employer.
As a consequence, we may expect that individuals with strong family
commitments are allocated to jobs where the eort is less important. Also,
if pay is positively related to eort, then these people are also less paid.
At least at rst glance, these features are characteristic for the situation of
women in the all modern societies. However, a more careful discussion of
empirical implications is postponed until the end of the chapter.
It should be noted that actual labour market outcomes may not fully
reect demand and supply conditions of eort. A market for eort may,
as well as the market for conventional labour, be noncompetitive. It is,
responsible for childcare than men and that the basic nature of childcare is
such that it is quite dicult to combine it with professions characterised by
high eort requirements
eort refers to a worker's commitment to serve the employer's goals
exibly
3.1.2 Domestic eort versus eort at work
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Francois (1998) expressed this idea by assuming in his model that there is family
specic human capital such that the members of the family are more productive in the
household production than outsiders.
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however, unlikely for market imperfections to totally distort the underlying
tendencies. Hence, the analysis is carried out assuming perfect information
and competitive markets. The only exception is that the number of rms
in the formal analysis is assumed to be constant.
The analysis in this chapter is based on the notion that in modern societies
the that childcare requires is not the issue. This can be justied by an
example. Assume that there are women seeking daycare for their children.
They always have an option: those women may form a collective, where
1 women work at the labour market and one takes care of all the children.
Although the double taxation causes extra costs in the form of a tax wedge,
the arrangement should be protable if is large enough. However, this
kind of shared childcare is not common in industrial countries.
The problem is that the required care is very dicult to produce outside
the family . Market labour or an arrangement of the above-described na-
ture are not very good substitutes for parental care. Though the required
working are marketable, the required is not necessarily. There
is a risk of private childcare arrangements outside the family not reduc-
ing, or redistributing the cost of eort performed at the labour market well
enough. Either children or performance at work suer.
Technological development has increased productivity also in childcare
production. In addition to better nutrition, housing, health care and other
factors aecting the physical safety of children, various immaterial elements,
education and communication technologies included, have made it possible
to increase the standard of living of children at the same time when the
childcare load has decreased. In general, the benets of childcare produc-
tivity growth have been distributed between children and parents. It seems
that women have beneted the most in this process. Decreased number of
births in an average woman's life is an important factor in this development,
but also eort costs per child have declined substantially over the decades.
What is most important from the policy perspective: decreasing the female
childcare load is quite a generally accepted policy target in industrialised
western countries. Moreover, it is possible that there are purely economic
reasons for providing childcare. For example, rms having female workers
may benet from the availability of public childcare. However, as Rosen
k
k
k
k
 
time
hours eort
3.1.3 Determinants of female childcare load
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The total cost of public daycare programmes in Finland was FIM 6.8 billion in 1992.
This is 1.4 per cent in relation to GDP.
In 1987, parents' share of the daycare running cost was 18.3 per cent in Denmark,
16.3 in Norway and 10.8 per cent in Sweden, see Leira (1992). In Finland, parents'
share was 14 per cent in 1992 (STM 1994). Because of the high subsidies in the public
childcare system, a private alternative has almost disappeared in the Nordic countries.
For example, the share of Swedish children in the age group of 3-6 years attending
government-sponsored daycare was 81 per cent in 1989 (Leira 1992). The corresponding
gure for Finland was 53 per cent in 1992 (STM 1994).
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(1995) argues, childcare programmes are expensive and require heavy tax-
ation and are thus also causing substantial welfare losses.
I would like to argue that there are three alternative approaches to
reducing the female childcare load further. The load can be divided more
equally in the family, reduced by further decreasing the number of children,
or part of the load can be borne by the government. Governments can do
this, for example, by providing public daycare facilities. The latter option
is discussed rst.
Public daycare facilitates participation in the labour force. As the example
given in Subsection 3.1.3 suggests, private arrangements can do the same.
However, the public alternative is superior in facilitating a strong supply
of eort as well, as the main problem in combining family and working life
is not the availability of childcare, but merely quality of it. Moreover, the
price of the service matters. For example, though the actual services are
sometimes produced by charities or other non-prot organisations, daycare
is almost totally nanced by the governments in Nordic countries . Because
of subsidies, the sta-to-children ratio is higher in public daycare and the
principal-agency problems are less severe than in private services as care
production is supervised and controlled by the authorities.
Providing education is, perhaps, the most important government inter-
vention in family life. In addition to formal education, schools are important
in transmitting cultural values and in providing care and protection for the
children. Basic education is organised by public authorities in almost all
countries, but very often no special public daycare is available. In many
countries, if daycare facilities exist, they are private and quite expensive.
However, it is common for children to start school at quite an early age
and thus primary schools provide a kind of public childcare service in those
countries. Specialised childcare is, however, superior in reducing eort costs
of childcare for the following three reasons.
3.1.4 Public daycare
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This age is now 12 months, but was previously 8 months. Local governments are
obligated to oer a place in a nursery or a publicly supervised family care for all children
under three years of age.
The group consists of West Germany, the Netherlands, UK, Italy, Luxembourg,
Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain.
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First, the way childcare is organised is better from the working life point
of view. For example, timetables of the Finnish daycare centres are designed
to suit working hours and there is normally only a short summer break. In
this respect, a combination of short working days and long holidays, typical
for the primary schools in all countries, make them inferior in providing
care.
Second, though formal schooling starts at an early age in many countries,
daycare starts even earlier. For example, Finnish children may go to a
nursery at the age of one year . As a consequence, the break in women's
working career may be much shorter in countries providing daycare than in
others. Duncan (1996) compared the availability of public childcare services
in European countries in 1989. According to him, the ratio of childcare
places to the number of children does not vary very much between countries
in the age group from 4 years to the age of starting school. In the age group
of 0-3 years, however, variation was substantial. In East Germany, Sweden,
France and Belgium, the ratio varied between 20 to 80 per cent, but in the
other European countries covered by the study , the share was negligible.
The third dierence is in sta and the premises of establishments. Schools
are planned to provide for education, but daycare centres are more capable
of providing for care. Children have several meals, they may take afternoon
naps and playing facilities are better in the daycare centres. Hence, no
private arrangements are needed even when both parents of young children
want to work full time. Hence, it is justied to conclude that daycare and
schooling are substitutes, but only imperfect ones.
The basic "ideology" of daycare is totally dierent in Nordic countries
from many other European countries. Although educational goals are im-
portant also in the Nordic model, these dominate in the other countries.
In the countries without public daycare services, almost all women are out-
side the labour force when their children are young. Moreover, during the
school years of their children, women are more often employed in part-time
jobs than, for example, in the Nordic countries. The services available do
not allow wives to commit to work eectively outside the family unless
the husbands make radical changes in their lifestyle. It is clear that the
trade-o between domestic duties and labour market commitments is much
more visible and tight in those countries than in the countries where public
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This is quite a generous income transfer paid to all families with children under the
age of three who do not use public daycare services, but rely instead on parental or
private care. It was introduced in the late 1980's.
Using micro-data from Helsinki, she estimated that rising allowance from zero to
FIM 3 500 (about the level of actual benet) would increase mother's probability of
staying home from 35 to 55 per cent.
Often these are migrant families from less developed countries.
According to Eurostat (1995), between the mid-1960's and 1992, fertility in the EU
was in constant decline. The overall pattern was aected by trends which varied from one
Member State to another. There was a slight recovery in the fertility rate in Belgium and
the Netherlands and a greater recovery in Denmark, Luxembourg, Finland and Sweden,
while the rate was unchanged in Austria, France, Germany and the UK. The southern
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childcare is provided.
It should be emphasised that the picture of the Nordic countries drawn
here is necessarily simplifying. For example, as Leira (1992) argues, child-
care policy in Norway deviates from that of the other Nordic countries.
Moreover, Ilmakunnas (1997) shows that there are labour supply reduc-
ing elements also in the Finnish family policy. She analysed the eect of
Finnish child home care allowance for women's labour supply decision.
According her results, introduction of the allowance increased popularity of
private care only marginally, but the eect on popularity of maternal care
was substantial . By having such a eect, the allowance is a major excep-
tion in the Finnish family policy, which has traditionally targeted increased
female labour supply.
The female childcare load can be reduced without any public intervention
by either decreasing the number of children or by dividing the load more
equally within the family. The former is the only solution if female labour
force participation rises without major changes in gender roles and if there
are no public childcare facilities available. In that case, children are often
concentrated into few families with many children. Modern Italy is a
good example of this kind of development. Availability of childcare is very
limited and gender roles have changed only marginally. As a consequence,
birth rates are currently very low in Northern Italy and as the rates are
declining also in the South, the average gure is one of the lowest in Eu-
rope. It is unclear how sustainable the current combination of high female
participation rate at the labour market and low birth-rate can be.
Hence, it is not very surprising that birth rates are high in countries
with generous public daycare . Moreover, Ilmakunnas (1994) has shown
3.1.5 Changing family patterns
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EU countries (Greece, Spain, Italy and Spain) experienced a sharp, swift drop.
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that there is a positive cross-country correlation between birth rates and
GDP-share of children-related public expenditures and transfers.
The latter alternative, i.e. changing gender roles, might be more at-
tractive if a public policy action has already taken place and has reduced
the costs associated with childcare (Francois 1998). However, in the model
analysed in this chapter, it will turn out that public policies would not
have any eect on decision making when gender roles are allocated in the
families. In what follows, the analysis of Francois is reviewed in Subsection
3.1.7 and commented in Section 3.4.
It is worthwhile to try to place this study in the existing literature. Rubery
(1987) divides neoclassical explanations of women's wages into three broad
categories. The rst one is Becker's discrimination hypothesis. According
to this hypothesis, women are paid less than their marginal product because
employers or fellow workers do not like them as employees or co-workers.
In this sense, female workers create a negative externality.
The second hypothesis is based on human capital theory, see Becker
(1993). For various reasons, mainly because of self selection, women tend
to have less work experience and a lower education level and hence their
productivity is lower than the productivity of men. Women's role in house-
hold and childcare is a barrier to the accumulation of human capital. Hence,
low human capital is a mediating factor, not the fundamental cause of the
lower pay of women.
Rubery's third category, job segregation, consists of three dierent fam-
ilies of theories. The rst of these segregation theories notes women's role
in reproduction. According to this explanation, women are allocated to
less paid jobs because they are less committed and less productive work-
ers. In this sense, this theory is quite similar to the human capital theory
mentioned above. However, the mediating factor is not human capital but
allocation of well-paid jobs. The second segregation theory is based on prej-
udice about which jobs are suitable for women. The third explanation of
labour market segregation is based on postulated real dierences of genders
in production.
Rubery (1987) also notes some non-neoclassical explanations of dier-
ent pay. Although this eld of research is wide and dispersed there is still
something in common. All these theories are based on the assumption that
3.1.6 Traditional gender studies
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the fundamental cause of women's low pay is their inferior position in the
social and cultural system. Patriarchal theories of women's wages are based
on the fact that women's position was inferior prior to capitalism and cap-
italism had to adapt to this structure. Women should earn less than men,
otherwise the patriarchal structure of society breaks down. The market
segmentation approach explains lower pay of women by referring to the
usefulness of dualism of the economy. The extreme version of this theory
states that the purpose of segmentation and divisions of the labour force
is to minimise the power of workers. The family-wage approach takes into
account the fact that labour income is divided inside the family. Accord-
ing to this approach, it is not correct to analyse an individual worker in
the labour market because his or her situation is heavily aected by other
members of the family.
This chapter denitely belongs to the job segregation theories. Genders
are allocated to dierent jobs because they face dierent costs of working
eciently. However, the idea behind the model has some links to the second
explanation category mentioned by Rubery. Women work less hard and are
less committed to work than men. This is not due to the lower technical
productivity of women, but due to market allocation. It is interesting to
note that there is no discrimination in the model and the outcome is "fair"
because employers get exactly what they pay for.
The recent paper by Francois (1998) is an interesting challenge for the tra-
ditional gender studies as well as for the analysis presented in this chapter.
In his model, all gender dierences arise endogenously. The author does not
deny the possibility of inherent gender dierences but argues that discrimi-
nation itself does not need to depend on such dierences. He demonstrates
that discrimination may persist even if inherent dierences between men
and women become less pronounced and indeed disappear altogether.
In Francois' model, labour markets are competitive, rms prot max-
imising, women and men are identical and neither employers nor anyone else
has a preference for men or an exogenous propensity to discriminate. The
analysis is based on two gender-symmetric assumptions. First, women and
men are organised into two-person households, in which both are equally
well-endowed with household-specic human capital; they are able to pro-
vide households services for themselves and each other at a cost lower than
3.1.7 Exogenous or endogenous gender dierences?
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This feature is adopted from Bulow and Summers (1986).
50
the external market rate. Second, the labour market consists of two job
types. There is permanent over-demand for eciency wage jobs in which
workers receive a wage premium in order to deter shirking . There also
exist non-eciency wage jobs which pay no such premium.
The features of Francois' model imply that if and only if one member
of a couple alone has an eciency wage job, both can benet by a trade
which increases the household work of the low-wage member in return for
money. The trade decreases household work of the high-wage member of
the family and the employer can lower eciency wage payments while still
satisfying the worker's participation constraint as threat of job loss entails
loss of gains from trade in addition to loss of the wage premium. Herein lies
a rm's desire to discriminate. If all other rms discriminate and allocate
attractive eciency wage jobs to one sex only, then a single rm can ensure
its employees receive this benet, and thus can pay a lower eciency wage
only if this rm employees men exclusively as well. Only by doing so can
it ensure that its employees come from households where they are the sole
eciency wage recipient, and therefore they can enjoy the benets of a trade
within household. Hence, discrimination is a Nash equilibrium.
Francois argues that policies focusing explicitly and solely on the labour
market may alleviate a substantial amount of discrimination, even though
external factors remains unchanged. For example, the author is able to
show that a policy of armative action, even when targeting only a part
of employers, can bring an end to discrimination. Furthermore, policies
that target gender dierences directly, such as childcare subsidies which
reduce female costs of employment, are markedly less eective in shifting
the economy from a discriminatory equilibrium. The policy advises drawn
from Francois' analysis are compared with our results in Section 3.4.
The basic model with two labour inputs (eort and conventional labour) is
introduced in Section 3.2. In the same section, the operation of the model is
illustrated assuming two types of rms, but only one gender type. Section
3.3 extends the analysis and studies the allocation of genders over rms.
Despite substantial inertia, family roles are not biologically or psycho-
logically xed. Individual families are able to alter their internal division of
labour and eort. Determinants of this kind of family role modernisation
are discussed in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes the analysis.
3.1.8 Content and organisation of the chapter
3.2. BASIC MODEL
15
16
15
16
They generalise the well-known Solow condition and show that a rm for which the
eort level is relatively more important pays higher wages than a rm for which eort is
of less importance. See also Stiglitz (1987).
This extreme assumption is justied because the aim of the analysis is to link pro-
duction and domestic activities together. The negotiation power of dierent types of
workers and eect of the trade unions are abstracted away to make the basic argument
as clear as possible.
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Wage formation and labour market stratication are analysed using a sim-
ple model with two labour input components. The labour demand side is
similar to that in Ramaswamy's and Rowthorn's studies (1991,1993).
The model of this chapter has a similar structure as the model in Chapter 2.
The basic elements are labour demand derived from the rm's maximisation
problem and preference relation of the workers. The preference relation is
again determined according to individual preferences. Despite the similar-
ities, the model is solved dierently; the rm is assumed to be capable of
setting the wage level . However, the labour market is structured in such
a way that there may be excess demand for high productivity labour, i.e.
the labour input of "high quality" workers. As a consequence, not only the
rm, but also the "high quality" workers extract some rent.
The rms produce goods using labour and eort and the workers are
paid according to their eort. The rm decides on the wage level taking
into account how the wage level aects performance of the workers. Math-
ematically, the problem of the rm is
max ( ( ) )
s.t. ( )
(3.1)
where
( ( ) ) = ( ( ))
is the prot function. The rm sets the number of workers and the wage
level to achieve the highest prot  available. The price level is assumed
N;E W ;W
N;W
U E;W U;
N;E W ;W F N;E W WN
N
W

 
3.2.1 General structure of the model
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Eciency wage models, i.e. models with a positive relationship between eort and
wage, have their roots in development economics, where there is a strong belief in the
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to be xed. If the link between wage and eort is bypassed, then prot is
increasing in eort and decreasing in wage .
The opposite is true for the workers; their utility is increasing in wage
and decreasing in eort. The utility realised in production, i.e. ( ),
must exceed the alternative , i.e. utility prevailing outside of the rm.
Otherwise the workers will not participate in production.
The restriction ( ) can be interpreted alternatively. The
participation constraint implies that ecient and exible working practices
should be compensated by higher wages if utility is xed. Assume that
( ) is well-behaving, that it can be inverted and treat utility as xed, i.e.
set it to . Then one obtains from equation = ( ) an alternative
description of the preferences of the workers.
= ( ) (3.2)
This is the eort function. For any given utility level, eort and wage are
positively related. Similarly, for any xed wage, the higher the eort, the
lower utility obtained. The eort function denes the shape of iso-utility
curves for the workers. All points ( ) satisfying Equation (3.2) are on
the same utility contour.
Eort functions of the form (3.2) are determined by the worker's outside
option. In the most simple case of our analysis, the outside option is the
utility of an unemployed worker. In more complex situations, utilities of
workers employed by other rms should be taken into account.
In the traditional eciency wage model the production function is
= [ ( ) ] (3.3)
where ( ) is eciency as a function of wage and is quantity of labour
input; ( ) and enter into the function multiplicatively. The rm
maximises prot  = [ ( ) ] and sets the wage such that
( )
( )
= 1 (3.4)
This is the Solow condition. The eort function that links together the
eciency of labour and the wage level is increasing.
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relation between real wage, nutrition and productivity. In modern industrial countries,
this explanation is quite irrelevant. More recent eciency wage models range from
imperfect information theories to so-called sociological explanations. The cornerstone
of the Shapiro-Stiglitz model (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984, see also previous articles by
Calvo 1979 and Salop 1979) is the fundamental disability of the rm to observe the
workers' eort. In the absence of proper screening devices, the rm pays high wages to
the workers and re them immediately if they are caught shirking in random checks. The
threat of losing a well-paid job deters workers from shirking and increases the average
eort. In other models with imperfect information, the relation between wage and eort
is based on analysis of search behaviour. Oering a higher wage will reduce the quitting
rate (Salop 1979) or will lead to a better pool of applicants. In the so-called sociological
models, the eort wages result from the notion of fairness (Akerlof 1984). Reduction in
wages by a rm may be considered unfair by the workers, leading them to supply less
eort.
The analysis of the production side of the model is the topic of discussion in Sub-
section 3.2.2.
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In this study, eort is a measure of the performance of the workers.
Interpretation of eort is closely related to exibility. The same amount
may be produced by using many hours in an inexible way or few hours
very eciently, just-on-time. The number of workers represents the quan-
tity of labour used in production. In this respect, the model is in line with
the traditional eciency-wage models where eort and hours are combined.
However, the production side of the model is richer in detail than produc-
tion in the basic eciency-wage model because it is necessary to allow the
importance of eort to vary across the rms. As a result, the Solow con-
dition does not hold anymore and the tools developed by Ramaswamy and
Rowthorn (1991,1993) are very useful.
Though the structure of the model analysed in this chapter is described by
(3.1), the analysis is actually carried out with the rm's iso-prot curves
and the workers' eort functions. The model is solved noting that in the
optimum, rms select the highest iso-prot curves that are consistent with
eort functions.
To facilitate the analysis, the production function of the model is spec-
ied in such a way that the iso-prot curves are linear in logarithmic wage
and logarithmic eort space . Hence, all combinations of log( ) and
log( ) satisfying
= constant + (3.5)
result in the same prot. is a rm-specic parameter describing the
importance of eort in production. Preferences of the workers can be ex-
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The operation of the basic model in its simplest form is analysed in Subsection 3.2.4.
The functional form, geometrical average, has a nice property
= = = =
An additional worker does not change the level of aggregate eort if he or she is of
the same quality as the original workers. As a result, there is a clear trade-o between
hiring more workers or paying more to the current ones to obtain a higher eort level.
Straightforward calculations show that if 1, the -function is increasing in
in a diminishing manner. As a consequence, there is no reason to use similar workers
dierently in production. See Propositions B.1 and B.2, page 155 onwards.
A A A A A A ::: A:
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pressed in the same space. It is shown in Subsection 3.2.3 that reasonable
assumptions produce a concave relationship between eort, wage and util-
ity.
= ( ) ( ) 0 ( ) 0 (3.6)
In the optimum = ( ) and thus the optimal eort and wage in the rm
depends on the parameter , i.e. on how important eort is in that rm .
The production function allows the importance of eort to vary across the
rms.
= ( )
( ) 0 ( ) 0 and ( ) 0
(3.7)
The parameter describes how important the eort of the workers is for
the rm. Low values of mean that production is very vulnerable if the
workers reduce their exibility, eort or care. Hence, in the rms with low
, the workers' commitment to proper working practices is more valuable
than in the rms with a high . In the latter group of rms, it is much
easier to substitute labour for eort than in the rms with low and high
.
Aggregate eort is a function of all individual contributions. The
following formulation is adopted:
( ) (3.8)
where is the number of workers in the rm. The aggregate eort is as-
sumed to be a symmetric Cobb-Douglas function of the individual eorts
, = 1 .
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Symmetric use implies that = = = and = = = .
Ramaswamy and Rowthorn (1991,1993) is followed here. However, labour input is
measured here in terms of the number of workers and wage is measured in per head
terms. Ramaswamy and Rowthorn did not specify the unit labour input.
W ::: W W E ::: E E
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In what follows, it is assumed that all the workers are equal and that
they are paid and used symmetrically in production . Then the production
side of the model can be solved using aggregate variables. In Appendix B,
it is shown that equal pay and equal role in production follow from equal
quality of the workers.
The rst step of the analysis is to derive the iso-prot curves . In
what follows, the rms are assumed to be small and posses no power at
the product markets, hence the price level can be treated as given. Prots
 ( ) are maximised when  ( ) = 0; the optimality
condition is
= ( ) (3.9)
Because ( ) is strictly decreasing, Equation (3.9) can be inverted and the
following expression is obtained.
= ( ) ( ) (3.10)
Using one of the rst-order conditions of the model allows us to write the
argument of the production function in a more useful form.
The model is partly log-linear and it is, hence, practical to analyse it in
the logarithmic form. Using logarithmic variables,
log( ) (3.11)
and
log( ) (3.12)
the variable
(3.13)
can be dened. This variable will have a substantial role in the following
analysis.
The next step in the analysis is to show that prot is an increasing
function of the variable . From Equation (3.13), one may note that
exp( ) = (3.14)
Let us dene the function ( ) as follows.
( ) ( ) (exp( )) (3.15)
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Using Equations (3.14) and (3.15), it is clear that the argument of the
production function (see Equations (3.7) and (3.10)) is equal to the function
( ).
= ( ) (3.16)
As a by-product, labour demand can be solved.
= ( ) = ( ) exp( ) (3.17)
Though the number of rms is constant, labour demand varies according
to the protability of each rm.
The wage bill can be written in the form
= exp( ) ( ) (3.18)
As a result, production and prot can be expressed as functions of the
auxiliary variable .
= ( ( )) (3.19)
 = ( ( )) exp( ) ( ) (3.20)
Note that ( ) is decreasing in . Then also ( ( )) is decreasing and as
a result ( ) is increasing in , see Equation (3.15). Because

= ( ) ( ( )) exp( ) + ( ) exp( ) (3.21)
and given that (see Equations (3.9) and (3.14))
exp( ) = = ( ) (3.22)
the following results are obtained.
( )
0 0 and

0 (3.23)
In the optimum, production and prot of the rm with depend solely
on the variable and thus it is in the interest of the rm to maximise it.
Iso-prot curves are therefore of the form = constant. Using Equation
(3.13) gives the form of the iso-prot curves in logarithmic eciency and
wage space.
= constant + (3.24)
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The utility function is given an alternative interpretation in Section 3.4.
The utility function used in this chapter is a simplied version of the more complex
alternative, see Appendix B, page 157.
In basic analyses,  is taken as a given parameter describing preferences. In Sub-
section 3.4, it will have a wider interpretation. Moreover, determining its value is also
discussed there.
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It should be noted that
( ) as far as is the argument of
the function. This property is used, for example, in Figure 3.1 on page 59.
The rm seeks the highest eort and the lowest wage available. Com-
binations of ( ) or equivalently combinations of ( ) are, however,
constrained by labour supply. Workers do not have any reason to accept
high eort requirements if the oered wage is not high enough because an
outside option is assumed to exist. Derivation of the eort function is the
topic of the next subsection.
Until now, the eort function has been used without a formal derivation.
The purpose of this subsection is to show that the concave eort function
can be derived from a reasonable utility function.
The starting point of analysis of this chapter was that female and male
workers are not equal. For a woman, it is more costly to commit oneself
to work according to the rules of the employer. This can be modelled as
follows. The utility of an individual worker is assumed to be an additively
separable function of wage and eort performed.
= ( ) = log( ) ( )
where  1 0
( ) 0 ( ) 0
(3.25)
The wage enters into utility function logarithmically . The convex
function describes the disutility resulting from the eort made. The
parameter  is allowed to vary across individuals. The higher is , the
higher is utility loss when eort is made .
By xing utility to the level and inverting the function , eort
can be written as a function of  and .
= (  )
log( )

(3.26)
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the iso-prot curves are linear in logarithmic space
for all concave production functions
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See Appendix B, page 158.
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A logarithmic version of (3.26) is
log( ) = log ( ) (3.27)
where = log() and = log( ).
Because ( ) is increasing and convex, ( ) ( ) is concave. The relation
between logarithmic eort and logarithmic wage is thus also concave. This
is shown in more detail in Appendix B (page 158), where partial derivatives
of the ( ) function are also provided.
The link between individual eort levels and aggregate eort was dened
in a way to allow easy aggregation . If the workers are identical, the
aggregate eort function ( ) is also concave, i.e.
= ( ) , ( ) 0, ( ) 0 (3.28)
Linear iso-prot curves and convex iso-utility curves guarantee that the
rm's maximisation problem is well dened. The rm chooses the highest
iso-prot contour consistent with the restriction (3.28). In Subsection 3.2.4
it will be shown that rms with dierent 's have optimums at dierent
points of the -curve.
Using the tools developed above, wage distribution can be analysed. For
simplicity, assume rst that there is only one gender and two rms in the
economy. The assumptions imply that  =  for = 1 2 and = 1 ,
is number of workers in rm . Without loss of generality, we can set
 = 1 and thus log() = 0. There is therefore a single and simple
aggregate eort function = ( ).
Let us begin the analysis by assuming that is constant and high
enough to cause unemployment. The assumption will be relaxed later.
Firms dier from each other only in how important eort is in production.
The eciency parameter for the Firm 1 is and for the Firm 2 , .
Because , eort is more important for Firm 1. The situation can be
analysed using iso-prot lines
( ) = +
( ) = +
(3.29)
where and are constants dening specic lines on the iso-prot cur-
vatures.
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If the function were linear, i.e. if the corresponding function between and were
exponential ( = exp( ) ) instead of concave, then there would be a corner solution.
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium with one gender and two rms
The rms choose the highest prot lines consistent with the -function.
They pick dierent points from the worker's iso-utility curve ( ) because
the iso-prot lines are tangent to the -function at dierent points, see
Figure 3.1.
The easiest way to solve the problem is to maximise = subject
to = ( ). The restriction can be substituted in the maximand. The
rst order condition of the problem
max ( )
(3.30)
is
( ) = (3.31)
and the second order condition is automatically satised because the -
function is concave . Because ( ) is monotonously decreasing (i.e. ( )
0), it is clear that
= ( ) ( ) + (3.32)
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An example of this kind of activity is cleaning work. It is always more protable to
hire more workers than to pay more to a constant number of sta. An opposite example
is airline piloting. To full the task of safe navigation it is better to pay more than to
employ more people into the cockpit of the aeroplane.
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and that
= ( ) ( ) (3.33)
i.e. the eort taken is determined according to the production function and
is independent of endogenous variables.
In the rm optimum, there are workers earning and producing ef-
fort , workers earning and performing eort and some unemployed
workers. This cannot be an equilibrium as the unemployed workers would
start to compete for the jobs.
Using the labour demand equation (Equation (3.17)) one may obtain
the labour market equilibrium condition
= = ( ) exp( ) (3.34)
where is the number of workers. Because is constant and = by
Equation (3.32), labour demand depends negatively on the utility the
workers enjoy, i.e.
=
( )
exp( ) 0 (3.35)
Equation (3.34) hence denes utility uniquely; corresponding values of
labour demands, wages and eorts can be calculated using it. As noted
previously, the Firm 1 with low pays high wage and the workers in this
rm work more eectively than those in Firm 2.
The results obtained can be generalised for more than two rms without
diculty. However, there is no reason to do this here as the results would be
obvious; rms with high and thus low nd their optimum at a low wage
and eort level. These rms value eort low and are capable of substituting
labour for eort and care.
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In the previous section, the basic model was set up and analysed. In the
rst phase a production function with two labour inputs, eort and the
number of workers, was postulated and the shape of corresponding iso-prot
contours was derived. The second step was to derive the eort function, i.e.
iso-utility curve for the workers from the utility function. In the following
subsection the setting was completed by an analysis of market equilibrium
when there is only one type of worker. If there are no gender dierences in
the labour force, then those rms with high eort requirements pay higher
wages than are paid by the rms with low-eort production technologies.
In this section, gender dissimilarities discussed at Section 3.1 are intro-
duced into the formal analysis. In the model, the genders dier from each
other with respect to the cost of eort, in all other ways they are equal. This
assumption is based on the discussion in Subsections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 where
it was argued that taking care of children requires mainly eort, but not so
much labour measured in terms of hours. Hence, women, who are usually
in charge of taking care of children, nd it harder than men to commit to
work eciently, i.e. under the strict rules of an employer. High eort can
be interpreted in this context as workers' readiness to concentrate on their
duties, to work exible hours and to leave personal matters out of their
mind when working.
The section is organised as follows. The analysis starts with the case in
which society is divided into two genders. The two genders are internally ho-
mogeneous, but dier from each other. Basic properties of the equilibrium
are analysed in Subsection 3.3.1 using the notation of the previous section.
The results are illustrated graphically in Appendix B. A continuous rm
distribution is assumed as it makes our notation much more simple and the
results more transparent. The main result of the analysis is presented in
Subsection 3.3.2.
The assumption that the genders are internally homogeneous is an ex-
treme one. Subsection 3.3.3 deals with a more realistic case where individual
workers are allowed to dier from each other even when they are of the same
gender.
3.3 Heterogeneous workers
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Gender dierences can be modelled by having dierent  for male workers
and for female workers. For simplicity, we assume that  = 1 0 for male
and  1 0 for female workers. The corresponding logarithmic coecients
are log( ) = 0 and log( ) 0. In what follows, the
subscript is dropped from because the symbol is not in use as
0.
The eort function = ( ) denes the shape of the iso-utility
curvature. By varying , one may observe how the shape of the iso-utility
contour changes with utility levels. From Equations (B.8) and (B.10) it
can be noted that the iso-utility curves for women are of the same shape
as those for men, but are located some distance below the correspond-
ing male curves in logarithmic wage and eciency space. Hence a female
worker's eort is lower than the eort of a male worker
. This creates a preference for the rms; male workers are preferred to
female workers. However, market mechanisms correct the situation and the
utilities of the genders adjust. Let us denote male utility as and female
utility as .
We assume that and show that it impossible. A rm may
hire a male worker with a ( ) combination determined by the function
= ( ) or a female worker with ( ) combination determined by
function = ( ) . Because , is positive and function ( )
is increasing, ( ) ( ) for every . This cannot be an
equilibrium allocation since every rm with a female worker is willing to
replace her with a man and every man is ready to accept the replacement
as his utility does not decrease.
Consider next the market allocation of genders.
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level
In an equilibrium, the utility of male workers exceeds the
utility of female workers, i.e. .
There are rms in the economy. The rms are char-
acterised by their eort parameters , . Let us rank the rms
according to the size of the parameter:
Proposition 3.1
Proof
Assumption 3.1
2
3.3.1 Equilibrium with two genders - discrete case
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Firm number 1 values eort at least as much as Firm 2 etc. Intuitively it
is clear that male workers are concentrated in rms with low serial numbers.
Let us analyse the problem more carefully. The following Assumption 3.2
simplies the analysis of gender allocation without loss of generality.
See Appendix B.
Proposition 3.2 has a clear interpretation. Female workers are concen-
trated in rms with a high , i.e. with low eort requirements. Male work-
ers are employed by rms with low and high . This result is illustrated
graphically in Appendix B. The next step is to study the determination of
the utilities and . In what follows, to simplify the analysis, an assump-
tion on continuous rm distribution is adopted.
Consider an allocation of workers in which men are concentrated in the
rms = 1 and women in the rms = + 1 . Denote number of
male and female workers in the economy by and . Gender utilities
and as well as the parameter could be solved using the denition of
the iso-prot curve and labour market equilibrium conditions
= and = (3.36)
where is labour demand in a rm employing only men and
labour demand in a rm employing only women. However, it turns out that
the analysis is more transparent and the notation simpler if a continuous
case is analysed, but the results are not altered.
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All workers in one particular rm are of the same gen-
der.
Let Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. In a market equilib-
rium it is impossible that women are working in the rm with and men
in the rm with if .
Firms are indexed according to the eciency parameter
, which is uniformly distributed between and . To avoid expressing the
density function explicitly, assume that .
Assumption 3.2
Proposition 3.2
Proof
Assumption 3.3
3.3.2 Equilibriumwith two genders - continuous case
e
e
X  e X  
 e  
CHAPTER 3. CHILDCARE AND WAGE DISTRIBUTION
i
i
f

s
f
i
m
s

m
i
 i i
i
i
i i i
 i
i
f f f m m m
f m
0
0
0
64
Utilities and and the parameter can be solved from the following
equilibrium conditions.
= (3.37)
= (3.38)
= (3.39)
Start with the female labour market equilibrium condition (Equation
(3.37)). Firms from to employ women; the labour demand of an indi-
vidual rm is
( ) exp
( )
(3.40)
The value of ( ) and thus eort are given because = ( ).
Because ( ) is increasing and = (see Equation (3.32)), labour
demand depends negatively on the utility the workers enjoy. Labour
market equilibrium requires that any decrease in labour demand in the
rms using female labour is absorbed by the other rms. Hence, the higher
utility, the lower the parameter . The equilibrium condition (Equation
(3.37)) can be written in the form
= ( ) ( ) 0 (3.41)
By similar reasoning one obtains
= ( ) ( ) 0 (3.42)
The third equilibrium condition (Equation (3.39)) is based on linearity
of the iso-prot curves . In the equilibrium, rm should be indierent
about using female or male workers. Hence
( ) = ( ) (3.43)
Prot maximisation requires that
( )
=
( )
= (3.44)
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hence
( ) = ( ) (3.45)
and
= (3.46)
From these equations one obtains
= = (3.47)
i.e. Equation (3.39). Substituting Equations (3.41) and (3.42) into Equa-
tion (3.47) gives
=
( ) ( )
(3.48)
which combines three equilibrium conditions in a neat form. As the right-
hand-side of (3.48) is decreasing and the left-hand-side is increasing in ,
there is a unique solution and the following conclusion is justied. It is
the main proposition of this chapter.
=
The wage premium of the model should be interpreted carefully. It is
the dierence between male and female wages in rm , i.e. in the rm
which is indierent between male and female workers. At the same time,
the premium is the dierence between the highest female wage and the
lowest male wage. The wage paid to male workers deviates from the female
wage more when the importance of eort increases in rm . The same
factor determines the extra utility, a sort of a "gender rent", that male
workers enjoy. In that sense, rms at the "middle" of the rm distribution
are crucial in determining gender stratication in the labour market.
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Let Assumptions 3.1 - 3.3 hold. The gender gap, i.e.
utility dierence between the genders is
where describes the extra eort cost of women and is a parameter
describing the importance of eort in the rm which is indierent about
employing men and women.
Proposition 3.3
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The analysis of Subsection 3.3.2 was based on an assumption that female
and male workers had dierent family commitments. Also, it was assumed
that these commitments are equal within both genders groups. As a result,
it was found that the assumed higher female cost of labour market commit-
ments led to a polarised labour market. Male workers are employed in high
eort jobs and are paid well, and female workers are working in low paid,
not particularly demanding professions. As a consequence of our extreme
assumptions, the model predicted that the highest female wage (eort) is
lower than the lowest male wage (eort). In this subsection, we show that if
this unrealistic assumption is relaxed, then the unrealistic predictions also
vanish.
As earlier, an economy with rms, female workers and male
workers is studied and Assumptions 3.1 - 3.3 hold. On the workers' side,
there is now more variation than before. Instead of two dierent values, 
may take any value larger than or equal to one. Hence, the logarithmic 's
( is index of individual, = 1 + ) are positive. Without loss of
generality individuals may be ranked according to their 's as follows.
(3.49)
+
= 1
Immediately one may conclude that all members in group have the
same utility . Because of asymmetrical gender roles it may be assumed
that male workers are concentrated in the beginning of the sequence and
female workers in the end, but in the middle they are mixed. However
natural, this assumption is not necessary.
Utilities , = 1 and parameters are determined
according to the following equilibrium conditions.
= ( ) (3.50)
= ( ) (3.51)
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There are ( ) groups of workers such
that for every worker belonging to group , there is an eort
parameter , . In other words, the groups are internally
homogeneous. Let us denote the size of groups by .
Assumption 3.4
3.3.3 Varying family commitments
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...
= ( ) (3.52)
= (3.53)
= (3.54)
...
= (3.55)
In the system, there are 2 1 unknown variables and 2 1 equations,
hence it can be solved. Because
= and = (3.56)
Proposition 3.3 can be generalised.
= +
= + +
= + + +
+ 1 = ( )
It can be concluded that the model is capable of producing a wage and
utility distribution. If men generally have less childcare responsibilities than
women, they are more often than women allocated to jobs with a high wage
and utility.
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Let Assumptions 3.1 - 3.4 hold. The utilities of groups
of workers are
...
where 's are group-specic eort cost parameters and 's eort parame-
ters of the rms that are indierent about employing workers from groups
and . Dierences are positive.
Proposition 3.4
Z
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An emergence of new family roles may be a result of the invention of new childcare
technologies. For example, in a traditional society, a change may be caused by the
availability of bottled milk. Children could then be cared for by their father as well as
their mother. Another example is the emergence of egalitarian values. Families may
recognise that the responsibility for children can be organised in a new way.
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In the previous sections family roles were analysed as exogenous for the
families. In the section at hand, family roles are analysed as endogenous
choices. Every family must provide a minimum amount of care for the
children and there is a trade-o between the eorts of the parents. A
family decides on its gender roles taking into account the expected wage
distribution and the labour market location of the family members.
In the basic model, the eciency parameter  was interpreted as a pa-
rameter describing preferences. In what follows, the preference interpreta-
tion will be relaxed and the parameter is merely understood as an outcome
from underlying preferences and restrictions, aected by public policies.
For technical reasons, it is assumed that the family cannot freely choose
the roles because this kind of model would be too complex to solve. In
the model, there is only one alternative for the traditional family model.
A modern family pattern is adopted if it renders higher utility than the
traditional one. If new roles are adopted, more male eort is required but
some additional female energy is saved for the labour market. A perfectly
egalitarian assumption is adopted.
Formally, this can be modelled as follows. A family, i.e. a couple con-
sisting of a woman and a man, has collective childcare duty. Either the
female member of the family bears the whole load, i.e. childcare param-
eters are  for women and  = 1 for men or the load is divided such
that  is parameter for both members of the family. The corresponding
logarithmic parameters are 0 and . The corresponding utilities are
(for the traditional women and men) and (for the members of
the modern families).
  1
 ;  ; 
U;U U ; U
> > :
If a family adopts a modern family pattern, the load of
childcare is divided exactly evenly.
The following holds for the parameters:
Assumption 3.5
Assumption 3.6
3.4 Modernisation of family roles
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Assumption 3.6 and Proposition 3.4 together imply that
.
The family faces a choice that will aect family life as well as labour
market participation of the family. According to Proposition 3.5, the fol-
lowing proposition is also true.
Without altruism, centralised decision making in the family or side pay-
ments, any deviation from the traditional family pattern is therefore un-
likely; Pareto improvements are impossible. Altruistic motives and side
payments may change the situation. However, the childcare technology
described by parameter pairs 0 and , should favour division of du-
ties. That is, should be small relative to . Only then the change in
the utility of the female worker can be large relative to the change in the
utility of the male worker, i.e. should be large relative to .
The situation can be modelled as follows.
The parameter  was introduced into the utility function (Equation
(3.25), page 57) as a parameter describing individual preferences. If Equa-
tion (3.25) is interpreted as a derivative of underlying preferences and con-
straints, then  also might have a wider interpretation.
    1
 
  
 1  1  1
In the basic two-gender case (see Subsections 3.3.1 - 3.3.2) we assumed
implicitly that  =  = 1, i.e. that the childcare loads of men and the
government are minimal. Because eort is arduous, women minimise it and
set
 =  =  (3.57)
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Let Assumption 3.6 hold. Then .
Deviation from the traditional family roles increases the
utility of the female member of the family and decreases the utility of the
male member.
Childcare is characterised by a Cobb-Douglas household
production function
where minimum childcare is produced by the eorts of the wife , the
husband and the government . is high enough to guarantee that
there are still some responsibilities for the parents after any government
intervention. Some basic eort is required from everyone involved in the
production, let us denote this by , and .
Proposition 3.5
Proof
Proposition 3.6
Assumption 3.7
2
e
e
e
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Let Assumption 3.7 hold and express the childcare production technol-
ogy in logarithmic form.
+ = (3.58)
where , and are childcare loads of the wife, the husband and the
government. , and are household production function parameters and
the minimum care requirement. If childcare is solely a female duty, i.e. if
= 0, then
= (3.59)
In the modern families, the load is divided equally, i.e. = = such
that
=
+
(3.60)
As a direct consequence of Assumption 3.8, one may observe that the
following must hold in the market equilibrium:
(i) + 2 if all the families are traditional,
(ii) + = 2 if both family types exist, and
(iii) + 2 if all the families are modern.
(3.61)
A stationary situation prevails only if there is no way to gain by changing
the roles in the family.
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;
  
  





:
  


 
:
U U U
U U U
U U U
 


 

 

;
 
  





Families are utilitarian, i.e. families tend to maximise
the sum of the female and the male utility.
Let Assumptions 3.5 - 3.8 hold.
(a) There are modern families only if men are at least as productive in
childcare as women, i.e. .
(b) If men and women are equally productive in childcare, i.e. if
approaches , the number of modern families approaches zero.
(c) The share of modern families approaches one only if men are re-
markably more productive in childcare than women, i.e. only if
i.e. only if .
(d) Government policy does not aect family decision making.
Assumption 3.8
Proposition 3.7
b
b
b
e
e
e
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See Appendix B.
Proposition 3.7 may seem quite pessimistic in terms of egalitarian aims.
Families adopt equal roles only if men are at least eective in childcare than
women. However, one may ask why families would then adopt an equal
division of the childcare load. Why would the most productive member of
the family, the man, not specialise in childcare?
The results obtained depend, of course, heavily on the strong assump-
tions made. However, they highlight some general features of our model
and, perhaps also of the real world. First, when a group of individuals
with equal eort parameters becomes larger, members of the group face
declining utility. Second, in a model where gender stratication arises from
exogenous dierences between the sexes, all gender gaps remain until the
basic factors are changed. In this respect, our results are more pessimistic
that those of Francois (1998). In his analysis, there are no exogenous gen-
der dierences, therefore relatively weak policy interventions can make a
dierence. For example, an armative action programme would be enough
to shift families from unequal gender roles to equal ones. In the analy-
sis at hand, this would not be enough as the dierences are more deeply
rooted in societies and cultures. There is therefore no reason to expect very
good output-to-input ratio for policies targeting more equal labour market
stratication.
Proof
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We have analysed labour market equilibrium in the case of unequal child-
care loads. According to the theoretical analysis, those with heavy do-
mestic commitments, or women, are allocated to occupations with pre-
dictable timetables and without high commitment requirements, i.e. in
low-pay production processes. Men, with lighter domestic
commitments, concentrate instead in rms where , i.e. commitment
of the employees, is more important. Flexible and irregular hours and a
high commitment to serve the employer are typical in, let us say, manage-
rial professions. Moreover, it was predicted that rms pay higher wages to
workers who are committed to work eectively and exibly, thus women
earn less than men.
Our second major conclusion was concerned with the size of the wage
dierence, i.e. the wage gap. According to our simplied model, the dif-
ference between childcare loads of the genders (parameter in the model)
explains wage gaps. The higher the dierence in load, the higher wage gap.
The number of children is, of course, an important determinant of the load,
but also the childcare facilities available and the division of duties within
family matter. Keeping industrial societies in mind, it was argued that the
availability of public childcare facilities, e.g. daycare centres, might have
an eect on wage gaps.
There are many factors aecting the gender wage dierential: traditions
(i.e. inertia in social roles and practices), dierences in skills and education
and, clearly, discrimination. The theory presented in this chapter does
not aim to substitute all other explanations, it is merely a complement.
However, for analytical and expositional reasons, the theory is presented
using a simplied model without any traditional elements creating gender
wage dierentials. For the same reasons, the results obtained should not be
taken too literally. It is, however, interesting to note that in the two-gender
case, an extremely small dierence in domestic eort requirements causes
a totally diversied gender allocation in the labour market. Though this is

time-intensive
eort
3.5.1 Predictions of the model
3.5.2 Does the theory t with the facts?
3.5 Concluding remarks
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a property of our simplied model, it might be a sign of something more
general. Like Becker (1993) points out, the cause and the consequences may
be extremely disproportionate in some cases. Hence, calculations showing
only a small productivity dierence between genders may be misleading:
it is possible that minor dierences have major consequences. If this is
the case, empirical testing of the theory presented here would be quite a
arduous task.
Before more structured analyses are available, one may consider some spe-
cial cases and casual observations. Our analysis of wage dispersion was
based on the eciency wage model by Ramaswamy and Rowthorn (1991,
1993). They used airline piloting and cleaning as examples of the main idea;
people with high eort requirements are paid high wages as a compensa-
tion for eort produced. Pilots are required to work in a very concentrated
manner; lack of eort cannot be compensated by longer working hours. On
the other hand, a bad cleaning result can be corrected by appointing more
cleaners or doing the job several times. The same example is suitable for the
analysis of gender wage dierential. Almost all pilots are men and almost
all cleaners are women.
Considering the care professions complicates and enriches the picture.
For example, both doctors and nurses should work carefully. Also, the work
process is continuous in both professions. Patients cannot be left alone even
if the family commitments of the sta would require one to stop working.
Still there is a big dierence in the salaries of doctors and nurses. Though
this observation at rst glance seems to contradict the theory presented
here, this it not the case. Not only the allocation of female workers adjusts,
but also the professional practices change according to the availability of
labour.
Care was historically organised at home and it was natural for women to
continue practising it when it was professionalised. Many researchers have
indeed emphasised that female wage labour emerged as an extension of
household work. Even nowadays, food processing, textile work and care are
performed by women both at home and at work. This is possible because
work processes are organised in a way that facilitates the female dual role.
For example, the shift system at hospitals is dierent for nurses and doctors.
Doctors, who are mostly male, are committed to work exible hours, but
nurses, normally female, are working according to a rigid timetable. One
explanation is the fact that the xed hours system suits also married women.
Moreover, hospitals oer nurseries for the children of the sta even in such
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Not all woman marry or have children. However, from the employers' side there is
always a risk of pregnancy and a sudden increase in domestic duties. To diminish the
risk, marriage has been forbidden for women in many professions. Maids, air hostesses
and nurses have had to commit not to marry and the practice still prevails in some
societies.
Duncan (1996) measures the wage gap by calculating the ratio of average female wage
rate to average male wage rate. The ratio measures inequality in wage rates per unit
time worked, not income dierences. The gures should be interpreted very cautiously
as the eects of the other factors aecting wage dierentials, e.g. educational dierences,
are not controlled.
O'Neill and Polachek (1993) show, however, that the wage gap has narrowed during
the 1980's in the US labour markets. On average, the gender gap declined by about 1 %
per year. The authors nd that convergence in measurable work-related characteristics
explains one-third to one-half the narrowing.
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countries where there are generally no such services available.
The second theme of the analysis was the determinants of childcare loads.
We argued that public childcare arrangements may be inuential explana-
tory variable for the wage gaps. It is interesting to note that wage gaps are
smallest in those European countries with large childcare programmes, see
Table 3.1. Moreover, wage gaps in USA, Japan and Canada are remarkably
higher than in Europe (see e.g. Gunderson 1989) . One possible expla-
nation for this observation is the almost complete non-existence of public
childcare policies in those countries. However, it cannot be emphasised too
much that the evidence is very weak.
Waldfogel's (1998) empirical results are also interesting. According to
her, there is a gap of 10-15 per cent between earnings of the women with
children and of those without children. Women with children are system-
atically paid a lower wage than women without children after adjusting
for dierences in human capital attributes. On the other hand, married
men receive a wage premium. Waldfogel includes short maternity leaves
and insucient childcare policies on the list of possible explanations for the
ndings.
Though casual observations support the theory, the acceptance of the the-
ory, i.e. acceptance that the family commitment is a factor among the others
aecting labour market stratication and that the availability of childcare
may matter, would require systematic empirical research. Unfortunately
this is not yet available. The following questions deserve attention in the
future.
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Sweden 90
Denmark 87
Norway 86
Italy 83
France 81
Finland 78
Belgium 76
Greece 76
The Netherlands 75
West Germany 73
Spain 72
Portugal 72
Ireland 68
UK 68
Table 3.1: The wage gap: Western Europe around 1990 (Duncan 1996)
In the discussion, the terms "eort" and "exibility" were used as syn-
onyms. How valid is this interpretation? Is the distinction between eort
and labour input measured in hours a useful conceptualisation? Can eort
be measured? If yes, is there a positive correlation between the eort per-
formed and the wage level? Is there a negative correlation between eort
requirements and the share of women in dierent professions or in dierent
rms? Is it possible to compare quantitatively childcare loads in dierent
countries?
A study of the strength of commitments in typical female and typical
male professions would be a reasonable starting point for combined concep-
tual and empirical research. International comparisons of childcare policies
also deserve more attention by economists.
A hypothetical case with two alternative family roles, i.e. traditional and
modern, was analysed in Section 3.4. The modern family was one with
equal childcare commitments. It was shown that a part of the families
adopt the modern family pattern only if the men are more productive in
Country Wage gap
3.5.3 Is there any scope for change?
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childcare production than women. Otherwise, the modern option would
imply in those families larger losses for the husband than the wife would
gain. In this respect, our results were much more pessimistic than those of
Francois (1998). According to his analysis, the gender roles are endogenous,
and limited policy action would be enough to move the economy into a non-
discriminating equilibrium.
12
1
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See for example Ashenfelter (1987), Ashenfelter and Currie (1990), Bloom and Ca-
vanagh (1986a, 1986b and 1987), Chelius and Dworking (1980), Crawford (1979, 1981
and 1982b), Currie and McConnell (1991), Farber (1980), Farber and Bazerman (1986,
1987 and 1989), Farber, Neale and Bazerman (1990) and Kennan and Wilson (1993).
Professor Matti Pohjola suggested to me to study the topic. He is perhaps the rst
person to discover the link.
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the operation and the role of the
Finnish wage arbitration system; this hasn't been attempted before in eco-
nomic literature. However, easy answers are not available as the system
is dicult to interpret. In this sense, the situation resembles its American
and Canadian counterparts. In spite of large and growing economic litera-
ture on the topic , many issues and aspects of arbitration are unclear and
dicult to interpret. The analysis of this study is carried out partly by
comparing Finnish and North American systems, partly by using simple
game and decision theoretical arguments.
The correspondence between the Finnish arbitration system and the
arbitration in the North American public sectors is not a well-established
fact. As far I know, the link has not been studied before . Hence, one of the
rst steps in the analysis is to show that the arbitrator may aect the wage
outcome also in the Finnish system; in the North American system this is
evident. After that, the issues raised in the North American discussion are
analysed in the Finnish context.
The most important disagreement in the discussion has been about the
77
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general role of the arbitrator in wage setting. As Bloom and Cavanagh
(1987, page 357) put it:
..., it remains an open empirical question whether arbitrators
should mainly be viewed as individuals who (1) impose on ne-
gotiators their exogenous preferences, or (2) seek to learn about
disputants' preferences from the relationship between the facts
and nal positions in an attempt to search for outcomes that
maximise the disputants' welfare.
Kennan and Wilson (1993) strongly favour the rst alternative, the second
one is supported, for example, by Farber and Bazerman (1986).
The chapter is organised as follows. In the next two sections the Finnish
arbitration system is described and North American arbitration systems,
both existing and suggested ones, are discussed. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 discuss
the theoretical fundamentals for understanding arbitration. It is argued
that implementingdesirable wage functions requires complicated structures.
From that basis, the Finnish wage arbitration system is analysed with sim-
ple game theoretical tools in Sections 4.6 and 4.7. It is argued that the
Finnish system can be interpreted as a particular form of arbitration, i.e.
that it goes further than simple mediation or conciliation. Though there is
a right to strike, the whole arbitration process is highly structured and the
state arbitrator is very inuential. Section 4.8 concludes the analysis.
4.2. THE FINNISH ARBITRATION SYSTEM
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in Finnish. Kauppinen (1988) uses an alternative translation
. Although that is the word-for-word translation, I prefer to use
the term . I like to emphasis the fact that the Finnish arbitration system is
highly structured and the arbitrator is inuential. However, the term is
proper when the period prior the Second World War or the rst two decades after the
war are described.
The very fact that the late State Arbitrator, Mr. Jorma Reini was chairperson of
one of the Central Trade Unions before his nomination, supports the same conclusion.
It also highlights the tripartite nature of the Finnish employment policy. Several other
arbitrators have also had personal relations with the tripartite incomes policy.
Mattila (1992) mentions that the rst known conciliation case was the strike in 1491
in the harbour of Turku. Mediation and conciliation became more important after the
Valtakunnansovittelija
The State Conciliator
arbitrator
conciliation
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According to Finnish labour law, all strikes or lock-outs must be announced
to the State Arbitrator , hereafter the arbitrator, fourteen days before the
industrial action is to take place. Otherwise, the action is illegal and those
responsible can be prosecuted. Illegal strikes or lock-outs have been very un-
common recently and the rules of the arbitration system are well-honoured
also in practice. There are several reasons for this. First, Finnish indus-
trial relations have been generally good, at least in a comparative sense, for
decades and strikes as such have been quite rare during the 1980's and the
1990's. Second, the state has historically been active in a tripartite system
in the labour market. Incomes policy and nation-wide wage agreements
have been important elements in the national consensus. Hence, it was
easy for the trade unions and the employer's associations to accept state
involvement in the wage negotiation process; it was only one form of the
state intervention in the labour market.
It is very dicult to believe that the current system of wage arbitration
would have survived for more than thirty years without sincere support
of the employers' associations and the trade unions. I suggest that the
arbitration system must be implicitly agreed upon by the labour market
organisations. Although punishments for illegal industrial actions are se-
vere, it is impossible to imagine a situation where all trade unions, rms or
employers' associations are forced to submit all cases to ocial arbitration
contrary to their own will .
Conciliation and mediation of industrial disputes have a long history also
in Finland . Between the First and the Second World War, conciliation
4.2.1 Historical background
4.2 The Finnish arbitration system
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industrialisation of Finland during the nineteenth century, especially from 1890's on
when industrial conicts increased during a long economic recovery.
Wage control was based on an idea of a constant consumption wage, i.e. all pro-
ductivity gain was assumed to belong to the employer. However, the development of
the labour market and the rapid economic growth that was experienced after the war
were not consistent with conservative wage increases. Wage control was under constant
pressure and wages actually increased faster than law allowed for.
Left-wing parties close to the trade unions voted against the reform in the Parlia-
ment. It was not an objection to the arbitration system as such, but merely a protest
against some details of the system. For example, the Ministry of Social Aairs was given
by the same law a right to postpone any strike or lock-out for two weeks and the trade
unions did not want accept that.
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was organised by the district conciliators appointed by the Ministry of So-
cial Aairs (Mattila 1992). During the Second World War labour market
disputes were mediated by wage control authorities. Wages were regu-
lated until 1955, but regulation could not always cope with pressure from
the trade union side. In fact, incomes policy with tripartite negotiations
started during the 1950's within the wage control councils. These councils
were nominated to implement the laws dening wage increase rules . Trade
unions and the employers' associations had their own representatives in the
wage councils. The role of these councils changed gradually; control was
replaced by conciliation and agreements. (Sovala 1991a and 1991b; see also
Pekkarinen and Vartiainen 1993)
After the Second World War, industrial relations were poor and concilia-
tion was needed more than before. An act passed in 1946 by the Parliament
made it obligatory for the disputing parties to give advance notice of a strike
or a lock-out to the district conciliators and to the opposite party in the
negotiations. Disputing parties were also obligated to take part in concil-
iation. (Kauppinen 1988) Conciliation started gradually to transform to
arbitration.
When wage control was abolished in 1955, new institutional arrange-
ments were needed. The main long term intention of the government was
to create an incomes policy; such a policy nally emerged in the late 1960's.
A more modest aim was to reform wage conciliation. The reform started in
1955 and the law was passed in the Parliament in 1962 . The main element
of the law was the establishment of the independent oce for the arbitrator.
However, it is important to note that the arbitrator is a civil servant and is
nominated for a four year term by the President of the Republic of Finland.
Five district arbitrators are also nominated to assist the arbitrator.
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Normally, only some two-thirds of employees are aected by the central agreement,
but the comprehensive incomes settlements in 1995 and 1997 aected almost 100 per
cent of the labour force.
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Wages are mainly agreed upon at the industry level in Finland. Since the
1960's these agreements between trade unions and employers' associations
have been co-ordinated at the national level. Almost every year there has
been at least an attempt to reach a centralised agreement between the
central organisations of trade unions and the employers' national bodies.
During some years, also the State and the federation of farmers have joined
in the agreement. The centralised agreement is binding only if the parties
at the industry level agree to abide by it. In that sense, there are two
negotiation rounds. The rst round is about the content of the agreement
and the second about who participates in the agreement .
Labour market conicts in the Finnish system can be classied into
three dierent types; the arbitrator is not involved in all of these. The rst
type is when there are problems in reaching a central wage agreement at the
national level. These disputes are normally mediated by a top civil servant
or by a leading politician, e.g. the PrimeMinister, and the arbitrator is very
seldom involved. Because reaching centralised agreement is not obligatory
in the Finnish system, these disputes normally end without a deal. The
parties then engage in industry-level negotiations, in which agreements are
reached without any formal co-ordination.
The second type of conict takes place when there is disagreement at the
industry level. These disputes are the main eld of work of the arbitrator.
He gets involved in the process after one of the parties has led a threat of
industrial action.
The third type is disputes at the rm level. These may happen if there
is disagreement about the application or interpretation of an industry level
agreement, this is called Often these disputes are
solved in the industrial tribunal without the arbitrator. It is also possi-
ble that parties at the rm level are not members in the industry level
organisations and encounter problems in agreeing upon work conditions or
pay. Firm and industry level arbitration is called The
arbitrator frequently takes part in these negotiations.
According to Sarkko (1980), the arbitrator has two tasks to full. First,
the arbitrator should prevent industrial conicts by promoting better in-
dustrial relations. The second task is to act as a chairperson in the actual
negotiations between parties.
grievance arbitration.
interest arbitration.
4.2.2 Wage setting and arbitration in Finland
CHAPTER 4. FINNISH WAGE ARBITRATION - THEORETICAL COMMENTS
9
10
11
9
10
11
In politicallymotivated strikes this is not the case: these are normally not announced
ocially. That is not a problem for the arbitration because in political strikes there is
very little to negotiate or agree: the strikes end like they start, without any formal notice.
This does not apply to political strikes or solidarity actions without any selsh
purpose.
The statistics of public arbitration are not published anymore. This is perhaps be-
cause the number of cases has declined drastically. This is mainly due to fewer industrial
disputes.
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The arbitrator gets involved in the negotiation after a strike or a lock-
out is announced. A prerequisite for industrial action is that there is no
collective agreement in force . The announcement should be given to the
oce of the arbitrator and to the opposite party fourteen days before the
action is planned to take place. The motivation of this requirement is to give
enough time for the arbitrator to operate. If the planned action threatens
"essential general interests", the Ministry of Labour has a legal right to
postpone it for two weeks . The decision is made after a recommendation
by the arbitrator.
After ling a notice of strike or of any other form of work stoppage,
the arbitrator takes whatever action he considers suitable. The parties
are obligated to attend negotiations chaired by the arbitrator and they are
required to supply any information the arbitrator deems necessary. After
receiving "information on all aspects of the dispute", the arbitrator should
induce the parties to determine the main matters of the dispute precisely
and to restrict them to as few as possible. Then the arbitrator seeks to
bring about a compromise, suggesting such concessions and adjustments as
appear appropriate and fair. If the parties fail to end up with a compromise,
the arbitrator may present a draft settlement to them and recommend to
accept it within a short time limit (Kauppinen 1988). According to Sarkko
(1980) the arbitrator makes his own proposal in about 80 per cent of cases.
One very important feature of the arbitration process should be noted.
The parties are obligated to attend negotiations, but they are not obligated
to accept the proposal made by the arbitrator. In this sense Finnish wage
arbitration diers from the North American counterparts. However, there
are two crucial features transferring power to the arbitrator. First, there
is only one way to start a legal strike: parties are obligated to announce
the industrial action to the arbitrator and to take part in the negotiation
chaired by the arbitrator. Secondly, the arbitrator normally does not make
a proposal for an agreement until the very last moment before the work
stoppage is due. By postponing the oer, the arbitrator is forcing the trade
union and the employer to a situation. There are alwaystake it or leave it
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some xed costs when the strike or the lock-out starts: it is dicult to stop
a strike after it has begun. Thus the parties should think very carefully of
accepting the oer by the arbitrator.
The arbitrator has at least some power in the wage setting. The timing
of the proposal and the time limit for the answers may make further nego-
tiations before the work stoppage almost impossible. Sometimes, when the
solution of the dispute is quite near, the parties can agree on postponing
the stoppage for further negotiations. The possibility to continue negoti-
ations after a rejection of the draft settlement is considered undesirable.
Both parties may take the proposal by the arbitrator as a minimum for the
agreement and that may postpone the compromise. Hence, the arbitrator
tries to make his oer as late as possible. The topic is discussed in more
detail in Section 4.6.
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In 1980, approximately 97 per cent of collective bargaining agreements in the private
sector covering 1 000 or more workers include grievance procedures with arbitration
(Farber and Bazerman 1989).
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In the United States, arbitration is based on law, but it is ran as private
business. Actually, it is quite a large industry. It is estimated that there
were over 100 000 arbitration cases in the United States in the realm of
labour-management relations in 1985 (Bloom and Cavanagh 1987). The
North American practices have been widely studied and the bulk of theo-
retical studies are done in that context. Hence, it is natural to contrast the
Finnish arbitration system with its North American counterparts.
Arbitration is used in disputes ranging from labour issues to legal ques-
tions. Here the main emphasis is on labour market disputes. However,
one aspect of legal disputes is worthwhile to point out. An arbitrator is
typically selected at least to a degree by mutual agreement of the parties.
According to Ashenfelter (1987), the key determinant of the parties' prefer-
ences is usually the extent of the arbitrator's experience in deciding related
cases (see also Bloom and Cavanagh 1986a). In courts, however, juries
are selected because they have little experience with the type of dispute at
hand. Specically, they are expected not to have any previous knowledge of
the particular case in process. This suggests that arbitration is appealing
because a smaller risk is involved in resolving the dispute than would be in
a court decision. Later it will be argued, however, that the arbitration is
riskier than agreeing.
Most labour contracts in the United States have an arbitration procedure
to settle disputes that arise in the course of administration of the agreement
( ). The most common form of in
North America is the so-called . In conventional
arbitration, the arbitrator is free to set any wage he or she desires and the
parties have to honour the decision.
The use of arbitration is in some cases based on law. This is typical in the
case of public sector wage disputes where the right to strike is restricted, e.g.
grievance arbitration interest arbitration
conventional arbitration
4.3.1 Forms of arbitration
4.3 Arbitration in North America
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According to Freeman (1986), by 1981 twenty States had specied that arbitration
is used to determine the terms of labour contract among public sector employees where
the parties cannot agree. According to Ashenfelter and Currie (1990), half of States have
arbitration statues covering some group of public employees. The nal-oer arbitration
is in use in six States (Farber 1980).
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in bargaining between municipalities and re brigades, police corps etc.
The use of arbitration can also be based on mutual agreement. For example,
Ashenfelter (1987) mentions the practice in New Jersey. The parties opt for
conventional arbitration when they agree mutually to adopt this procedure,
while nal-oer arbitration is used otherwise.
In the arbitrator's behaviour is restricted. He or
she should choose one of the last oers by the parties if the negotiation
breaks down. The idea behind this procedure is to make extreme demands
more costly. The parties are forced to take into account the trade-o be-
tween the probability of winning and expected size of the victory. After
some experience of the use of conventional arbitration in the public sector,
it was argued that the arbitrators tend to simply split the dierence be-
tween the last oers by the parties. If that kind of behaviour is recognised
by the parties, they will adopt a strategy to demand as much as possible
to maximise their utility. Thus the conventional arbitration procedure does
not encourage compromises.
A strike imposes costs on parties directly in form of lost wages and
production. Although arbitration may also impose direct costs (Ashenfelter
and Currie 1990), the primary channel through which nal-oer arbitration
imposes costs on parties is fundamentally dierent. It is the uncertainty
concerning the arbitrator's award combined with the risk-aversion of parties
which is hypothesised to make nal-oer arbitration a costly alternative.
(Farber 1980)
Ashenfelter and Currie (1990) also mention , which
has been in use in Iowa since 1974. In this form of arbitration, the arbitrator
may also choose a fact-nder's position.
In Canada, the right to strike is limited. Both in the private and in the
public sector it is necessary to go through some form of non-binding third-
party mediation before a strike or a lock-out can be legally declared (Currie
and McConnell 1991). In this sense the system resembles the Finnish one.
About one-third of the contracts were negotiated under the compulsory
arbitration statutes. Most collective bargaining statutes allow two parties
to agree voluntarily to use binding arbitration. Conventional arbitration is
practically the only form of arbitration in use.
Very often in economic analyses it is implicitly assumed that the dis-
nal-oer arbitration
tri-oer arbitration
CHAPTER 4. FINNISH WAGE ARBITRATION - THEORETICAL COMMENTS
14
14
A similar procedure is used in Eugene, Oregon (Crawford 1979 and 1981).
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pute is one-dimensional: there is only one parameter, e.g. the wage rate,
in the agreement. There is another possibility leading to one-dimensional
bargaining: if utilities of the parties depend on parameters of agreement
in exactly the same manner, the problem reduces to one dimension. Both
cases are very unlikely. Finnish collective agreements normally consist of
roughly one hundred pages of text. Moreover, the negotiating parties value
working conditions and pay increases very dierently. According to Craw-
ford (1981) is widely used in the United
States. In this case, the arbitrator is permitted to design his or her settle-
ment from the components of the parties' nal oers. As an alternative
solution to the problem, Donn (1977) and Crawford (1979) suggest a pro-
cedure called . In this form of arbitration,
the parties are asked to submit more than one oer. If the parties agree,
the agreement becomes nal. Otherwise, the arbitrator announces which
agent has made the most suitable oer. Then the other agent must choose
one of the rst agent's oers. As result, the solution is more likely to be at
the Pareto-frontier.
The discussion of advantages of dierent arbitration schemes begun when
nal-oer arbitration was started in the 1960's. The mechanism for settling
disputes determines not only the terms of agreement in all cases but also the
probability of reaching an agreement without using the dispute settlement
mechanism (Farber and Bazerman 1986). Arbitration procedures can be
ranked by three criteria: the quality of the settlements they generate when
negotiations break down, their freedom of bias and the extent to which they
generate negotiated settlements (Crawford 1981).
Crawford (1979) showed that in a zero-sum setting the most commonly
used obligatory arbitration schemes are equal if the award by the arbitrator
is certain and known to the parties. In conventional arbitration, whatever
negotiated settlement was proposed by one party, the other party would
always do better to wait for the arbitration award. Hence, all outcomes
would coincide with the arbitrator's will. Assuming that the arbitrator
selects the nal-oer closest to his or her notion of a fair settlement, the
same result holds also for nal-oer arbitration. Whatever oer is made by
one party, the other could always do better to propose something between
the oer and the arbitrator's most preferred wage. Hence, both parties are
issue-by-issue nal-oer arbitration
multiple nal-oer arbitration
4.3.2 Conventional vs. nal-oer arbitration
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led to agree on the arbitrator's preferred wage or see it imposed by the
arbitrator. (Ashenfelter and Bloom, 1984)
An outside observer would interpret this as a success of arbitration. The
parties are eager to agree and costly strikes can be avoided. However, this
is illusory because the very nature of bargaining is dierent. The parties
are forced to follow the line of the arbitrator and they agree only to avoid
direct costs of the arbitration.
If preferences of the arbitrator are stochastic or not perfectly observed
by the negotiating parties, there is a distinction between the arbitration
systems. Also, if the arbitrator extracts information on the case from the
oers of the parties, the system of arbitration matters.
As Currie points out, it is dicult to draw any inference about the
eect of arbitration on wages simply by comparing wages under dierent
forms of arbitration. States with a high wage level may be more likely
to adopt arbitration statutes (Currie 1989, see also Currie and McConnell
1991). The same criticism applies to the argument put forward by Bloom
and Cavanagh (1987). They point out that arbitration usage rates are not
notably dierent in those States with conventional arbitration provisions to
those with nal-arbitration provisions. There have been several attempts to
avoid the aforementioned sample selection bias and the question is studied
by laboratory and eld studies. According to Farber and Bazerman (1989),
nal-oer arbitration leads to higher negotiated settlements rates.
As already noted, nal-oer arbitration was developed in response to
criticism of conventional arbitration. It was argued that conventional arbi-
tration awards tend to be compromises between the parties' nal positions.
If the arbitrators really split the dierence between the last oers, the re-
sulting situation would be very unfavourable (Feigenbaum 1975 and Feuille
1975). Parties would have an incentive to maintain polar positions in the
negotiation to inuence the arbitration award most favourably.
Bloom (1987) lists several reasons why the arbitrator would split the
dierence between oers. First, making a mechanical compromise between
the parties may be an optimal strategy for the arbitrator who wants to show
fairness. Second, it is a potential way to shirk. Third, if the nal oers
contain useful information on the case, it is wise to use that information.
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that an arbitrator can extract any information
from the oers without any reference to exogenous data. If this is the case,
the optimal arbitration awards will not be simple compromises, but rather
functions of both the oers and the facts.
Bloom also mentions a strong opposite argument. If the parties can
forecast the oer by the arbitrator, their negotiations will take place over a
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See also Crawford (1982a).
However, it can be noted that extreme oers do not exist. This is evidence against
"splitting-the-dierence" behaviour.
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settlement that is near the expected oer by the arbitrator. For example,
if the arbitrator is favourable to the trade union, the last oers are centred
around the expected arbitration award. The arbitration decisions may ap-
pear to be mechanical compromises of the parties' nal positions, although
the causal relationship may be reverse.
If the behaviour of the negotiators is really aected more by the arbi-
trators' expected award than the award is aected by the oers of the ne-
gotiators, there are also other important consequences. First, if nal-oer
arbitration is more eective in solving the disputes, this is only because
the arbitrator is more eective in dictating his or her preferences to the
negotiating parties than in other forms of arbitration. Second, as Farber
(1980) points out, there is a trade-o between the incentive for negotiations
and the quality of arbitrated awards . Maintaining a high degree of un-
certainty to promote reaching negotiated settlements is a good mechanism
for reducing reliance on nal-oer arbitration. However, if the agreement
is not reached, uncertainty will result in extreme awards.
The problem at hand is dicult to study empirically . The relationship
between the last oers and arbitration awards may be simultaneous for
aforementioned reasons. Bloom (1987) and Farber and Bazerman (1986)
used simulated cases to avoid simultaneity bias and asked real arbitrators to
oer awards. Bloom concluded in his statistical study that the arbitrators
do give weight to the facts, but dierent arbitrators act so dierently that
the weight tends to show up as random noise.
According to Farber and Bazerman (1986), conventional arbitration
awards seem to be weighted averages of the facts and the oers. The
weights seem to be dependent on the quality of the oers. Because -
nal oer awards are aected by facts and oers very similarly than the
awards in conventional arbitration, Farber and Bazerman conclude to the
arbitrators determine their awards without reference to the particular form
of arbitration in use.
In addition to the theoretical studies, there are several empirical studies
available. Chelius and Dworking (1980) studied salary disputes in major
league baseball in the United States. They conclude that nal-oer ar-
bitration is an eective strike substitute and impasse solution technique.
4.3.3 Empirical analyses
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It is interesting to note that this observation does not raise any criticism against
arbitration by the authors. The same comment applies to Faurot's and McAllister's
study (1992).
Currie and McConnell point out, however, that they have looked at only one dimen-
sion of the cost of disputes: the length of strikes. Moreover, they have neglected all other
aspects of contracts than the wage change.
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Burgess and Marburger (1993) concluded, however, that most arbitrated
settlements in baseball dier signicantly from settlements negotiated by
players of comparable value. This evidence suggests that bargaining parties
retain substantial freedom to negotiate their own settlements. On the other
hand, this means that most nal-oer awards are of "low quality" in the
sense that they lie outside the range of negotiated settlements .
Currie and McConnell (1990) conclude in their study of public sector
contracts in the United States that if the aim of collective bargaining legis-
lation is to reduce disputes, granting workers the right to strike is the most
eective policy. While the incidence of strikes is the same under arbitra-
tion and the right to strike, arbitration hearings are more common under
arbitration systems. Strikes are the shortest under compulsory arbitration
and longest when strikes are legal. They note also that the form of collec-
tive bargaining legislation seems to have no eect on the negotiated wage
increase. Hence, it is possible that substituting compulsory arbitration for
the right-to-strike would be welfare-improving .
Currie and McConnell (1991) got similar results using Canadian panel
data of public sector contracts. They found out, however, that wages are
higher under compulsory arbitration than under a right to strike or without
any collective bargaining legislation.
Currie (1991) studied contracts between teachers and school boards in
the Canadian province of British Columbia. She found out that the variance
of arbitral wage rates is systematically lower than the variance of wage rates
which were freely negotiated. Currie's interpretation of her nding is that
arbitrators co-ordinate their awards.
It is known that the arbitration awards are not evenly distributed in the
binding arbitration. Ashenfelter (1987) and Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984)
presented data from New Jersey police disputes. According to the data,
employers have won only about one-third of the nal-oer decisions during
1978-1980. According to Ashenfelter, this is not dicult to understand.
Using the mean award from conventional arbitration cases as a benchmark,
he argues that the oers of workers have been closer to the mean of arbi-
trators' preferences. Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984) noted that nal-oer
arbitration leads to lower average wage increases than does arbitration un-
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The data covers the years 1976-1983.
The arbitrator exchangeability hypothesis states that arbitrator decisions contain
an unpredictable component. The unpredictability is the key element of the
acceptability of awards. Ashenfelter argues that the arbitrators with predictable bias
are ruled out by the selection process. Only "random" enough arbitrators are accepted
by the parties.
ex ante
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der conventional rules. They concluded that what the union bargainers
gave up, therefore, by way of a decrease in the mean award under nal-oer
arbitration, they may have made up by a reduction in its variability. Brams
and Merrill (1991) suggested that one way to account for this conservative
behaviour by labour is to postulate that labour, but not management, per-
ceived itself as receiving a bonus for winning. If winning is attractive
enough, the union would behave like observed.
In the public sector of Iowa , the employer side has won in two-thirds
of the cases. However, also in Iowa the winning party has been closer to
the recommended awards elsewhere. According to Ashenfelter, these results
support the .
Bloom and Cavanagh (1986a) showed some empirical results on choosing
arbitrators. Trade unions and employers seem to have similar preferences.
They are in favour of lawyers, more experienced arbitrators, and arbitrators
who seem to have favoured their side in the past. However, the parties do
not agree on every issue. The employers' side has a strong preference for
having economists as arbitrators while the trade unions are against them.
per se
arbitrator exchangeability hypothesis
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The topics dealt with in arbitration vary from simple wage questions to com-
plex issues in working conditions, in working time and in workers' rights
to participate in management. The negotiation issues may be multidimen-
sional even in pure wage setting: there may be dierent wages for dierent
groups of workers or perhaps a special wage for weekends and night shifts.
And also, when piece rates are in use, rules for calculating the rates are
needed. These rules can be quite knotty.
In what follows, however, the analysis is restricted to one-dimensional
wage questions. The choice is justied because wage questions are dicult
enough to understand and analyse even in the one dimensional case. The
interplay between wage and working conditions and other issues can be
analysed successfully only after the more simple questions are answered.
In this study I attempt to argue that it is fruitful to analyse dier-
ent wage setting institutions by asking which purpose a certain institution
serves. In the context of the Finnish wage arbitration system, one may
ask if the system serves some general principles of good labour market per-
formance. Answering that question requires discussion on the features of
desired performance. In the present section I will ask what is the right
wage level? The nature of the problem forces us to restrict our analysis to
micro-economic questions. The growth aspects or business cycle considera-
tions are now bypassed and the question is dealt with as a micro-economic
bargaining problem.
An intrinsic element in wage determination is that the size of the cake
to be divided depends on actions taken by the rm and the workers. If
a co-operative solution is not reached, production may prove impossible
or output may turn out to be unsatisfactory. The problem is very often
analysed with the concepts of the Pareto-frontier or the bargaining set,
see Figure 4.1. The axis in the gure are and , utilities of the rm
and the worker. Depending on the case, the utilities can also be dened
as aggregates. may denote utility of the employers' association and
aggregate utility of the workers or the trade union.
In the most simple case, utilities can be written as a function of wage
V U
V U
4.4.1 What is the right wage level? - A micro-eco-
nomic view
4.4 Towards understanding arbitration
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In general, the utilities may depend on other factors inuenced by wage level, e.g.
on employment and on the production level. For example, the utility of the trade union
may be = ( ( )), where ( ) is labour demand. Function ( ) is then a
reduced form of ( ( )).
Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) discuss the proper interpretation of reser-
vation utilities. They argue that the utilities should reect the utility during the dispute
(when time preference matters) or the utility if the bargaining breaks down (when risk
of negotiations breaking down matters).
U U W;L W L W U W
U W;L W
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Figure 4.1: Bargaining set and Nash-point
level . We assume that is selected from the real axis, and that the
utility functions are continuous and twice dierentiable. If no agreement
is reached, no production takes place and the utilities of the parties are
determined outside of the model. The rm's reservation utility is denoted
by and the reservation utility of the workers is . The Pareto-frontier
is a border for the bargaining set. Points at the Pareto-frontier, i.e. at the
contract curve, can be calculated by solving the following problem for every
.
max ( )
s.t. ( )
(4.1)
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If functions ( ) and ( ) were linear, the Pareto-frontier would be a straight
line.
U W V W
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By denition the Pareto-frontier is ecient, i.e. it is impossible to increase
utility of an agent without decreasing utility of another agent. However, if
no agreement is reached, utility allocation ( ) would take place inside
the Pareto-frontier.
In what follows, it is assumed that the utility functions satisfy the fol-
lowing properties .
( ) 0 ( ) 0
( ) 0 ( ) 0
(4.2)
Then the Pareto-frontier

 argmax ( )
s.t. ( )
(4.3)
has the following properties

 0 
 0 (4.4)
As a consequence, the bargaining set is convex.
The nature of the reservation utilities implies that no allocation with
smaller than or with smaller than are agreed upon. There are still
innumerable alternatives because the utility functions are continuous and
the wage is selected from the real axis.
Which point at the contract curve or at the Pareto frontier is reached?
The question can be stated positively as well as normatively. How are the
points selected in the real cases? Which point should be selected in an
ideal case? Bloom's and Cavanagh's notion " ... maximise the disputants'
welfare ... " requires dening how the preferences are aggregated (see page
78). What is the right wage?
The questions raised are very complex and have been discussed widely
in social philosophy. The solutions for the problem oered by the axiomatic
co-operative game theory are the most valuable here.
Nobel laureate John Nash introduced the by speci-
fying a list of properties that a bargaining solution should satisfy (1950). If
there is a unique solution that satises a given list of axioms, i.e. theoretical
requirements, then the solution is said to be by the axioms
(see introduction in Conley and Wilkie, 1994).
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The solution should not change when original utility function ( ) is replaced by
function ( ) + ( ), 0.
For a detailed exposition, see Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Chapter 15).
The problem can be extended to the non-convex sets, see discussion below.
An alternative way to solve the problem is to dene the iso-loci for the maximand.
The equation
( ) ( ) = 

denes implicitly the correspondence between and for every 
. Iso-loci are rect-
angular hyperbolas. The Nash-point can be determined by selecting the highest 
 such
that the corresponding pair ( ) belongs to the bargaining set. The corresponding
hyperbola is asymptotic to the Pareto-frontier and the Nash-point belongs to both loci,
see Figure 4.1 at page 92.
Later, the Nash solution has been generalised for variable bargaining powers and
more than two bargainers. See references in Osborne and Rubistein (1994).
u x
u x a bu x b >
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Nash required that the solution must satisfy four conditions. First, the
solution must be . This axiom means that outcomes in-
ferior to the disagreement outcome are ruled out. The second axiom requires
that the solution should be invariant to of
the utility functions . The third axiom requires : the outcome
should not favour one of the bargainers. Fourth, the solution should be
. This implies that if the bargaining
set is reduced such that the original solution point still belongs to the set,
the original point should remain as a solution .
Nash showed that if the set of alternatives is convex and if the prefer-
ences are "well-behaving", there is a unique solution that satises the ax-
ioms. The solution maximises the product of the bargainers' utilities when
the utilities are measured as deviations from the utilities obtained when
the noncooperative outcome is realised. In a context of wage bargaining
the problem can be formulated as follows .
max ( ( ) ) ( ( ) )
(4.5)
The maximand is called Nash product and utility pair ( ( ) ( )),
where solves Problem (4.5), is called Nash-point.
The Nash axioms and the corresponding solution is not the only possible
way to solve the bargaining problem. Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) gave an
alternative list of plausible axioms and showed that the solution satisfying
the list is equivalent to sharing the benets resulting from co-operation.
The Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions to the general bargaining
problem are valuable as such. They show that a set of intuitively appealing
U W U V W V
W
V W ;U W
W
   
individually rational
positive ane transformations
symmetry
independent of irrelevant alternatives
e
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The concept of implementation is discussed in Section 4.5.
See, for example, Binmore's article in Binmore and Dasgupta (1987) or Binmore,
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986).
Rubinstein (1982) and Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) have constructed
games implementing the Nash solution and Moulin (1984) implementing the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution. Also generalised axiomatic solutions for non-convex bargaining
problems (allocations are chosen from a non-convex set of feasible allocations) have been
found. For implementation of Nash extension, see Kaneko (1980), Herrero (1989) and
Conley and Wilkie (1994). Other axiomatic solutions for non-convex problems are stud-
ied in Anant, Mukherji and Basu (1990), in Howard (1992) and Conley and Wilkie
(1991).
Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) show that if the risk that the negotiations
break down goes to zero in a game of alternating oers, the limit of the unique sub-game
perfect equilibrium is equivalent with the Nash solution discussed above. Moreover, if
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axioms leads to a unique and easily calculable co-operative solution. How-
ever, without any further justication, the solution have only normative
value and nothing guarantees that the solution actually is realised. Co-
operative solution concepts would be more appealing for theorists if one
found plausible noncooperative grounds for the solutions. However, the
ultimate test for relevance of any theoretical concept must be empirical.
If a plausible noncooperative game with an equilibrium corresponding
to the co-operative solution exists, it is said to implement the solution
concept. Nash (1953) himself started to examine noncooperative grounds
for his solution concept. He showed that there is a noncooperative game
with an equilibrium corresponding to his axiomatic solution. The bar-
gaining game was quite articial and, worse still, had multiple equilibria.
Moreover, Nash's procedure requires that the designer of the noncoopera-
tive game knows the utility functions of the agents. This is quite a strong
assumption. It is preferable to design the rules of the noncooperative game
such that for any prole of the agent's utilities unknown to the designer, the
equilibrium payos are unique and coincide with the allocation determined
by the axiomatic solution (Conley and Wilkie, 1994).
The Nash Programme , i.e. showing that the axiomatic solution to
the bargaining problem can be implemented by constructing dynamic non-
cooperative games, has advanced very remarkably since publication of the
seminal paper by Nash . The problem of multiplicity of equilibria can be
avoided by requiring that the strategies of the players should be sub-game
perfect. In short, the agents should have an incentive to follow the equilib-
rium strategies during the course of the game. If this perfectness is required,
there are games with a unique noncooperative equilibrium that corresponds
to the co-operative bargaining solution .
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the delay between the oers goes to zero, a similar result is obtained.
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The Nash solution or the corresponding implementation games are not
intended to be realistic descriptions of actual decision making in society.
However, the analysis of arbitration may benet much from the advances
of the Nash Programme.
Analysis of Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) clearly show the
factors that aect the outcome in a noncooperative bargaining game. The
more impatient the player is, the less he gets. Similarly, if there is a risk that
the "cake" disappears during a bargaining delay, the more risk-averse party
will suer and get a smaller share of the "cake". Moreover, because the
outside option, described by utilities and in our example, aect the
outcome, the bargaining outcomes favour people with favourable starting
points. It can be concluded that wealthy people with large amounts of
capital can expect a good outcome from any bargaining. They are capable
of waiting and they can tolerate more losses than poor people.
The co-operative Nash solution is actually a powerful concept with very
strong implications. If the agents in the real world are concerned only
with maximising their own welfare and if they interact according to rules
of the game, the Nash bargaining solution emerges without any outside
intervention. The resulting utility allocation fulls reasonable criteria and,
what is most important, the allocation is ecient. The solution is intuitively
appealing because it takes into account relative power of the bargainers
and the noncooperative game implementing solution explains the sources
of bargaining power. By doing this, the solution escapes many caveats of
social choice theory, where normative theories like the Rawlsian maximin
principle lack a avour of realism.
There is, however, a remarkable paradox involved in the implementa-
tion games. Noncooperative games implementing the Nash solution and
other co-operative solutions have shown the factors aecting the allocation
resulting in bargaining. By doing so, they have also shown why the imple-
mentation of the co-operative solutions in the real world is so dicult or
even impossible. Implementation games assume complete information, i.e.
the bargainers are expected to know the preferences of the opposite party.
However, in the real world that kind of an informational requirement is
seldom satised. Informational asymmetry and the results of implementa-
tion games imply that the parties have an incentive to signal that they are
patient, risk-neutral and that they have good outside options available. As
a consequence, the bargainers have strong incentives not to follow the rules
of the implementation games.
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The relation between labour and capital cannot fully be understood if it is studied
only as a trade between two independent agents. History does matter, the parties are
fundamentally dependent on each other, there are intrinsic asymmetries in the relation,
and what is the most important, the wage relation is also a power relation. However, the
topic of this dissertation is not the long term "class struggle" between labour and capital,
but "everyday life" of labour and capital. Hence, the issues raised by aforementioned
authors are the relevant ones.
An often cited early reference is Hicks (1963).
If the parties were risk-averse and had identical expectations about uncertain arbitral
settlement, then there would be a non-empty contract zone (Ashenfelter and Currie 1990,
Farber and Katz 1979).
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Though micro-economic theory has proposed good candidates for the
right wage level, it is likely that they are dicult to realise in the real
world. The outcomes may be inecient or there is risk that the
bargaining breaks down and a labour market dispute emerges. The latter
option is causes ineciency. Reasons for ineciencies are discussed
more carefully in the next subsection.
Analysis of the arbitrators' behaviour cannot go very far without asking
what is the ultimate reason for labour market disputes (Farber 1980, Far-
ber and Bazerman 1987). More generally, economists ask why are there
delays in agreeing and why are sometimes mutually benecial agreements
not reached (Kennan and Wilson 1993).
Without arbitration labour market disputes are solved by industrial ac-
tion (Farber and Bazerman 1986). The action normally ends with an agree-
ment, but sometimes the cake disappears before it is divided; the rm goes
into bankruptcy before the deal is reached. Arbitration is not a denitive
solution to the problem; strikes exist though they may be illegal.
Farber and Bazerman (1987) listed ve possible reasons for labour dis-
putes. First, the parties may have divergent and relatively optimistic ex-
pectations regarding the ultimate outcome if they fail to agree . If the
, i.e. the range of wages which both parties prefer to disagree-
ment is empty, there is no way of reaching an agreement. The contract
zone is determined by expectations of the disagreement outcome and the
risks involved in disputing . Assuming that systematic dierences in ex-
pectations are independent of the type of arbitration scheme, then the size
of the should be a proper measure of
ex post
ex ante
contract zone
identical-expectations contract zone
Divergent expectations or asymmetric information?
4.4.2 Reasons for labour disputes
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Moreover, Bloom and Cavanagh (1987) noted that the steady-state rate of arbitra-
tion usage seems to vary between 15 and 30 per cent in States with compulsory interest
arbitration laws. According to the authors, it is unlikely that the bargainers would con-
sistently be overly optimistic about the size of an arbitration award in the context of
what is essentially a repeated game.
The average estimate for the probability to win was 68 per cent. In reality, only 50
per cent of the last oers can win.
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the likelihood of an agreement in actual cases where expectations may dif-
fer. However, the calculations of Farber and Bazerman (1989) showed that
these zones are larger in conventional arbitration, but the settlement rates
are higher under nal-oer arbitration. This is evidence against the diver-
gent expectation theory . On the other hand, Neale and Bazerman (1983)
show that in experimental negotiation situations negotiators systematically
overestimate the probability that they will be successful in arbitration .
Divergent expectations are also challenged at the theoretical level. Ken-
nan and Wilson (1993) reviewed recent studies of asymmetric information.
According to them, persistently diering expectations can explain any be-
haviour except the absence of learning. Furthermore, if the parties learn
from past mistakes, the divergence disappears. According to the authors,
dierent expectations can be reduced to dierent sets of information (see
also Ashenfelter and Currie 1990). Hence, the reason for a bargaining im-
passe must be found in the existence of private information.
Kennan's and Wilson's main argument is that the need to nd out
private information of the opposite party is the fundamental reason for
bargaining delays or labour market disputes. The uninformed party may
"screen" or the informed party may "signal" information. The authors
conclude (Kennan and Wilson 1993, page 92):
Situations in which the parties' expected payos exceed the ob-
tainable gain are usually interpreted as indicative of divergent
expectations. Here and more generally, however, they reect
merely that the parties condition their expectations on dierent
information.
Learning is the second point on Farber's and Bazerman's (1987) list of
the potential explanations of disputes. However, they are not convinced
about the signicance of asymmetric information. They refer to the obser-
vation of sizes of identical-expectations contract zones and the assumption
that the size of the zone is a measure of cost of disagreeing. The larger
size of the zone under conventional arbitration is not consistent with the
fact that there is less disagreement in nal-oer arbitration. Learning in
4.4. TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING ARBITRATION
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The same contradiction is also evident in the discussion on reasons for strikes. Strikes
can be interpreted as results of mistakes or to the contrary, strikes can be seen as infor-
mation revealing tools. For references and empirical results, see McConnell (1989).
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the form of disputes is costlier in conventional arbitration and thus disputes
should exist less frequently than in nal-oer arbitration. As a conclusion,
Farber and Bazerman state that asymmetric information is not a sucient
explanation of disagreement.
The aforementioned discrepancy in interpreting importance of asym-
metric information has a crucial implication . In the literature of labour
economics, all forms of labour market disputes have been seen as inecien-
cies. Work stoppage causes losses in production, bad industrial relations
reduce eort and care, an inadequate quality of production and delays ruin
the market for products etc. Kennan and Wilson dier radically from this
traditional labour economics view. According to them, a wasteful conict
is in some situations a necessary implication of each party's incentive to
exploit the advantage of its private information. This kind of thinking has
its roots in Myerson (1979). He demonstrated that eciency can be
incompatible with the incentives of the parties in the bargaining.
In an imaginary command economy, all trades known to have positive
gains could be dictated and the costs of delays could be avoided. Creating
this kind of environment is a controversial and unrealistic project. Ken-
nan and Wilson argue that in the larger social context, ineciencies caused
by delays and failed agreements are costs imposed by the reliance on the
privileges of private property when in fact the parties have dierent infor-
mation and some monopoly power. For example, strikes are tolerated in
some countries to ensure that workers are not disadvantaged.
Kennan and Wilson mention Scandinavian countries explicitly as an
opposite example. According to the authors, the larger social interest is
invoked to justify occasional intervention in strikes in the Scandinavian
countries. Similarly, binding arbitration is dictated by law in most countries
for workers in critical occupations and the public sector. (Kennan and
Wilson 1993, page 47)
As a conclusion, it can be noted that the argument put forward by Kennan
and Wilson is an interesting standpoint, but it cannot be taken literally. In
specic, I think Kennan and Wilson have gone too far in their conclusions
in three respects.
First, the right to strike and the binding arbitration dictated by law are
extreme options, but not the only alternatives. The use of arbitration is
ex post
ex ante
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See also Calmfors and Drill (1988) or other articles in Pekkarinen, Pohjola and
Rowthorn (1992). Alesina and Perotti (1997) and Summers, Gruber and Vergara (1993)
are more recent studies.
The seminal papers are Schelling (1956) and Crawford (1982c).
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often based on mutual agreement. In many cases, the arbitration laws are
at least tacitly accepted by the trade unions.
Second, the observation that in the Scandinavian countries the right
to strike is limited does not take all aspects of the situation into account.
As Therborn (1992) and Rowthorn (1992) argue, the Scandinavian coun-
tries are characterised by corporatist structures . Incomes policy is an
important part of wage determination and the trade unions are accepted as
negotiation partners in a wide range of political issues. Hence, limitations
in the rights to strike are agreed upon at least in an implicit way. Similarly,
as I pointed out in Section 4.2, the Finnish arbitration system is accepted
by the trade unions.
Third, informational superiority of conicts, claimed by Kennan and
Wilson, can be questioned. In principle, the arbitration systems can be de-
signed to be more ecient in revelation of private information. For example,
in the following sections it will be argued that the Finnish arbitration sys-
tem creates a similar incentive to agree and make concessions that does
the threat of work stoppages. Moreover, in the Finnish system it is always
possible to obtain the same information that is available if there is no ar-
bitration. Both sides of the conict may check "the hard facts" of dispute
by rejecting the oer by the arbitrator and by initiating a work stoppage.
The third possible explanation for labour market disputes, mentioned by
Farber and Bazerman (1987), is commitment . Bloom and Cavanagh
(1987) point out that the political pressure of the members makes conces-
sions costly and commitment by leaders of the trade union credible. Also,
it has been argued that bargaining may end with an impasse because an
arbitrator is useful as a scapegoat (Farber 1980).
The fourth explanation refers directly to the structures of arbitration
systems. The parties may avoid any concessions in the bargaining because
they fear that possible concessions are used as evidence in the arbitration
hearings. Farber's and Bazerman's (1989) nding that oers in conventional
arbitration are much further apart than oers in nal-oer arbitration is
supporting evidence for the argument.
In nal-oer arbitration, the eect of the oer on the arbitration award is
Other reasons for strikes
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The validity of experiments may be challenged. However, Olson, Dell'Omo and
Jarley show (1992) that arbitration awards in single-issue cases are substantially the
same as awards by the same arbitrators in actual cases. However, the awards dier in
multidimensional cases.
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more salient to the parties than in conventional arbitration. This "salience
theory" is the fth on Farber's and Bazerman's (1987) list. The authors
do not believe that the players in conventional arbitration situations can
see through the system and structure the game. The predictions of the
standard economic model, which assumes that the parties fully understand
the game, are likely to be awed.
I nd it dicult to believe that the negotiators are less informed about
the nature of strategic interaction than, say, monopolistic rms at the prod-
uct market. Wage negotiations are complex, but the same people are en-
gaged in them from year to year; many of them do it on professional basis.
Why should "bounded rationality" be more important in wage bargaining
than elsewhere? If Farber's and Bazerman's critique is correct, it applies
to a wide range of issues.
There is also some experimental evidence of the topic (Farber, Neale
and Bazerman 1990). They organised 114 undergraduate students to nego-
tiate articial labour contracts and the economic model predicted the be-
haviour of the negotiators quite poorly. The parties reached an agreement
in some cases where the economic model would have suggested that there
would be no contract zone. In addition, when the parties reached agreement
where there was a contract zone, the outcome was not always within the
zone. The authors conclude that the development of more complete models
of negotiation and bargaining that blend economic and behavioural theo-
ries is an important area for further research. I think that this conclusion
is plausible.
CHAPTER 4. FINNISH WAGE ARBITRATION - THEORETICAL COMMENTS102
In Subsection 4.4.1, I argued that the Nash co-operative solution is a nat-
ural candidate for a wage agreement. It takes into account eciency, one
possible denition of fairness and is "realistic" because it takes into account
relative powers of the agents involved in the bargaining. Nevertheless, it
is quite unlikely that the Nash solution can ever be implemented if the
informational assumptions of the implementation games are not realised.
The noncooperative models used in implementation of co-operative solu-
tions showed that the agents would have an incentive to signal that they
are patient, risk-neutral and that their utility is high during any conict.
Hence, the agents have an incentive not to follow the rules of the game.
The problem of asymmetric information can be seen as an even more
fundamental question. In Subsection 4.4.2 the argument put forward by
Kennan and Wilson was discussed. They argued that asymmetric infor-
mation is an intrinsic element in wage setting and that the expected losses
in production caused by work stoppages should be tolerated. Delays in
bargaining and all other types of labour disputes are useful because they
reveal important information. Thus Kennan and Wilson are critical of wage
arbitration and any other form of public intervention in wage setting.
The message of Kennan and Wilson can be put as follows. There is
a trade-o between and . The
authors seem to put much weight on informational eciency and claim
that work stoppages are the only way to screen fundamental information.
In the study at the hand, I would like to take a dierent route. Taking
informational problems seriously, I would like to ask if the Finnish wage
arbitration system is useful just because it gives the parties an alternative
way to signal their strength. There is no articial imperative not to start
a work stoppage, but many cases are solved without a strike or lock-out.
Perhaps the Finnish system can be seen as a compromise between ex ante
eciency and informational eciency?
Before embarking on the analysis of concrete models of the Finnish
wage arbitration system, the question of wage setting under incomplete
information is analysed from a wider perspective. Wage setting can be seen
as a social choice situation.
ex ante eciency informational eciency
4.5 Arbitration as an implementation issue
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In what follows, the notation of Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995, Chapter
23) is followed.
This assumption will be relaxed in Chapter 4.5.3.
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A social choice function describes what economic allocation or any other
social decision should look like. It is a function because it should, in general,
reect the fundamentals of society. Specically, preferences of the members
of society, at least when they are involved in decision-making, should aect
the choice.
Consider a general setting where independent agents should make a
collective choice from set of possible alternatives . There are agents,
indexed by = 1 . The agents dier from each other by their type ,
 . The type of an agent denes his preferences over alternatives in
, i.e. agent 's utility function is ( ), where . Note that the
sets  , = 1 may vary between the agents and thus the setting may
well be asymmetric.
In the wage arbitration case is a set of feasible wage outcomes. There
are two agents: the workers and the rm. Alternatively, the arbitrator can
be seen as a third player.
In the general social choice situation, the setting is assumed to be of
incomplete information . The types of agents are drawn from a commonly
known prior distribution ( ). Each agent observes privately pa-
rameter , but the observation is not made prior to the choice. The dis-
tribution function ( ) and the utility functions ( ) are of common
knowledge among the agents.
Preferences of the agents depend on the realisations of = ( ).
Hence, it is natural to require that the social choice should reect the real-
isations; otherwise the choice cannot be ecient. Such an ideal choice can
be formalised by dening a social choice function.
: 
 ( )
( )
Dierent agents may have very dierent views about how the decisions
should be taken. It is natural for all the agents to want to see that the value
X I
i ; :::; I 

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A is a function
, i.e. for each possible prole of the agents's types
there is a collective choice .
Social choice as a function of preferences
Denition 4.1 social choice function
4.5.1 Mechanism design: basic concepts
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The question whether an arbitrator seeks realisation of his own preferences or
whether he tries to maximise the parties welfare is actually a question about the form of
the social choice function. If the arbitrator chooses between the alternatives according
to his own preferences, value of the ( ) function is independent of the preferences of the
parties.
It may be worthwhile to note that voting is very seldom an unproblematic solution
to the social choice problems. Black (1948) showed in his seminal paper that voting equi-
librium can be guaranteed only if the preferences of the voters are single-peaked. Later
is has been shown that the voting equilibrium can be obtained in a multidimensional
case only under very restrictive assumptions.
Even if the labour market parties cannot nd a common view, the legislator of the
society may be able to do this. I argued that the contractual elements in deciding on the
arbitration rules are present in the North American and the Finnish systems. However,
it is clear that the rules are also inuenced by parliaments and other bodies presenting
wider social interest than the labour market parties present. The inuence of legislature
is evident in the Finnish arbitration system, but is not imaginary in the North American
arbitration system either.
f :
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of the social choice function is very sensitive to the value of their personal
parameter and independent of the values of the other parameters .
The problems with social choice functions are well known. The Ar-
row Impossibility theorem showed that if some very natural and appealing
principles are honoured, there is no universal way to aggregate private pref-
erences to social preferences (Arrow 1951). Arrow's impossibility theorem
does not, however, postulate that there is no way of making decisions at the
social level. Instead, other rules than mechanical aggregation of the private
preferences are needed when making social decisions .
One may ask if the problems associated with implementation of the
social choice functions can be overcame by avoiding specifying any mech-
anism, and instead negotiating an outcome once is known (Moore and
Repullo, 1988). Moore and Repullo note that circumventing the
choice may be ecient, but that in general, there may be
ineciencies. The authors seem not to realise all other problems associated
with ex post negotiations. Decision-making may in some cases be much
easier before the state of nature, i.e. individual characters of the agents, is
known. It might be helpful if the agents can credibly commit to follow a
certain rule when the individual characters are realised .
Despite of the fact that the exact form of the social choice function is
unclear, it is quite natural to require that it is ecient, i.e. that a social
choice function selects a Pareto optimal alternative given the agents' util-
ity functions ( ) ( ). Though the arbitrator may ignore the
preferences of the parties, there is no reason to assume that he tries to
"punish" the parties by wasting some resources when deciding on the allo-

u :;  ; :::; u :; 
ex ante
ex post ex ante
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See also the references in Hammond (1979a) and (1979b).
The constraint is often called an and the problem
an .
individual rationality constraint
incentive compatibility problem
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cation. However, it will turn out that it may be dicult to bring about, i.e.
implement, an ex post ecient outcome. Though the social choice function
may be , the ultimate realisations may be ineective.
Even if the social choice function can be agreed upon, it might be dicult
to implement it for two reasons. First, the agents may not be willing to
accept the allocation that the function determines. When decision-making
is decentralised, it may be dicult to reach an ideal outcome. In principle,
this kind of a can be solved by the
legal institutions of society. However in reality, the use of force is always
dicult.
The second problem is a more fundamental one to solve. When the
agents have some private information, implementation of one particular so-
cial choice function may be dicult or even impossible. Seminal analyses
are Hurwicz (1972,1973) . An agent may have an incentive not to reveal
his private information or perhaps to give wrong information about his true
type. As a consequence, the information revelation problem constraints
the set of social choice functions that can be successfully implemented. This
has been an impor-
tant issue in many elds of economics and decision theory recently. In what
follows, this problem of incomplete information is analysed more carefully
than other elements in implementation.
In general, it is preferable to have rules for a noncooperative game, such
that for any prole of the agent's utilities unknown to the designer, the
equilibrium payo vector is unique and coincides with the allocation deter-
mined by the axiomatic solution (Conley and Wilkie 1994). If such a game
exists, it is said to implement the solution concept. Designing the structure
that implement the social choice function is called a mechanism design.
The mechanism is designed before the types of agents are known. Thus,
in deciding the rules for the mechanism, the social planner has to anticipate
the behaviour of the agents. The best way to anticipate the choices is to
calculate equilibria of the game created by the mechanism. Hence, the social
ex ante ecient
decentralised decision-making problem
informationally decentralised decision-making problem
Decentralised decision-making
General implementation problem
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In specic, if there is a common time preference and the labour force is very spe-
cialised, the workers and the management of the rm may prefer the same rate of invest-
ment. If the investments are determined according to prots, then there is a possibility
of agreement. However, a possibility to behave opportunistically may ruin the possibil-
ity of consensus. That may happen if the trade union or the individual workers worry
about the possibility of the rm deviating from the agreement and using the saved money
for consumption, not for investments. Classical reference is Lancaster (1973), see also
discussion in Pohjola (1983), de Zeeuw (1992), Eriksson (1993) and Seierstad (1993).
Grout (1984) and van der Ploeg (1987) analyse an opposite case where the union is able
to deviate.
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planner knows that if he can choose a suitable set of rules for the mechanism,
rational agents may act in such a way that the allocation dened by the
social choice function realised. Implementation is unique if there is a single
equilibrium in the game created by the mechanism.
We noted that in the context of wage bargaining, a meta-contract of the
social choice function may emerge even if there are bitter disputes over
every particular wage agreement. It is possible for the workers and the
employers to agree upon general terms for a suitable division of income
that the rm generates. If a general agreement is achieved, then the labour
market parties actually form a collective mechanism designer. One may
ask if this possibility reduces the importance of possible multiplicity of
equilibria. It might be possible to agree upon the equilibrium which is
played if the mechanism can be agreed upon at rst hand. However, this
conclusion is not always justied because there may be a problem of time
consistency .
The multiple equilibria problem has been discussed actively in abstract
game theory. One approach is to assume that there is an individual, perhaps
one of the players, called the . He determines the focal
equilibrium in a game by publicly suggesting to the players that they should
all implement this equilibrium (Myerson 1991). Even though this suggestion
has no binding force, if each player believes that every other player will
accept the suggestion by the arbitrator, then each player has an incentive
to play according to the suggestion.
In many cases assumption of existence of a co-ordinating individual is
too strong, but the multiple equilibria problem looks very dierent if the
arbitrator is involved. The arbitrator may act as a co-ordinator of the wage
setting game and indicate an equilibria that is to be played. Hence, a wider
class of social choice function can be implemented uniquely than in a pure
focal arbitrator
Implementation with multiple equilibria
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For example, if in a multiple equilibria case there is only one equilibrium with pure
strategies and the others are based on randomisation, it would be natural to assume
that all the players select pure strategies. Myerson (1991, page 113) points out that the
cultural norms may also help to select a focal-point. In a context of wage bargaining,
it is clear that in societies with good industrial relations it is quite natural to select an
equilibrium with no work stoppage as a focal point if such a equilibrium is available.
This holds whether or not an arbitrator is involved.
The most robust equilibrium concept in game theory is the dominant strategy equi-
librium and we have good reason to believe that the agents really follow their dominant
strategies if such strategies exist. Dominant strategy equilibrium requires that every
agent selects a strategy that gives him at least as large a payo as any of his other
possible strategies for every possible strategy that the other agents might play. It should
be emphasised that choosing a dominant strategy does not require any knowledge of the
probability distribution of the types of the other agents. And also, it is optimal to act
according to dominant strategy even the rivals behave irrationally.
See Myerson (1991), pages 260-261.
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bilateral setting.
There is, nevertheless, no reason to exaggerate the dierence between
wage bargaining with or without an arbitrator. A may
emerge without a middleman if the common culture of the players makes
one of the alternative equilibria more natural than the others, or if the
payos in one particular alternative are much higher than in the others, or
if some of the alternatives are very unfair for some players. In addition, the
properties of the equilibrium strategies as such may give a focal status to
one of the strategies .
Transmitting information is an essential element of any kind of arbitration.
It is interesting to note a related theoretical result from abstract implemen-
tation theory, namely the (Dasgupta, Hammond and
Maskin, 1979, Green and Laont, 1977). According to this principle, if im-
plementation is based on a dominant strategy equilibrium or on a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium, any social choice function that can be implemented, can
be implemented such that the agents reveal their true preferences.
In a , the agents are asked to announce
their types and the social choice function is based on those announcements.
requires that at least one of the equilibria of the
mechanism is such that every agent tells the truth.
A mechanism is said to implement the social choice function ( ) inf :
focal-point eect
revelation principle
direct revelation mechanism
Truthful implementation
Truthful implementation
4.5.2 Incomplete information
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See Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979).
In Bayesian Nash equilibrium an agent is comparing the expected utilities resulting
in dierent strategies. A strategy of an agent is an equilibrium strategy if the agent
cannot increase his utility by changing his strategy given the strategies of the other
agents. In that sense the concept is quite robust, though it requires more information
and deeper belief on rationality than the dominant strategy equilibrium.
The dominant strategy equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium are called
here robust equilibria.
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dominant strategies if there exist dominant strategy equilibria of the mech-
anism, such that one of the equilibria corresponds to social choice. If a
social choice function can be implemented with a mechanism which asks
the agents to reveal their types and one of the dominant strategy equilibria
of the mechanism is truth-telling, the function is
. It turns out that the if the function ( ) is imple-
mentable in dominant strategies at all, it can be implemented by a mecha-
nism, in which telling the truth is an equilibrium .
A mechanism implements the social choice function ( ) in the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium if there are Bayesian Nash equilibria of the mechanism
such that one of the equilibria corresponds to social choice. The social
choice function is
if telling the truth is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct revelation
mechanism. All social choices implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium
are truthfully implementable (Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin 1979).
These results are of interest for the analysis of wage arbitration. As
far as social choice, i.e. wage agreement, is implementable with robust
strategies, i.e. with dominant strategies or in Bayesian Nash equilibrium
strategies, it can be implemented by saying: "You tell me your type, and
when you tell your type, I will play your optimal strategy." Thus, if the
arbitrator is powerful enough to implement the desired outcome, he then is
capable of forcing the players to reveal their types.
According to the revelation principle, it is enough to study whether the so-
cial choice function is truthfully implementable. If the answer is negative,
we know that the implementation is not possible with robust equilibria .
Hence, we have a necessary condition for implementability. But this reve-
lation principle does not provide a sucient condition, since the revelation
mechanism may have other, unwanted, non-truthful equilibria (Moore and
Repullo, 1988).
f :
f :
truthfully implementable
in dominant strategies
truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Truthfully implementable social choice functions
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A social choice function is dictatorial if there is an agent such that ( ) always
chooses one of 's top-ranked alternatives.
All results are not, however, impossibility results. If there are only two alternatives to
choose between, majority voting is implementable in dominant strategies, see Mas-Colell,
Whinston and Green (1995, page 875). Moreover, if the preferences of the agents are of
quasi-linear form, decisions on and nancing of common projects can be implemented
with dominant strategy equilibria. This is the so-called Groves mechanism, see Groves
(1973). Nevertheless, majority voting is not a relevant issue for wage bargaining if the
internal life of the trade unions is not dealt with. Moreover, wage arbitration is very
dicult to see as decision-making upon a common project.
All dominant strategy equilibria are automatically Bayesian Nash equilibria, but not
.
i f :
i
vice versa
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The requirements for a social choice function to be implementable with
robust strategies are quite demanding. The preferences of the agents sat-
isfy the . According to the property, an
agents' preference rankings should (weakly) reverse when his type changes.
This property can be stated in general form using lower contour sets (see
Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green 1995, page 872). Gibbard (1973) and Sat-
terthwaite (1975) have proved that under some natural assumptions only
can be implemented with a dominant
strategy equilibrium. The is a strong result
and together with the weak preference reversal property it convinced us
that arbitration cannot be based on a dominant strategy equilibrium.
It is thus not surprising that the implementation of Nash and Kalai-
Smorodinsky bargaining solutions for general bargaining problem require
more elaborated equilibrium concepts and more complex games than is the
dominant strategy equilibrium in a static setting. Moreover, what is more
important, implementation is based on games where the players observe the
type of the opposite side.
Example C.1 in Appendix C highlights the abstract conclusions above.
In this simple example, a constant wage is the only social choice imple-
mentable in dominant strategies.
Social choice functions implementable in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
can be recognised similarly. Because only truthfully implementable social
choice functions are implementable in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we need
only identify those social choice functions that are truthfully implementable.
Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a more demanding equilibrium concept
than the dominant strategy equilibrium . Hence, it is natural that a wider
class of social choice functions can be implemented in the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. For example, if the utility functions are of quasi-linear form,
and if the types of agents are statistically independent, there is always an
weak preference reversal property
dictatorial social choice functions
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
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ex-post ecient social choice function that is implementable in the Bayes-
ian Nash equilibrium . These conditions again are too restrictive and the
result does not change our main conclusion.
Example C.2 in Appendix C show that implementation of wage agree-
ments might be a very dicult task for the arbitrator. Even if the structure
of the example is very simple, the resulting conditions for implementabil-
ity are quite strict. If non-linear utility functions are used, the conditions
would be much more complicated.
One additional problem should be noted. Nothing guarantees that the
allocations corresponding to implementable choices are attainable if the
agents are free to withdraw from co-operation. Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) have shown that in a bilateral trade setting with risk-neutral agents,
there is no social choice function that is ex-post ecient and gives every
agent type a nonnegative expected gain from participation in trade and
is implementable in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Also this may be a
relevant point for wage arbitration.
Until now we have considered implementation in an incomplete information
environment. However, much of implementation literature studies the case
where each agent observes not only his own preference parameter , but
also the preference parameters of all other agents. Though the agents
observe all parameters, the observations are not veriable, i.e. no outsider
will observe any of 's. Hence, implementation cannot be done in the court
and, i.e. enforceable agreements are impossible.
Which kind of social choice functions are implementable under complete
information? Clearly, an increase in information cannot restrict the set of
implementable social choice functions more than the assumption of incom-
plete information does. All functions that are implementable in dominant
strategies equilibrium are implementable in complete information environ-
ment (Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995).
A corresponding equilibrium for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the com-
plete information case is the traditional Nash equilibrium. The mechanism
is said to ( )



f :
ex ante
implement the social choice function in the Nash equilibrium
Implementation in Nash equilibrium
4.5.3 Complete information
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The following example adopted from Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) shows
this clearly. In the game of announcements, the agents are asked to reveal the true
prole = ( ) to the social planner. It is agreed that if at least 1 agents
announce the same prole , outcome ( ) is selected. Assume that the true prole is .
Structure of the game guarantees that there is no incentive to deviate from announcing
true , because an individual deviation does not aect the outcome . However,
announcing any other is also equilibrium.
See reference in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) or in Moore and Repullo
(1988 and 1990).
Moore and Repullo (1990) complete the analysis of Maskin and show that there is a
necessary and sucient condition for an arbitrary social choice rule to be implementable
in Nash equilibrium if there are three or more agents. The authors also show that
necessary and sucient conditions for implementability in a Nash equilibrium in the
case of two agents are quite demanding.
Monotonicity requires that social choice function should reect the preferences of
the agents "continuously" enough.
No veto power condition says that if an outcome is top-ranked under by 1
agents, then must belong to ( ) (Moore and Repullo, 1990).
If is nite and contains at least three elements, if all agents have equal set of
possible preference rankings and if () = , then () is strongly implementable in
Nash equilibrium only if it is dictatorial.
  ; :::;  I
 f  
 f 

x  I
x f 
X
f X f
 
 
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if there is a Nash equilibrium corresponding to the selected social choice.
The mechanism is said to ( )
if, for each , every Nash equilibrium of the game
induced by the mechanism results in outcome ( ).
If the multiplicity of the equilibria is not seen as a problem, then any so-
cial choice function can be implemented if there are at least three agents .
However, implementation with multiple equilibria is not satisfactory and
strong Nash implementation is required. Maskin has shown in an un-
published paper, that only social choice functions can be im-
plemented strongly in Nash equilibrium . If 3, then a sucient
condition for ( ) to be Nash implementable is that ( ) satises the
monotonicity and the conditions . Monotonicity and no
veto power condition together are quite strong requirements .
Example C.3 in Appendix C explains why implementation wage agree-
ments is not easy even there is complete information.
The set of implementable social choice functions expands remarkably if
the game induced by a mechanism consists of several stages and if o-the-
equilibrium-path strategies are required to be credible, i.e. if the equilib-
f :

f 
I
f : f :

strongly implement the social choice function
in the Nash equilibrium
monotonic
no veto power
Implementation with dynamic games
b
b be
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Abreu and Matsushima (1992) show this if there are three or more players using
iteratively undominated strategies. If small nes can be levied on the agents, any social
choice function can be implemented exactly in the environment with three or more players
(Abreu and Matsushima, 1994).
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rium strategies are required to be sub-game perfect. Moore and Repullo
(1988) show that if there are three or more agents and at least one divisi-
ble private good ("money"), then choice function can be implemented.
Moreover, the authors show that if there is a possibility of sucient free
disposal of goods, the conclusion holds even there are only two agents. The
authors argue that the conditions are likely hold in "economic" environ-
ments, though the classical problems of voting etc. may be inconsistent
with the assumptions. Abreu and Sen (1990) have shown that the condi-
tions for implementability with sub-game perfect implementation can be
relaxed even more.
The power of multistage games in implementation is well-known in ab-
stract game theory. Axiomatic bargaining solutions can be implemented
with dynamic games when perfectness of the equilibria is required. More
generally, almost any feasible payo allocation that gives each player at
least his security level can be realised in an equilibrium of the repeated
game. These kind of results are known as .
The multistage games with (sub-game) perfect solutions are complicated
and are quite unrealistic in their structure. This is not a major problem
when general conclusions are drawn for an abstract theoretical purpose, but
it is dicult to assume that the games are actually used to implement the
wage agreements proposed by the arbitrator. Moreover, a sub-game perfect
solution requires that the players are capable of seeing the structure of the
game and to forecast rationally how the other agents react in each stage of
the game.
The most serious problem with implementation in dynamic games is,
however, the one mentioned already in Subsection 4.4.1. In a dynamic
setting, the agents have an incentive not to follow the rules of the game if
there is incomplete information. All agents try to signal strength, and as a
consequence, the setting collapses.
In addition to the multistage games with sub-game perfect solutions,
other of equilibrium concepts may also solve the problem with
multiple equilibria. In general, these solutions require that the players
choose their strategies more carefully than in a normal (Bayesian) Nash
equilibrium . Though the structures of the games are not as complicated
as in the case of multistage games, the rened solution concepts are very re-
strictive. It can be questioned whether players in the real world are capable
any
folk theorems
renements
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Alternatively, the same is true if the multiplicity of equilibria is solved with
renements.
A similar result is obtained even if there is complete information and the implemen-
tation is based on Nash equilibrium.
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of avoiding iteratively dominated strategies.
The Nash solution or the corresponding implementation game are not in-
tended to be realistic descriptions of actual decision-making in society. Nev-
ertheless, these studies are of great value as they highlight the factors aect-
ing the division of imaginary cakes. Time and risk preferences of the agents
are decisive. It should be remembered that the results of implementation
games for the Nash bargaining are obtained in a complete information set-
ting.
If the dynamic games of complicated structure and with detailed rules
are allowed , and if the agents observe the same facts, implementation of
almost any wage function is possible. Nevertheless, if one looks at more
realistic decision-making situations, conditions concerning information and
farsightedness of the agents may be too demanding.
In the real world, implementation operates in an incomplete information
environment. If the agents are required to use dominating strategies or
follow Bayesian Nash strategies, and if the uniqueness of the solutions is
imperative, then the set of implementable social choice functions is very
small.
Examples given in Appendix C show that it is not enough to ask the
labour market parties to reveal their preferences. In a context of wage
setting with incomplete information, a constant wage is the only imple-
mentable choice if implementation is based on dominant strategy equilib-
rium . Bayesian Nash equilibrium is capable of supporting a larger set of
wage functions if the utility functions of the players are linear in wage.
The results of Rubinstein (1982) and Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1986) explain why agents in the real world signal their strength by delaying
the arbitration process or by starting a work stoppage. Moreover, it might
be very dicult to force the agents to follow the rules of the game. This
is a decentralised decision-making problem, referred to already in Subsec-
tion 4.5.1, which has very little, perhaps nothing, to do with informational
problems. The agents may simply refuse to follow the rules of the game if
they think that the rules work against their will.
4.5.4 Arbitration and implementation
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The discussion of implementation theory gives us an important lesson. If
one takes into account the above-mentioned theoretical factors, it is not
dicult to understand why implementation of ecient and justied social
choices is so dicult in the real world. We are back asking the same question
with which the discussion was started. Either unsatisfactory wages are
tolerated or a risk of work stoppages are accepted. Third, and the most
relevant alternative in the Finnish case, is that wage setting institutions are
aimed at producing a compromise between the conicting targets.
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However, discussion on what might be the objective function of the arbitrator or,
more generally, what is the economic function of the whole arbitration procedure, is
postponed until Section 4.7.
See Gu and Kuhn (1998) for thorough discussion about holdouts.
In the Finnish labour market system there are many levels of agreements. General
agreements dening the basic rules of negotiations may still be in force though there is
no wage contract in force.
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The operation of the labour market is aected by the authorities in all
industrial countries. To understand why, it is interesting to ask which
social or economic function the intervention serves. My hypothesis is that
the rules of the Finnish wage arbitration system are designed to reduce the
risk of work stoppages. To serve that purpose, the rules of arbitration should
imitate the properties, especially the costs, of labour market disputes.
The discussion of the previous section shows that with simple games and
simple strategies, complex wage functions cannot be implemented. Hence,
it is reasonable to expect that the wage setting game should have a com-
plicated dynamic structure. I would like to suggest that the actual form of
the Finnish arbitration system is a compromise between optimal game and
the realities of the labour market. Perhaps the peculiar rules of the Finnish
arbitration system can be seen as an imperfect version of the even more
complex dynamic game capable of implementing ecient wage agreement
without any risk of strikes.
In the North American arbitration systems, the decisive power of the
arbitrator is guaranteed by the rules of arbitration; the arbitrator sets the
wage. The rules of the Finnish system are more complicated. Before en-
tering into the analysis of usefulness of arbitration, I will show by using a
simple game theoretical model that also the Finnish arbitrator can inu-
ence the wage outcome. Though the model is simple, it captures the main
elements of the Finnish arbitration system .
The negotiation between parties typically starts before the old agree-
ment ends. However, it is quite normal that there is a holdout , i.e. a pe-
riod without a collective agreement . If the disagreement continues and the
negotiations do not terminate, one or both negotiating parties announces a
strike or a lock-out. The announcement of a work stoppage is done to the
4.6 A model of the Finnish wage arbitra-
tion system
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A large share of all arbitration cases are disputes at industry-level collective
bargaining.
Note the link with the analysis presented in Chapter 3.
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opposite party and to the oce of the arbitrator. It should be done at least
14 days before the strike or the lock-out is due. After the announcement,
the negotiations continues with the arbitrator, who acts as a chairperson.
Arbitration starts as conciliation and the arbitration oer is done as late as
possible. This gives more leverage to the arbitrator. The negotiators know
that if they do not reach a settlement before and without the arbitration
oer, they would be in a situation. A rejection of the
arbitration oer leads to work stoppage.
If the work stoppage takes place, there are always some xed costs. Even
if the agreement is reached just after the beginning of the strike or the lock-
out, it will take several hours to distribute information to all rms . Firms
and industries with continuous production processes are more vulnerable to
short strikes than, say, retail businesses or cleaning work . For example, it
takes several days to stop a paper mill. When there is threat of a strike, the
process of running down the mill is started more than 24 hours before the
strike is due. If the strike starts, it is very costly to restore the production
process although the strike may last only a few hours. Hence, rejection of
the oer by arbitrator is an important move and backing down is dicult.
In what follows, it will be demonstrated that the assumption of xed costs
is essential in the model, it helps simplify the model substantially. As a
consequence, the model describes more accurately arbitration in the sectors
of economy with continuous production processes.
The negotiation period of fourteen days is modelled simply as a pair
of simultaneous wage oers ( of the game) and a pair of
simultaneous replies ( ). If the employer or the trade union
accepts the oer by the opposite party, the game ends and a settlement
is reached. A special rule is needed for the case when both parties accept
the oer by the opposite party. By following the patterns of the North
American arbitration studies, it is assumed that wage is then an average of
the oers.
If both parties reject the oer by the opposite side, the arbitrator makes
his arbitration oer at the very last moment ( of the game).
If one or two of parties reject the arbitration oer in of the
game, the work stoppage starts, otherwise the arbitration oer becomes a
settlement.
take it or leave it
the rst phase
the second phase
the third phase
the fourth phase
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The Finnish arbitration system deals with disputes at the industry and the rm
level. Thus we use here the words "employer" and "rm" interchangeably.
In reality this cannot be the case. Both parties know that their behaviour during
negotiation and arbitration aects the beliefs of the opposite party and thus the be-
haviour of the opposite party during a work stoppage. Also, the outcome of a strike is
always uncertain; otherwise it would be very dicult to understand why there are strikes.
However, the assumption is justied as a rst approximation. The full structural model
dealing also with the sub-game starting from the beginning of the work stoppage would
be too complex to analyse. In addition, the notion of expected utility in the case of
strike is an index describing the expected wage after the work stoppage, utility during
the dispute and the cost of uncertainty associated with the duration of the strike and
with the settlement after the strike.
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The utility of the trade union is denoted by and it depends on the wage
as follows.
( )
0
( )
( )
0 (4.6)
The utility of the employers is also a function of wage.
( )
0
( )
( )
0 (4.7)
In the North American arbitration literature, the preferences of arbitra-
tors are not explicitly dealt with. According to the arbitrator exchangeabil-
ity assumption, the arbitrator's awards are designed so that both parties are
ready to hire him or her again. In the Finnish system of arbitration, there
is no hiring problem as the arbitrator is a civil servant. However, he cannot
behave partially. Otherwise the losing party would refuse to participate in
arbitration and the whole system would threaten to collapse. As already
mentioned, the aim of this model is to show that the arbitrator is capable of
aecting the wage outcome. For this purpose, it is enough to assume that
the arbitrator's preferences can be described with the following relation.
settlement
without arbitration
settlement in
arbitration
work
stoppage
(4.8)
To simplify the model, the utilities in the case of a strike are assumed to
be xed . The trade union's utility in the case of work stoppage is denoted
by . For the rm, is used for the same purpose. Equivalent wage levels
are dened as follows.
= ( ) (4.9)
U
dU W
dW
> ;
d U W
dW
dV W
dW
< ;
d V W
dW
U V
u U U


 
4.6.1 The economic model and notations
( ) ( ) ( )
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The order of moves can be reversed without any consequences.
It was assumed that if both parties accept the oer of the opposite side, the average
of the oers is agreed upon.
118
= ( ) (4.10)
Immediately, it can be concluded that if the contract zone is
empty and the strike cannot be avoided. In other words, if the strike-
equivalent-wage for the trade union is higher than for the rm, there is no
room for agreement. Trade union's oer is denoted by and the oer by
the employer by The arbitrator's award is . In what follows, it is
assumed that the contract zone exists and that it is larger than a single
point, i.e. .
An extensive form of the game is shown in Figure 4.2. The game starts with
simultaneous oers by the parties. It is modelled assuming that the rm
moves rst and oers Then the trade union demands , without
observing the move by the rm. In the second phase the oers become
public and there is again a pair of simultaneous moves. The trade union
either accepts (denoted by ) or rejects (denoted by ) the oer of the
rm. The rm does the same without knowledge of the decision of the
trade union. The game ends and the wage is agreed upon if at least one of
the parties accept the oer by the opposite side. Otherwise, the arbitrator
makes his oer and the parties respond simultaneously again. The
oer is ratied as a settlement if both parties accept it, otherwise the
work stoppage starts. The small circles in the gure are decision nodes
and the numbered squares on the right hand side of gure are end nodes.
Information sets are depicted with dotted lines.
The game is solved from the end; this guarantees a sub-game perfect
solution.
. The solution of the sub-game which starts after the
arbitrator's oer is simple if at least one of the parties has accepted the
oer by the opposite side. Then strategies of the players have no eect
anymore and the wage settlement is (end nodes 5{8), (end nodes
9{12) or ( + ) 2 (end nodes 1{4) .
If both parties have rejected the oer of the opposite side, the arbitra-
tor's oer matters. The sub-game ending with nodes 13{16 can be analysed
in a normal form, see Table 4.1. If the arbitrator's oer lies inside the zone,
there are two Nash-equilibria in the game. Both either reject the oer or
v V V
u > v ;
w
w : W
u < v
W : W
Ac Re
W
W
W W
W W =
The fourth phase
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If the oer is at one end of the zone, i.e. if = or if = there would be
two perfect equilibria. In one of the equilibria, the oer is accepted and in the other,
the work stoppage starts. If the oer lies outside the zone, there is only one perfect
equilibrium and that is a strike.
W u W v ;
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Figure 4.2: The extensive form of the game
accept it. However, equilibrium ( ) is not perfect because strategy
dominates for both players. Hence, it can be concluded that the fourth
phase of the game ends with the oer by the arbitrator as a settlement if
the oer is on the contract zone .
As already noted, the arbitrator's oer does not matter if
one or both of parties have accepted the oer by the opposite side. If not,
the arbitrator may oer any wage satisfying
(4.11)
and the work stoppage can be avoided. The arbitrator can credibly com-
Re;Re
Ac
W
u < W < v
The third phase.
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Table 4.1: The fourth phase of the game
mit to do this and in what follows, it is assumed that the is known
beforehand.
. The negotiators respond simultaneously to wage oers
by the opposite side. Again this game can be analysed in the normal form,
see Table 4.2. If both negotiators accept the oer of the opposite party,
the average realises. If only one of the parties accepts, the oer of the
opposite party is agreed upon. The strategy combination ( ) leaves
the question in the hands of arbitrator. Because the arbitrator tries to
avoid work stoppages and the contract zone is not empty, becomes a
settlement in this case.
The equilibrium of the second phase depends on relative sizes of
and Table C.1 in Appendix C (page 169) displays all Nash-equilibria
and perfect equilibria of the second phase. As far as , the size
of does not aect the equilibria, though it aects the best response
mappings. In the equilibrium, both parties accept the oer of the opposite
side and the average of the rst phase oers realises. If = , then the
size of determines which equilibria is perfect. However, all the outcomes
are equal in terms of utilities: the rm gets ( ) = ( ) and the trade
union ( ) = ( ). When is smaller than , the oer by the
arbitrator really has an eect. As far as , the only perfect
equilibria is ( ). If the arbitrator's oer is weakly superior to the oer
of the opposite side for both players, both parties cannot do better than to
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Table 4.2: Second phase of the game
reject the oer of the opposite party. If the arbitrator's oer lies outside
the range of oers by the parties, the party with the oer closer to is
better o.
The parties are assumed to decide their oers simultane-
ously, without knowing the move by the opposite party. Both parties know
that their oer aects how the game is played in the latter phases. For
example, the trade union knows from Table C.1 that if it demands a lower
wage than the employer oers, then in the second phase the average of the
oers is agreed upon. Figure 4.3 illustrates the same information that is
available in Table C.1. It is easy to see from the table that the best reply
mapping for the trade union is
and (4.12)
For the rm's oers which are smaller than or equal to the arbitration award,
the trade union may demand any wage higher or equal to the award. For
the rm's oers higher than the trade union may demand any wage
such that . Similarly, the best reply mapping for the rm is
and (4.13)
The xed point of these mappings is the set
(4.14)
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There are four perfect equilibria in the second phase. In three of these, the oer of
the opposite party is accepted and in one, both parties reject the oer by the opposite
side.
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Figure 4.3: The rst phase of the game
All points in this set correspond to an equilibrium. Figure 4.4 displays best
reply mappings and xed points of the mappings.
In the equilibrium, the employer side oers a lower or the same wage
as the arbitrator is going to oer. Similarly, the trade union demands the
same wage as, or higher than, the arbitrator proposes. Only if both demand
exactly the same wage, that is only if = = , there is a possibility
that the oers are accepted without arbitration. Otherwise there is always
an arbitration hearing which ends with the oer by the arbitrator. This is
accepted by the parties in the fourth phase of the game.
The model predicts that the threat of arbitration has a strong eect on
the parties. The outcome is always such that a strike is avoided and the
wage is the same as the arbitrator's oer, i.e. for the equilibriumwage holds
= (4.15)
However, this wage may be agreed upon in various ways and the model does
W W W
W W :
45Wu
aW fW
aW
Best reply
for the trade
union
Best reply
for the firm
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Figure 4.4: Best reply mappings for the game
not predict how likely these alternatives are. All the equilibria are ecient
from the point of view of the labour market parties because no arbitration
costs are assumed. If the utility of the arbitrator is taken into account, all
the equilibria are not equivalent. According to Equation (4.8), there is a
utility loss if the parties cannot agree without the arbitrator's involvement.
The model analysed in this section is simple and is not intended to be
an accurate description of the Finnish arbitration system. The aim of the
exercise was to show that also in the Finnish arbitration system, the will of
the arbitrator matters if the contract zone is non-empty and the arbitration
award is known and there is no uncertainty about it. In this sense, the
analysis corresponds to Crawford's (1979) analysis of the North American
arbitration systems.
The main deciency of the model is that it does not explain why ar-
bitration is useful, i.e. what are the economic or the social functions of
arbitration. This question is addressed more carefully in the next subsec-
tion.
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In Section 4.4, the argument put forward by Kennan and Wilson (1993) was
reviewed and commented. The authors argue that the costs of labour dis-
putes must be balanced against their informational benets. They claimed
provocatively that strikes resulting from the right to strike are fair costs of
reliance on the privileges of private property. I argued that the authors have
gone too far; although strikes transmit relevant information, there is no rea-
son not to allow parties to avoid dispute costs. Voluntary incomes policy
is one way of dodging costs associated with work stoppages; in this section
it will be argued that the unique features of the Finnish wage arbitration
system is the second. Using a modied version of the model presented in
Section 4.6, it will be shown that the Finnish arbitration system increases
the costs associated with bargaining impasse. However, it helps circumvent
the most expensive options, the strike or the lock-out.
The model presented in Section 4.6 was simple. It could explain why the
arbitrator may aect wages even though there is a right to strike. However,
the fundamental issue of usefulness of the arbitrator still remains. The
arbitrator eectively sets the wage and there is no incentive to try to avoid
arbitration. Actually, in the negotiations before ocial arbitration, there
was no reason to agree because the arbitration did not cause any costs. In
this section this assumption is relaxed and the uncertainty with arbitration
is explicitly dealt with.
It is dicult to study consequences of arbitral uncertainty in the model
presented in Section 4.6. The problem is technical. Assume that the nego-
tiating parties are risk-averse. Then there are wage levels and dened
as follows.
= ( ) (4.16)
= ( ) (4.17)
and are expected utilities of the parties if the wage is determined by
the arbitrator, but stochastically. Immediately it follows from the assump-
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Risk-aversion implies that, for the trade union, a deterministic wage is equiva-
lent to a stochastic wage with a higher expected value. Similarly, the rm prefers the
deterministic wage to a wage distribution with a lower expected value.
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tion of risk-aversion that . Because the arbitrator wants to avoid
strikes (see preference relation (4.8)), the distribution of arbitration awards
is bounded: all awards must satisfy condition (4.11). Hence, it holds that
(4.18)
where is a mathematical expectation of the arbitration award. Now it
can be shown that the best reply mappings are not properly dened. For
example, the best reply to should be the highest wage that is still
smaller than . However, such a number does not exist.
The game analysed in Section 4.6 can be dened slightly dierently such
that the above mentioned problem disappears. Figure 4.5 illustrates a mod-
ied game. The second phase of the game is deleted and it is simply dened
that if the trade union demands the same as or less than the rm oers,
the average is agreed upon. Otherwise the case is arbitrated. Also, the
uncertainty of the arbitration award is modelled simply by substituting the
nature for the arbitrator. This is the so-called Harsanyi transformation
(Rasmusen 1989).
From Section 4.6 it is known that the oer by the arbitrator is accepted
if it lies inside the contract zone. This is always the case because the
distribution of the award was assumed to be bounded so that (4.11) always
holds. As a result, the new game with uncertainty can be analysed using
Figure 4.6. Points on the 45 line correspond to situations when both
parties propose the same wage. Points below the line are equivalent to the
situation when the trade union demands a lower wage than the employer
oers. Again, the average of the oers is realised. If the oers do not match,
and the demand of the trade union is higher than the oer of the rm, the
wage dispute is solved in arbitration. As it was shown already, in this case
the arbitrator may set the wage.
u < v
u < u < w < v < v ;
w
W < u
v
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Figure 4.5: Extensive form of the game with uncertainty
It is then easy to see that the best reply mapping for the trade union is
where = and
= and =
= = and
(4.19)
As long as the oer by the rm is lower than the wage equivalent to ar-
bitration award, that is it is optimal for the trade union to demand a
higher wage than the rm oers (set ). If the utility of the rm's oer is
equal to the arbitration utility, then the trade union may demand any wage
such that (set ). If the oer by the rm is higher than
then the trade union optimally demands exactly the same wage as the rm
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Figure 4.6: The outcomes of the game with uncertainty
oers (set ). Similarly, the best reply mapping for the rm is
where = and
= and =
= = and
(4.20)
The xed point of these mappings is the set
=
where = and
= =
(4.21)
The equilibrium set of the game consists of two subsets. The rst possibility
is that the trade union demands more than it expects from the arbitration
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( ) and the rm oers less or equal than . Then the arbitration
starts and the arbitrator sets stochastically somewhere between and
. The second alternative is that both players demand and oer the same
wage as the opposite party. This agreement should be between the wages
that the parties evaluate as indierent to the arbitration.
Both types of agreements are ecient. However, arbitrated
agreements are inecient . The parties' utility as a whole
can be increased if wages are set without arbitration. However, there is a
co-ordination problem: which wage should be agreed upon. This problem
is severe; the rm prefers to set = and the trade union prefers the
highest possible wage = . The co-ordination problem requires co-
operative behaviour.
In the Finnish arbitration system, there are features that are designed to
facilitate co-operative solutions. The obligatory period of fourteen days for
negotiations can be interpreted as an attempt to nd a co-operative so-
lution. Also, the arbitrator may act as a co-ordinator before last-minute
oers are made. However, as it was pointed out earlier, there is no guaran-
tee: the co-operative solution is sometimes reached before arbitration and
sometimes during arbitration, but often the solution is not reached at all.
A mixture of co-operative and noncooperative behaviour cannot be
analysed using formal methods of game theory. Nevertheless, the afore-
mentioned situation can be illustrated heuristically, see Figure 4.7. When
obligatory arbitration starts, the parties know that if they do not reach
an agreement co-operatively, the noncooperative game has the aforemen-
tioned co-ordination problem. Hence, it is very likely that it ends with
formal arbitration. The risk associated with arbitration means that point
( ) is not at the Pareto-frontier. However, it still lies to the right and
upward from the original threat point ( ). The parties have an incen-
tive to co-operatively choose one point on the Pareto-frontier, i.e. choose
wage level such that In this kind of heuristic expo-
sition, there is no reason to try to specify exactly how this co-operative
outcome is determined. In the gure, an iso-Nash-product curve is drawn;
the Nash-solution would be one natural candidate for the solution concept.
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is an alternative.
The uncertainty related to the arbitration award has an important func-
tion. Under certainty, the "contract zone" before the arbitration hearing
consists of a single point, i.e. = . The only possible co-operative so-
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The results obtained in this section were based on the assumption that the arbitrator
may randomise the arbitration award. Equivalently, it is enough that the negotiating
parties cannot forecast the arbitration award precisely. Then the rm and the trade union
would form an expectation about the arbitration award. Even if the expectations are
rational, i.e. even if the expectation errors are distributed around zero, the risk-aversion
of the parties causes the existence of a non-empty contract zone.
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Figure 4.7: Pareto-frontier of the wage setting game
lution would be = = = , where is the arbitration award.
Adding uncertainty changes the situation remarkably. Arbitration with
stochastic arbitration awards allows parties to make their deals freely even
though work stoppages can be avoided. The only costs are associated with
risk-aversion. Strikes and lock-outs would also cause real costs.
It should be noted that arbitrator's choice of type of uncertainty may
aect the wage outcome. By manipulating the probability distribution,
the arbitrator may be capable of moving the outside options and
disproportionately. If the co-operative solution is based on Nash or Kalai-
Smorodinsky bargaining, the location of disagreement points aect the out-
come.
A recent unpublished manuscript by Manzini and Mariotti (1998) devel-
ops a similar argument than the one put forward above. Using the abstract
bargaining model of Rubinstein (1982) as a point of departure, the au-
W u v W W
U V
Ex ante
ex post
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thors add a possibility of calling an arbitrator in. If both parties of the
negotiation agree, the arbitrator is called to divide the cake between the
disputants. Though arbitration is never used in a sub-game perfect equi-
librium, the possibility of calling the arbitrator in changes the bargaining
outcome remarkably. For example, the authors show that if the bargaining
costs are zero, any given division of the cake between the players can be im-
plemented. Moreover, if the division is suciently balanced (not favouring
one of the parties too much), implementation is unique. Though arbitration
has a function of increasing the parties' willingness to reach a negotiated
agreement, the analysis of Manzini and Mariotti points out an opposite
possibility. In their model, arbitration may generate inecient delays even
when the players have complete information about the behaviour of the
arbitrator.
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In this chapter, I have compared Finnish wage arbitration with its North
American counterparts. The similarity of the systems is not evident. The
arbitration award in the Finnish system is not binding and there is a right-
to-strike, whereas in USA and in Canada the arbitration award is binding
and work stoppages are illegal if arbitration is compulsory. However, I have
argued that the strategic behaviour of the labour market parties under
Finnish arbitration rules based on labour law gives the State Arbitrator
a lot of power. In the model analysed, the arbitrator can aect the wage
outcome by presenting a last-minute oer just before the work stoppage is
due to start. Hence, the arbitrator is capable of dictating any wage level on
the contract zone. The result should not be taken too literally, but it gives
some support to my hypothesis that the arbitration systems in Finland and
in North America have the same features.
The second main theme of the chapter was the analysis of the economic
and the social function of the Finnish arbitration system. I started the dis-
cussion from an analysis of the Nash bargaining solution. I argued that the
games used to implement the solution actually show why the Nash solution
is so dicult to reach in the real world. The parties cannot be forced to
play according to rules of the implementation games. This fact has very
strong implications if there is asymmetric information. The parties would
have an incentive to signal their patience and risk-neutrality by delaying
their moves or perhaps starting a work stoppage. By doing so, the parties
can expect to achieve a bigger share of the utility "cake" to be divided
between them.
I argued that the Finnish wage arbitration system can be seen as an
alternative way to achieve the same information that is attainable through
labour market disputes. However, arbitration is a better way to achieve
this because it is helpful in avoiding production losses. The risks which are
present in the labour market disputes can be imitated with smaller costs in
an arbitration procedure.
The third observation in the chapter was about the structure of the
arbitration process. The rules of the Finnish arbitration system, and the
games used to analyse it, are complicated. The process is based on proper
4.8.1 The Finnish system of wage arbitration
4.8 Concluding remarks
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timing of the consecutive moves by the parties. The complicated nature
of the arbitration processes is easy to understand if one observes the re-
sults obtained in implementation theory (Section 4.5). According to these
results, only very simple social choice functions can be implemented with
static games. If the multi-stage games with sub-game perfect strategies are
adopted, also more complex choice functions can be implemented. How-
ever, implementability requires that the parties can observe the relevant
facts behind the dispute, i.e. that there is complete information. This is
very seldom the case.
The comparison between theoretical implementation models and the
practice of wage arbitration suggests that the Finnish arbitration system
can be seen as an imperfect version of the even more complex dynamic
game capable of implementing ecient wage agreement without any risk of
strikes. The rules of the arbitration are a compromise between theoretical
requirements for a good system and practical possibilities.
The incomplete nature of the system implies that arbitration sometimes
leads to a work stoppage. Moreover, it can be questioned whether the
actual social choice rules followed in arbitration are ecient. It is also clear
that the arbitration award does not always reect fully the preferences of
the labour market parties. However, in general, there are good reasons to
believe that the outcomes in the labour market are better with the Finnish
arbitration system than without it.
It is very likely that there are less strikes and lock-outs because the
labour market parties can compare their "weights" without starting a work
stoppage causing production losses. The allocation is not, of course, iden-
tical to that would prevail after a strike, but at the same time the costs
associated with a strike are avoided and the parties may also divide this
extra utility.
The starting point of my analysis was to show that the arbitrator may aect
the wage outcome even in the Finnish systemwhere there is a right-to-strike.
The Finnish system was compared with its North American counterparts,
where the arbitrator has a right to set the wage. However, it might be
useful to note that the power of the arbitrator is limited also in the North
American system of binding arbitration. A successful career as a profes-
4.8.2 Feedback mechanisms in arbitration
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There are two main selection mechanisms for arbitrators. In both of them, an impar-
tial agency supplies the disputants a list of potential arbitrators. In the Alternate Strike
Mechanism, each party alternately cross a name o the list. The last name remaining
on the list is appointed as arbitrator. In the Rank-veto Mechanism an impartial agency
makes the appointment according to the rankings announced by the parties. In both
alternatives the arbitrators have a strong incentive to maintain a reputation of fairness.
In some disputes concerning female employees there has been criticism, but it has
never gone very far.
There is no information available on the awards in the Finnish system, but it is
known that the arbitration awards are not evenly distributed in binding arbitration (see
Subsection 4.3.3), but this does not seem to reduce the acceptability of arbitration.
Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984) argue that what the union bargainers give up by way
of a decrease in the mean award under nal-oer arbitration, they may make up by a
reduction in its variability. Brams and Merrill (1991) suggest that one way to account for
this conservative behaviour by labour is to postulate that labour, but not management,
perceives itself as receiving a bonus for winning.
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sional arbitrator requires that the disputants are willing to hire him . In
this sense arbitration and working of the courts dier fundamentally.
The Finnish arbitration system is somewhere between binding arbitra-
tion and the court system. The arbitrator is employed by the State and
his position is not directly aected by satisfaction of the negotiators. How-
ever, it is not as independent as that of the judges. As I have argued, the
working of the arbitration system is based on an implicit acceptance by
the employers and the trade unions. If the arbitrator loses his reputation
of impartiality, the whole wage setting system collapses. Hence, it is clear
that the State Arbitrator is replaced if one of the parties demands this to
be done. This has never happened and the impartiality of the arbitrator
has been questioned only few times . The right-to-strike feature in the
Finnish wage arbitration system is probably one main reason for this. If
the arbitration award is favouring one of the disputants, the another may
start a work stoppage.
In the binding arbitration system there is a risk of ending up with a lower
utility or a lower prot than would prevail in the strike situation. However,
even in that system, any arbitration award whatsoever is not possible. The
punishments for illegal strikes are limited and the ultimate constraint is the
situation at the labour market. If the arbitration award deviates too much
from the market wage, production ceases or the workers quit.
The authority of the arbitrator is limited in all arbitration systems. The
form and the strength of feedback may vary, but there are always certain
limits to the arbitrator's behaviour. Also in this sense the North American
and Finnish systems are not very dierent from each other.
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Arbitration procedures have become more common in the United States
recently. These are used to determine the terms of labour contracts in
almost all branches of the public sector. In the private sector, grievance
arbitration is the main application. In some cases, the parties have agreed
to solve disputes using an arbitrator.
The attitude towards wage arbitration is mainly positive in North Amer-
ican economic literature; the article by Kennan and Wilson (1993) is a
remarkable exception. However, there are only few recommendations to
introduce arbitration to a wider class of issues. This can be interpreted to
imply that authors are happy with the application domain of arbitration.
From the Finnish point of view, one may ask if we should follow the
American way and increase the use of binding arbitration. It is wise to avoid
overly strong conclusions, but the following comments are still justied.
First, the state of industrial relations is very dierent in Finland than in
the United States. Even on European standards, union coverage is very high
in Finland and has risen during the last years. As I have argued, Finnish
wage arbitration complements incomes policy. The arbitration boom in the
United States was parallel to the decline of unionisation. Binding arbitra-
tion can thus be seen as a substitute for trade union activity. From this
point of view, it is quite dicult to see how binding arbitration would t
with other features of the Finnish labour market institutions, which are
very dierent from those in the United States.
Second, the use of binding arbitration schemes in the public sector may
be an attractive option, because in many circumstances the employer role
of public authority is unclear. In specic, the interest of tax payers is not
always well-presented. On the other hand, there haven't been many bitter,
long lasting labour disputes in Finland recently; the present system seems
to work. However, one lesson from the American experience can be drawn.
If binding arbitration is introduced, it should be based on acceptance of
both parties. The awards by the arbitrator are valueless if the trade unions
do not accept the system.
Third, the concept of universal use of binding arbitration can be criti-
cised on the following grounds. Many authors have emphasised that arbitra-
tors try to relate their awards to the general wage development; agreements
in similar cases act as yardsticks. When the coverage of binding arbitra-
4.8.3 Is binding arbitration an alternative for Fin-
land?
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The Economic and Monetary Union of the EU may change the situation. Wage
developments in the other EMU countries as well as the ination target of the ECB may
provide a yardstick for the domestic arbitration awards.
The Australian wage setting system has been based on arbitration tribunals since
the beginning of the century (Hancock and Isaac 1992). When a dispute occurs, the
arbitration commission is rst required to encourage conciliation between the parties.
If the parties manage to reach an agreement, the commission will usually register it.
But if the parties fail to agree arbitration is compulsory and the award is given by
the commission. Either way the outcome is legally binding (Archer 1992). Hancock
and Rawson (1993) point out that voluntary agreements were aected by the parties'
awareness of the tribunals' norms. Although the system was originally very diuse, there
were several local arbitration commissions and it lacked formal co-ordination, it gradually
transformed to a system of centralised wage co-ordination. However, the system was
reformulated in 1992 and the Australian government seeks a more restricted role for the
tribunals.
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tion approaches 100 per cent, the outside reference level disappears . It has
been argued that the bargainers are likely to take into account the expected
award by the arbitrator. If the arbitrators follow the general development
and if this is determined by the awards of the other arbitrators, the re-
sulting system would be very strange. It is very likely that there would be
multiple equilibria. It is very dicult to see how that kind of system would
dominate the existing system.
Fourth, the indeterminacy of universal binding arbitration can be over-
come by changing the status of arbitrators. If arbitration is obligatory and
the parties cannot choose the arbitrators, the arbitration system may have
other yardsticks than "fairness" or "facts" for the basis of the awards. The
Australian wage setting system is an example of this kind development .
An important conclusion can, however, be drawn from the Australian expe-
rience. If binding arbitration spreads throughout society, it is very dicult
to say when arbitration ends and when incomes policy or wage control
starts.
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can hold only if . However, then = is larger than one as
1 Hence, . From Equation (2.26) one may observe that
0 if 0. Because 0 by Assumption 2.5, must be
positive.
(b) Expected prot is decreasing in .
(c) If + , ( ) = [ + ( )] ( + ( )) ( + ( ))
is positive only if ( + ( )) 0. Linearity of the production function
implies then ( + ( )) = 1. If + , ( ) = 0 and ( ) would
be negative regardless value of ( ).
(d) Because the rm is able to set = 0, a positive implies that expected
prot is higher with than without an insurance policy.
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The derivation of iso-prot lines was based on the assumption that all work-
ers are used equally in production, i.e. that = = = and
= = = . As a consequence, the model could be solved using
aggregate variables. However, the validity of this symmetry assumption
was not checked.
Let us dene that two workers 1 and 2 are equal if their eort is determined
by the same eort function ( ), i.e. if = ( ) for = 1 2
( ) 0
( ) 0
The following proposition can be stated.
( )
In the optimum, the wage bill is minimised subject to given produc-
tion . The following Lagrangian function can be formed:
 = ( )
= [ ]
(B.1)
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Let Assumption B.1 hold and consider a pro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where is the shadow price of the constraint and = ( ) From the
rst order conditions

= 1 ( )
( )
= 1 ( )
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= 0
(B.2)
( = 1 ) can be solved such that
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= =
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( )
(B.3)
Because of concavity of ( )
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=
( ) ( ) [ ( )]
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0 (B.4)
and Equation (B.3) can hold only if = = . In can be concluded
also that = =
The analysis can be concluded by noting that the use of aggregate vari-
ables in the analysis is legitimate if all the workers in the rm are identical
in respect of the eort functions. The closer inspection of the proof of
Proposition B.1 gives an additional result.
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The eort functions are of the form
such that
and
is a parameter and may reect any property of an individual worker
aecting the supply of eort.
The labour force of the rm consists of dierent sub-
groups , . All workers ( ) in sub-group are equal
such that , i.e. all workers belonging to sub-group
are equal in terms of eort functions.
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From Equation (B.3) it is known that eort-wage elasticities are
equal for all workers in the optimum. Partial concavity of ( )-function
in respect to for all guarantees that
1
( 
)
( 
)
=
1
( 
)
( 
)
can hold only if = .
According to Proposition B.2, if the rm is employs several types of workers,
the workers belonging to the same group are paid equally and they work
similarly, i.e. with the same eort and care. For example, male workers
in the rm have a dierent role in production than female workers if they
have dierent eort functions than female workers.
The utility function used in this chapter is a simplied version of the more
complex alternative
= log( ) ( ) ( )
where ( ) measures disutility of hours worked. If ( ) 0 and ( ) 0,
optimal labour supply is a solution to
1
( )
=
As a consequence, labour supply, i.e. supply of hours, is constant. Hence,
it can be neglected in the analysis.
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Let us dene the function ( ).
( ) ( ) (B.5)
Concavity of this function can be shown by calculating
( )
=
1
( )
( )
0 (B.6)
and
( )
( )
=
1
( )
( )
+
1
( )
( )
( )
0 (B.7)
The following derivatives are also obtained.
( )
= 1 (B.8)
( )
=
( )
0 (B.9)
( )
= 0 (B.10)
( )
=
( )
( )
0 (B.11)
Logarithmic eort of a rm having workers is
log( ) log( )
= ( ) + + ( )
(B.12)
If = = = and = = = and thus = = =
(see Proposition B.1 on page 155), then it is easily shown that
= ( ) (B.13)
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Assume that the opposite is true, i.e. that there are women working in the
rm with and men working in the rm with such that . In
Section 3.2 it was shown that prot is a strictly increasing function of the
variable , see Equations (3.13) and (3.23). This allows us to
write the equilibrium conditions:
(B.14)
In the equilibrium, prot of the rm using women should be at least as
high as prot of the same rm if men are employed. Hence, the variable
= should have at least as high a value as the variable .
A similar condition holds for rm using male labour. From Equation
(B.14) one may solve
( )( ) 0 (B.15)
If , then and thus . Note that Equation (B.15)
implies ( ), i.e. female workers work more eectively
than male workers and are better paid than men. In what follows, we show
that neither (a) nor (b) = can exist in the equilibrium.
Hence, it impossible for women to work in a rm with
(a) From Proposition 3.1 it is known that . From Equation (B.11)
one may note that
( ) ( ) (B.16)
if . Because the rm employs female workers with eort and
wage , the following must hold:
( ) ( ) (B.17)
From Equations (B.16) and (B.17) one can easily note that
( ) ( ) (B.18)
Clearly, cannot be an equilibrium. For the rm employing male
workers, it would be more protable to hire female workers, see Equation
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(B.18). With wage , female workers work more eectively than male
workers.
(b) From Equation (B.14) it can be seen that = implies that = .
Consider rm , i.e. the rm employing male workers. Prot of the rm
remains constant if eort is reduced by and wage by .
= ( ) ( ) (B.19)
The slope of the female iso-utility line at point ( ) is ( ).
Hence, all women working in the rm are ready to move to rm if eort
is reduced by and wage by . At the same time, prot of the rm is
unchanged. Hence, = cannot exist in the market equilibrium.
The analysis of market equilibrium can be done graphically, see Figure B.1.
Let us start the analysis by assuming that utility is for all workers. If
this is the case, rms may hire male workers and obtain ( )-combinations
described by function ( ). Function ( ) graphs the points
attainable by employing female workers. It is easy to see that these two
iso-utility curves cannot form the market equilibrium. The male workers'
eort function is on the right and above the female one. All rms would
prefer to hire male workers because prot increases towards left and up in
the gure. One may conclude that the utilities of dierent types of workers
cannot be equal in the market equilibrium. Moreover, utility of the male
worker must be higher than utility of the female worker. Otherwise the
male eort function is above the female one and excess demand of male
workers prevails.
Because female workers are homogeneous, they must all have the same level
of utility in the market equilibrium; this is denoted by . Hence ( )
is the equilibrium female eort function. Because male workers work more
eectively than female workers, it is intuitively clear that rms value them
higher. Utility of the male worker is , . Locus ( ) shifts down
when is increased because the derivative is negative, see Equation
(B.9) on page 158. The shape of the locus also changes because
is positive see Equation (B.11). It can be concluded that the equilibrium
locus ( ) is steeper than the hypothetical ( ). Moreover, it
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Figure B.1: Equilibrium with two genders
is located below the hypothetical ( ). In Figure B.1 the graphs of
( ) and ( ) cross. This is an essential element of market
equilibrium. If the graph of ( ) is never above ( ), then
female workers would not be hired by rms. Similarly, in the equilibrium
( ) should be above ( ) at least somewhere.
The next step is to determine , the equilibriummale utility. Its intuitively
clear that rms that value eort highly, and rms with low and thus high
employ males. At the other end of the rm distribution, workers are female,
thus is determined at the middle of the rm distribution. The last rm (
counting from the rm having the lowest ) still using male workers should
be indierent between using male or female workers. As a consequence, the
iso-prot line of the rm at middle should be tangential to locuses of the
functions ( ) and ( ). If is the eciency parameter
and thus the slope of the iso-prot line of the rm in the middle, then the
location of ( ) is determined such that = ( ) = ( ),
where is the wage paid if the workers are female and is the wage
paid to male workers. The location of ( ) determines uniquely.
The rms having nd their optimal ( )-combinations from the
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( ) function, at a higher wage than . Similarly, rms having
select the optimal points from the graph of ( ) . Firms
with atter iso-prot lines hire male workers and pay a better wage than
other rms because eort is important for them. Firms with steeper iso-
prot lines hire female workers because eort is not as important for them.
Also, it should be noted that women are ready to work at lower utility
than men. As a result the highest attainable eort-wage combination for a
female worker is and the lowest eort-wage combination for a male
worker is . Our assumptions determine that and .
(a) There are modern families only if + 2 holds when there is zero
measure of modern families, i.e. only if
2 + 2 + 2
see (iii) of Equation (3.61) and Propositions 3.3 and 3.4. The parameter is
determined according to the labour market equilibrium condition. Straight-
forward calculation using Equations (3.59) and (3.60) renders .
(b) The rms with [ ] employ members of the modern families only
if
2 + + 2 + 2
According to straightforward calculation, inequality may hold only if
+ +
If approaches , inequality holds only if approaches .
(c) The share of modern families approaches one only if + 2 holds
when the share of modern families approaches unity, i.e. when
2 + + 2 + 2
Note that gender gaps are determined according to the end-points of the
distribution. Straightforward calculation gives
+ +
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Proof of Proposition 3.7
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Note that + 2 by denition as (see Assumption 3.3).
(d) The results obtained do not depend on government eort nor the
parameter .
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Let ( ) be a social choice function in a situation with two agents ( = 2).
Assume that both agents have two possible types: is or and is
or . Truth telling is the dominant strategy equilibrium if
for = (C.1)
and if
for = (C.2)
and if
for = (C.3)
and if
for = (C.4)
where ( ) = ( ( ) ) is utility function of agent . Inequalities
(C.1) and (C.2) require that Agent 1 should nd telling the truth protable
in all circumstances and Inequalities (C.3) and (C.4) set the same require-
ment for agent 2.
Inspection of Inequalities (C.1) - (C.4) shows that these are unlikely to hold
in the context of wage bargaining. The only exception is the case where
165
f :; : I
   
 
u f  ;  ;  u f  ;  ;    ;  ;
u f  ;  ;  u f  ;  ;    ;  ;
u f  ;  ;  u f  ;  ;    ;  ;
u f  ;  ;  u f  ;  ;    ;  ;
u x;  u f  ;  ;  i




Example C.1
       
       
       
       
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
00
0 0 00
0 00 0
00 0 00
0 00
0 0 0 0 0 00
0 00 0 0 00 00
00 00 0 00 00 00
00 0 0 00 0 00
0 0 00 0 0 00 00 00
1 2
1 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 2 2
2 1 1 1 1 2
2 2 2
1 1 1 2 2 2
1 1 2 1 1 2
1 1 2 1 1 2
1 1 2 1 1 2
1 1 2 1 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
166
the wage does not depend on types of the agents. Assume that Agent 1 is a
worker. If his utility is strictly increasing in wage as it is very often assumed,
Inequalities (C.1) and (C.2) can hold simultaneously only if =
for = . If the utility of Agent 2, i.e. the employer, is
strictly decreasing in wage, it can be concluded that the only social choice
that can be truthfully implemented with dominant strategies is a constant
wage. Because only truthfully implementable social choice functions are
implementable in a dominant strategy equilibrium, a constant wage is the
only social choice implementable in dominant strategies.
Let ( ) be the social choice function in a situation with two agents ( =
2). Agent 1 is again the worker and Agent 2 is the employer and denotes
wage level. Both agents have two possible types: is or and is or
. is with probability and is with probability 1 . Similarly
is with probability and is with probability 1 . Assume that the
utility functions are of linear form: ( ) = and ( ) = ,
where is an uninteresting positive constant. Social choice function ( )
is truthfully implementable in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if inequalities
+ (1 )
+ (1 )
(C.5)
and
+ (1 )
+ (1 )
(C.6)
hold for worker (Agent 1) and if the similar inequalities hold for employer
(Agent 2).
Existence of truthful a Bayesian Nash equilibrium requires thus that
= = = (C.7)
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or that
=
1
=
1
(C.8)
It can be concluded that the existence of a truthful Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium and thus the implementability of can be guaranteed even if
the wage is not constant. However, the probabilities and restrict the
set of implementable social choice functions remarkably. For example, if
= = , then = , must hold for all , , and .
Let ( ) be a social choice function in a situation with two agents ( = 2).
Agent 1 is again the worker and Agent 2 the employer and denotes the
wage level. Both agents have two possible types: is or and is or
. is . Types are observable, but not veriable. Assume that the util-
ity functions are strictly increasing (Agent 1) and strictly decreasing (Agent
2) in wage = ( ). The social choice function ( ) is implementable
in Nash equilibrium if the inequalities
(C.9)
and
(C.10)
and
(C.11)
and
(C.12)
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hold. Strictness of the utility functions dictates that
and
and
and
Hence, for the Nash implementable social choice functions hold
= = = (C.13)
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A
B =
C = =
D =
E
F =
G
H =
I
Table C.1: The second phase of the game
W > W Ac Ac Ac Ac
W W < W Re Ac Re Ac
Ac Ac
W W W Ac Ac Ac Ac
Re Ac Re Ac
Ac Re Ac Re
Re Re Re Re
W < W W Ac Re Ac Re
Ac Ac
W < W < W Re Ac Re Ac
W < W W Re Re Re Re
Re Ac
W < W < W Re Re Re Re
W W < W Re Re Re Re
Ac Re
W < W < W Ac Re Ac Re
Size of Nash- Perfect
parameters equilibria equilibria
Trade Firm Trade Firm
union union
